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The Week

IN its immediate practical results, the Washington Conference may or may not succeed, but except in one unlikely event its reaction on American public opinion is almost certain to be profound and beneficial. It will arouse and enlighten American popular consciousness to the condition of the world, the sufferings and the problems of the peoples and its own vital relationship to these things. The mind of the American people needs both to be aroused and enlightened. During the war it was flogged and drugged into a condition of unwholesome and blind excitement, which momentarily submerged the barriers of distance and history and plunged the American nation up to its neck in European hatreds and loyalties. When the flogging and drugging ceased after the Armistice, the popular interest in European and in foreign affairs had been strained to the point of exhaustion, and it relapsed into a condition of apathy, indifference and almost impenetrable ignorance. The Conference will initiate the process of recovery. It will help all Americans with any powers of reflection to understand how intimate and inescapable the relationship of his country is to the sufferings, the privations and the perils of other countries, and yet how essentially different the relationship of the United States is from the relationship which any and all European nations bear to the same condition. That in general is what they need to know.

THE only event which might hinder American public opinion from being aroused and enlightened by the Conference would be the deliberate and the successful falsification of its discussions and decisions as the result of perverted publicity. No such falsification will occur. The administration neither desires nor intends to conceal from the European or American publics anything which they are entitled to know about the Conference. Some of its officials are indeed foolishly solicitous of guiding and controlling the attitude and behavior of American opinion. They do not understand that public opinion lives and grows by conflict and ferment and that when it is guided and controlled, as it was during the war, it becomes either hysterical or emasculated. But in spite of the almost morbid fear which the spokesmen of the administration are expressing that the American public will expect too much from the Conference and think too independently about it, the administration really proposes, we fully believe, to take the public into its confidence and to see that it gets access to the facts. Moreover, even if it did wish to misinform the American public by perverting and hiding what actually takes place, it would not have a chance of success. There will be so many delegates representing so many differing government inside the Conference and so many keen journalists on the outside that the whole truth will soon leak out. Considering the nature of the Conference and the temper of the occasion, and the traditions of the place, publicity will abound in Washington during the next few months as noisily and as ubiquitously as high explosive shells abounded on the western front during the war.

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IT is fairly certain that the worst stage of the Russian famine will not be reached until the end of this year, when, after the exhaustion of food stocks now on hand, the number of people who need relief will gradually increase until the next harvest. Considering the millions by which these people are numbered, one hopes that American help can soon be given them on a scale larger than at present. The Relief administration is now feeding only a few hundred thousand children, and at best plans to feed no more than a million regularly. Adults it cannot provide for. What is to be done? Mr. Hoover has asked Congress to allow the War Department to turn about four million dollars worth of medical supplies, left over from war stocks, for use in Russia. Can anyone dare oppose this humane plea or delay it? Relief supported by private gifts will never be sufficient. America can go far to heal the bitterness of old wounds if she generously gives of the war supplies she does not need.

THE assassination of the Prime Minister of Japan is doubtless symptomatic of the troubled violence of the public mind throughout the Far East, but it will not alter the position and the policy of Japan at the Conference. Japan is still governed by ruling clans whose power is exercised by a few authoritative leaders. They determine in general what the policy is to be, and no man who will not submit to this dictation has a chance of being Prime Minister. The kind of individual leadership which sometimes exists in the western democracies, the kind which Woodrow Wilson at one time practised in the United States and which Lloyd George and Briand each still possesses in his respective country, is not as yet possible in Japan. It will not become possible until a political and social convulsion overthrows the leadership of the Elder Statesmen and the rule of the clans.

BECAUSE a group of experienced and all powerful men, acting in secret, determine Japanese policy with respect to other nations, it has exhibited a rare continuity of purpose and the shrewd selection of appropriate methods. But of late some indications of vacillation and infirmity have appeared. The Japanese government in its treatment both of China and Siberia has backed and filled. Its policy of economic and political aggrandizement remains the same, but its rulers are not at all as sure as they were how far and how fast they can go. The conditions of success have changed radically from the days between 1906 and 1917 when they accomplished so many of their diplomatic successes. In those years they always possessed in a German and Russian alliance an alternative to their alliance with Great Britain. But now they have no such alternative. The American government is pressing them to define their policy towards China and Siberia at the very moment when the price of frankness may be isolation. Under these conditions differences of opinion and infirmities of tactics are certain to develop among the Elder Statesmen and the inroads which wealth and industry have already made upon the homogeneity of the ruling clans will encourage these dissensions. The rulers of Japan are still most formidable in their power, determination and adroitness; but they are fallible human beings who are being pushed into a tight place and who, no matter what they do will have to assume a dangerous loss. It remains to be seen how they will extricate themselves and which way they will take their loss.

THE proposal of Hugo Stinnes that the industrial leaders of Germany might furnish the government with a credit of two billion gold marks, in return for important concessions to business, will be seized upon by those who have insisted that Germany could pay if she would. German industry can not furnish anything it does not have, and if German industry is in possession of gold credits, why does not the German government appropriate them and apply them to its international obligations? The German government, like any other, is sovereign, and there are no theoretical limitations upon its right to draw upon the services and resources of those who are subject to it. No theoretical limitations: but we are living in something other than a theoretical world. Every government is limited, in practice, by the taxdodging capacity and the sabotage capacity of its people. These capacities are especially potent where a government lacks prestige, as the German government does in extreme degree. So long as the Allied powers insist on making the German government dance to every tune they play, they can not reasonably expect it to be strong enough to serve as an efficient agency of collection of the surplus of German production.

THE men who saw in the overwhelming victory of the Republicans a Heaven sent opportunity to roll the burden of taxation upon the necks of the consumers must be bitterly disappointed with the legislative bodies at Washington. Nothing has come out of tax revision, as yet, except the substitution for the excess profits tax of a corporation tax that is likely to prove far more onerous to business. All the hopes that have been reposed in

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the sales tax scheme, it now appears, are to be frustrated. The manufacturers sales tax was beaten in the Senate, 43 to 25, and the business sales tax was beaten 46 to 25. There remains, to be sure, the possibility that the sales tax plan will be revived as a means of financing the soldiers' bonus. But there is no comfort for the reactionary tax reformers in that prospect. What they wanted was relief from existing taxation, not the financing of new outlays.

IT sticks in the craw of the Times that Debs will have to be pardoned, if at all, without acknowledgment of the error of his ways. This is "forgiveness without repentance." The Times misses the point. What Debs and all those who are held in prison for war time political offenses are demanding is amnesty, forgetfulness, not forgiveness. The activities for which they were punished were lawful in time of peace; the same activities would be lawful now, since the war is over. That places them in an altogether different category from the ordinary criminal. It would be idiotic to release a burglar or a forger who insisted that there was nothing wrong in those crimes. With such a man it is impossible to live at ease, in peace or in war. Men like Debs are no doubt an embarrassment to the government in time of war—though the evil they can do is greatly exaggerated. We do not question the right of a war government to silence them, by imprisonment, if necessary. But the expedient is an ugly one, offensive to the spirit of liberty, and when the occasion has passed, forgetfulness on both sides is desirable. The Times certainly would not urge that it was wrong to grant amnesty to the leaders of the Confederacy before they exhibited repentance. Or to the Boers of South Africa. The fact is, the Times wants Debs kept in jail, not for his war time offenses, but for his socialistic opinions, which "would turn the United States into another Russia."

THREE facts make what Mr. Henry Ford—in an interview in The Nation's Business—has to say about railroad management well worth listening to. He created one of the most remarkable producing organizations of the century; he got himself out of a financial tangle without recourse to the banks; and he recently took over a broken-down, bankrupt railroad and made it pay, in spite of the fact that it hauled more freight the year he took it over than the year after. And recently his railroad asked the Interstate Commerce Commission for permission to cut its freight rates twenty percent, a plea which struck horror to the hearts of the railroads brought up in the old belief in the dangers of efficiency. We cannot pretend to judge Mr. Ford's technical recommendations, but his ideas about the financial end and the general operation of a railroad seem eminently sound. He would get rid of the unproductive stockholders, and have the stock held by the employees: "The real purpose of a railroad is to serve the public. There is no reason why it should be diverted from that service and set to doing an entirely different thing—putting money into the pockets of stockholders." And as a corollary to this: "Railroads should not have to go to banks for money." The railway capitalist of the old school has often smiled at such sentiments when coming from progressives and radical theorists, but when they are spoken by a man who saved his company with its own resources and rescued a railway system from the junk heap, he can scarcely afford to be amused.

ON November 3rd Algernon Lee and Edward F. Cassidy, elected to the Board of Aldermen in November, 1919, were permitted to take their seats. For two years the will of the voters of the eighth and twentieth aldermanic districts has been set aside. A committee has taken two years to report errors in the count of ballots which corrected gives Mr. Lee and Mr. Cassidy pluralities respectively of 368 and 165. The majority report holds that the Socialists have failed to prove fraud, but a minority report by Alderman Beckerman takes the ground that "frauds have been deliberately perpetrated," and "those responsible for those frauds should not go unpunished." Alderman Beckerman further points out that the Board of Aldermen has acted in the entire proceedings only under compulsion of the courts, that the committee did not make its report until it was actually in contempt of court, and that the Board took up the matter on the last day granted by the courts. It is the irony of democracy that the courts should be the safeguard of representative government in bodies existing by virtue of its principles, and it is significant of the futility of this reliance that the courts should succeed in obtaining seats for elected representatives only a few days before their terms expire.

SO much attention is devoted these days to the subject of public health and so much money is expended on it that thoughtful folk may properly question whether the results achieved in the way of disease control really merit what they cost. Take the case of tuberculosis. A sum exceeding $4,000,000 was spent by national, state and local tuberculosis associations during 1920 in the war against this disease. Since the first sale of Christ-

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mas Seals was held in 1908 these little penny stickers have gathered in a total of approximately $16,000,000. The money has been invested for the most part in educational propaganda dealing with the prevention and treatment of consumption. As a result of this intensive campaign, there is now in existence in this country anti-tuberculosis equipment valued at $150,000,000, consisting of hospitals and sanatoria for the treatment of tuberculosis, preventoria and open air schools for children and the Modern Health Crusade which now boasts a membership of more than 6,000,000 school children. Besides these, there are hundreds of free tuberculosis clinics and dispensaries under the direction of specialists where new cases which would otherwise continue to spread the disease broadcast are discovered. Several thousand specially trained tuberculosis nurses care for poorer patients in the homes and instruct their families in the prevention of infection. The annual expenditure of these various institutions is approximately $30,000,000 and most of the money invested in their equipment and operation is derived from state, county or municipal budgets. It is no wonder consequently that since 1908 when the death rate in this country from consumption was 168 per 100,000 mortality figures have decreased to 114 per 100,000 in 1920. This represents a saving of at least 50,000 human lives per year within that period. Apparently the mission of the Christmas Seal is worthy, and the war against tuberculosis is proceeding towards an assured result.

THE Survey magazine, like every other honest and intelligent spokesman for social justice, has found its audience narrowed by the very honesty and intelligence of what it had to say. One way to increase the audience of such a message is to make it more visible, to add color to it, and so win over people whose sympathies are more quickly reached through their eyes than their minds. Accordingly, the Survey has issued the first number of a Graphic, "founded in the belief that . . . the destiny of a million new citizens, the struggle for public health, the aspirations of workaday men and women are as colorful as a trip to the Fortunate Isles." Anyone who is tired of the glimpses of a circus sideshow view of the world in the Sunday supplements will find relief and pleasure in the Survey Graphic's pictures of men as they are: Monday morning confusion in a police court; series of portraits of railwaymen; a tent colony in Mingo; Sid Hatfield in an engaging pose, with a gun in each hand. There is nothing quite like this Graphic. It has before it an endless unexplored tract of human life.

MR. CHARLES M. SCHWAB took the auspicious occasion of the annual banquet of the National Paint, Oil and Varnish Association to tell the world that the United States is on the eve of the greatest boom in history. "However wild may be your business dreams of the future I will wager they will not be as wild as the realization which many of you younger men will see." He cited as a proof of his faith that one of his companies now running at 20 percent capacity had decided to take the opportunity to expand its works, because "we can do it cheaper now than at any other time." Apparently Mr. Schwab's experience with building trades and material differs from that of everybody else. But what casts most doubt on his prophecy is his linking it with an entirely meretricious description of his method of promoting that industrial peace which is a condition of prosperity. "If this great country of ours was properly governed," said Mr. Schwab, "then the foundation of the government of this country ought to be a great foundation for business." Accordingly Mr. Schwab has adopted the Leitch system, which includes an elected house of representatives of the workers, and a Senate of foremen and superintendents. Here the analogy to the national constitution breaks down, for the executive administration under the Leitch system is no more responsible to the Congress than the Tsar's government was to the Zemtsvos. The recovery of business prosperity, which depends in part on peace between labor and capital, will not come any sooner by reason of bunk.

THE case of Mollie Steimer and the three Russians associated in her case will remain a classic one in the annals of justice in this republic. These Russians were arrested in December, 1918, under war acts after the war had ended, for distributing literature about the Soviet government which Judge Holmes of the Supreme Court held that they had as much right to circulate as copies of the Constitution of the United States. Their treatment was such that the death of one of them in jail is with some reason attributed to it. They were convicted and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, which now the Department of Justice graciously offers to waive on condition that they deport themselves to famine stricken Russia and at their own expense. The behavior of the government in this case has ranged from brutality to meanness. The only thing to mitigate it is to pay the fare of these victims back to Russia, through The Political Prisoners' Defence Committee, 857 Broadway.

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The "Betrayal" of Ulster

AFTER a hard detour occupying four months the Irish negotiations have now returned to North-East Ulster. They have not returned, however, at anything like the same point in the road. In July Sir James Craig was being invited to London as the representative of a definite parliamentary settlement to which de Valera was to be requested to defer. Now, so far as one's judgment may be formed on the basis of surmises and hints, the compromise that is uppermost in Lloyd George's mind is a possible settlement with Sinn Fein "inside the empire." And the body that is being asked to accommodate itself to this settlement is the Northern parliament.

Such an inhospitable change has, on the face of it, aroused the liveliest opposition in Ulster Unionist circles. The names of Lloyd George and de Valera are coupled as villains in the Northern Whig, and we are told that the Ulster people will see Lloyd George and de Valera in a region to be identified as hell "before even beginning to consider the possibility of accepting" Ireland as a dominion and Ulster as an autonomous province in that dominion. This sharp language is no doubt partly for effect, but the prospect that N. E. Ulster is to be unsettled by Lloyd George, after he had so recently made the parliament himself and sent King George to open it, is a prospect that fills the traditional Ulsterman with extremely strong feelings.

In one view of the matter, these feelings may be said to be justified. But the act of parliament by which Lloyd George's government put through the division of Ireland into two zones, one of six counties and the other of twenty-six counties, cannot actually be worked unless the South as well as the North gets behind it, or unless there is fresh legislation. This in itself impairs the legal claims that the Ulster Unionists are justified in making. But in any view of the matter the act has very slight moral prestige. The northern zone was determined not by the people concerned, but by an inner ring of English politicians. It includes several positions of territory in which Sinn Fein sympathizers are in a large majority. By declaring that they will not open their case for discussion under any circumstances, the Ulster Unionists take up a morally indefensible position. What might in other circumstances be called heroic tenacity and indomitable courage will here rightly be termed bitterness, obduracy and hate.

This fact, it is pretty certain, Lloyd George will recognize. When the Unionists of N. E. Ulster built their house on the sands they probably supposed that they could count on their plausible architect. But Mr. George is in the house-wrecking business as well as in architecture, and it would be in perfect line with his character, or his want of character, to pull down the Northern parliament.

A more respectable solution, however, may be found in the assignment of Tyrone and Fermanagh, or parts of Tyrone and Fermanagh, to the Southern unit, with some sort of qualified separation arranged between N. E. Ulster and the rest of Ireland. This would be a sad makeshift. It would leave an exasperated and intimidated minority in Belfast, Catholic in religion and anti-Unionist in politics. By the exclusion of Tyrone and Fermanagh the plight of this minority of generally poor people would be much worse than it was previously, and the sources of friction in Ireland would be seriously increased. How Sinn Fein proposes to minimize these sources of friction has not as yet appeared, and indeed the orthodox Sinn Fein position still seems to be that Ulster Unionism is largely a myth and that homicide in Belfast is politically insignificant. Mistaken as this view is, it is not so palpably wrong-headed and wrong-minded as the view that official England has taken of Ulster since the Ulster Rebellion of 1913. Mr. Asquith cultivated the plant that now flourishes. He betrayed Redmond and canonized Carson. Mr. Lloyd George matured the plant and built a parliamentary hot-house around it.

The main contention of the Ulster Unionists is, of course, that they stand for union with the empire. Their flag of war is the Union Jack. But if, as is strongly and repeatedly intimated from London, the Sinn Fein delegates are ready to arrange or recommend Ireland's inclusion in the empire, what greater manifestation of goodwill could the Ulster Unionists demand? If after their ardent war for Republicanism, after the cold executions of 1916 and the sacrifices since that date, the Republicans are ready to shake hands, to undertake participation in the empire in a heartfelt spirit of conciliation and goodwill, on what ground can Belfast insist on separation, mistrust and suspicion? Does Lord Carson, from his elevation on the bench, see anything that resembles enlightened statecraft in the proposed shabby isolation of Ulster?

That Lloyd George should now be attempting to end that isolation which he himself opportunistically framed, is a distinct advance toward peace. What remain to be devised are the steps which the Ulster Unionists can be induced to take that lead to a rapprochement with the South. It is

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utter waste to elect a national spite-fence zigzagging around four counties and offering a perpetual incitement to hatred. The essential condition of peace, therefore, is that Ulster do not interfere with the offer, and the acceptance of a genuine full dominion status for Ireland, or its treaty-bound equivalent. It is an ironical but quite predictable result that Lloyd George and Sinn Fein should be brought together on common ground against the recalcitrancy of Ulster. It is intolerable and unthinkable that Ulster's stubbornness should again be the cause of open hostilities between them.

Pittsburgh Repeats

THEY arrested another speaker and broke up another meeting down in Pittsburgh last week just as if it were the days of the steel strike. In fact it was his references to the steel strike—to workmen arrested wholesale for "disorderly conduct" or as "suspicious persons," to authorities who systematically broke up and then suppressed all meetings—it was these reminders at a street meeting which brought two policemen on his neck. He showed his police permit for the meeting; no use; three auditors growled; two arrested; all four locked up; " disorderly conduct."

The only thing unusual for Pittsburgh was that this case got into the newspapers to the extent of a few paragraphs per paper. The speaker happened to be the candidate for mayor, W. W. McNair, running against the Republican "old gang." He had been making speeches, with permits, on other issues, at Democratic and independent Republican meetings. He was well qualified to talk about the authorities' suppressions in Pittsburgh because he had handled steel strikers' cases. At times when the police courts and jails were jammed full and strike leaders were asking lawyers if they would take the cases of strikers and were being answered "Huh!," Mr. McNair had dared accept retainers from labor.

His arrest was hastily "denounced" by Mr. Magee, the other candidate, and by Mayor Babcock, who ordered the suppressions during the strike. One or two of the newspapers even talked about free speech. Surprising for Pittsburgh. A former assistant to the United States Attorney said: "I remember when the committee of the United States Senate was here investigating the steel strike and their attention was directed to activities of the Pittsburgh police as flagrant as any exhibition under the Czar of Russia and I do not remember any protests about free speech from Mr. Magee or Mayor Babcock, or these newspapers."

After two years the civil liberty issues of the steel strike began actually to be discussed in public in Pittsburgh. A Democratic candidate for district attorney could be heard saying, "How many of you remember the murder at Tarentum not long ago? I mean the time those deputy sheriffs shot into a strikers' parade and killed a woman—and no person has ever been prosecuted for it?" Pittsburgh newspapers might have commented (they did not) that "the speaker's reference was to Mrs. Sellins, a labor organizer" but the papers would have been gravelled to supply the names of others killed, by deputies and the state constabulary, in 1919. And as for the hundreds merely imprisoned in the Pittsburgh District during the strike, could you find their names in the files of newspapers—or sometimes even in the court papers? Huh. They were "hunkies."

An Outlet for Japan

IT may not be propaganda—most of it surely is not consciously such. But there is an amazing amount of matter appearing just now in the American press on the necessity of giving Japan an outlet for her superfluous population. The argument runs in simple, and apparently cogent terms. Japan is already one of the most densely peopled countries in the world. The Japanese are a vital race, with a birth rate much in excess of the death rate and consequently a rapidly increasing population. There is some uncertainty as to just what the increase amounts to, because the figures are subject to political coloring. It cannot, however, be less than half a million, and it is probably a good deal more than that. Accordingly the time must come, if it is not already at hand, when the existing limits of the empire will not hold the increase. A well made boiler may withstand the increasing pressure of steam up to a certain point, but beyond that point, if there is no provision for the escape of the steam, there must be an explosion. There must be an outlet for the superfluous Japanese population, it is argued, or war will inevitably result.

But where are the Japanese to go? The United States and Canada, Australia and New Zealand, have closed their doors to Japanese immigrants. Latin America remains open to them, but everyone knows that if Japanese immigration into any Latin American state became so active as to threaten the substitution of an oriental civilization for the existing Latin civilization, the United States would reinterpret the Monroe Doctrine to cover the case. It follows, or seems to follow, that the outlet for Japan must be on the side of the Asiatic mainland. Give Japan Manchuria and eastern Siberia, it is

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often suggested. Manchuria is not densely peopled, and eastern Siberia is hardly peopled at all. The expansive force of the Japanese population can then exert itself peacefully, instead of destructively. The menace of war will disappear from the Pacific.

Such in substance is the argument. It can be made more seductive by emphasis upon the superior character of Japanese civilization and the political incompetence of the Chinese and the disorderliness of the Russians. Such considerations ought not to seem irrelevant to Americans. We have used them again and again to justify our supplanting of Indian populations by white. The propagandists of Japan no doubt exaggerate both Japanese virtues and the vices of Manchurians and Russians. We availed ourselves of similar exaggeration in our time. But what is most relevant is the substance of the argument. Is the increasing pressure of Japanese population an irresistible force of nature, and is Japanese occupation of Manchuria and eastern Siberia an appropriate and adequate means of relieving it? We are waiving, but not ignoring, the question of the morality of satisfying Japanese needs at the expense of the weaker nations, China and Russia, while America and England have in Australia, Alaska and western Canada, lands that are much better suited physically to Japanese immigration.

The history of occidental industrialism indicates quite clearly that an unrestricted increase in population is a passing phase in social development. The change from the self-sufficing rural and village economy to modern industrialism accelerates an increase in population, so long as rural standards of living and habits of life hang over. But sooner or later the standards and habits of the population change, and the birth rate declines. We need not linger over the figures, which are accessible to any one who cares to glance at a standard work on vital statistics. It was marked enough to reduce the birth rate by one-sixth in Prussia and by one quarter in England in the thirty years from 1880 to 1910. The same forces are operating in Japan, and may be expected to operate more promptly and efficaciously because there is no religious ban upon the use of knowledge pertaining to birth control.

We are not urging that Japan ought to content herself with her present boundaries and avert the menace of increasing pressure upon the means of subsistence by checking the growth of population. It is perfectly possible that population in Japan will outrun subsistence for a considerable time, and in that time an outlet would be desirable. But do Manchuria and eastern Siberia offer a suitable outlet? On that point we have a considerable body of evidence. The Japanese have now held Korea, and have practically controlled southern Manchuria, for sixteen years. They have also held the southern half of Sakhalin. They have used very freely their conqueror's power to dispossess natives in favor of Japanese settlers. Has there, then, been a considerable movement of permanent Japanese settlers into these territories? Not at all. Soldiers, officials, merchants, organizers of businesses have found occupation in the conquered territories, and there have been considerable bodies of contract labor employed. But as for the process of settlement by families, like the process that peopled America, the results have been negligible. The climate of Korea is too inclement to draw permanent settlers from the more densely peopled Japanese islands, which lie well to the South. The Manchurian climate is even less temperate, and Sakhalin is no more attractive to the Japanese than Labrador would be to Carolinians. Eastern Siberia is no better than Sakhalin. Even if the world were agreed that the Japanese population needed outlets, Siberia and Manchuria would not supply the need.

The races of man are all adaptable to wide variations of climate, and there is no scientific basis for the popular belief that the Japanese are less adaptable than any other. In time they could no doubt learn to live in Siberia, as English stock can learn to live almost anywhere. But adaptation is a matter of generations, and the pressure of population is something that will manifest itself in its greatest severity in the next decades.

We think that the Japanese statesmen and the better informed friends of Japan have taken these facts into account, and have no more faith in the project of settling the surplus Japanese population in Manchuria and Siberia than we have. We think that the proposal of an outlet for the Japanese population is nothing but a popular form for a different proposal, a closed field for Japanese industry. The full control by Japan of eastern Siberia and Manchuria would offer Japanese industry and commerce a preferential position in the exploiting of the natural resources of those territories. Although those resources would be worked by native labor or Chinese coolies brought from further south, the net returns of exploitation would add materially to the wealth of Japan and would add something, if not much, to her capacity for supporting an increased population.

There is nothing economically fantastic about such a proposal. It is like any other adventure in imperialism, profitable to the private persons

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who work the privileges, and possibly to the state, if the cost of maintaining order and of insuring against attack from outside is not too heavy. Where logic goes astray is in the deduction that Japan, once her ambitions in this quarter were realized, would rest content and refrain from pushing on to new acquisitions. No imperial state has ever rested content. One acquisition leads on to another, needed for the rounding out or the defence of the first. The history of British, French and German colonial dominion illustrates amply the insatiate character of the imperialistic impulse.

It is idle to plan to attach Japan securely to the forces of peace by attempting to satiate her imperial ambition. We do not condemn Japan for wishing to realize such an ambition, in a world in which the western powers have all behaved in exactly the same way. But imperialistic ambitions lead to war, not to peace. If it is the firm intention of the western powers to enter upon the liquidation of the imperialistic era, Japan can afford to forego her dubious right to a territorial expansion which can not in its nature mean an expansion of the territory actually settled by Japanese. Then the peace of the Pacific would fall within the range of practical political objectives. And we think that Japan will best advance her own prosperity as well as the general peace, by reserving territorial claims as a last resort, to be brought forward only in case the movement for peace in the Pacific should turn out to be a cloak for western imperialistic designs.

Frozen

"HE knows that there was once an ice age and that there will some day be an ice age again. This makes him indifferent." So Wilfrid Scawen Blunt reports George Wyndham's comment on Arthur Balfour. The conversation took place more than a decade ago, but the years since have borne increasing witness to the truth of the comment, and its application not only to Mr. Balfour but to the statesmanship which he represents, and to the world which it guides. As if in anticipation of the coming ice age the minds of men have stiffened, the processes of civilization have congealed. The hypnotism of the glacier is upon other elements of the social order besides Mr. Balfour.

How easily the word frozen comes to our lips. The streams of bank credits are frozen. Retail prices are frozen. The other day a German paper, Das Korrespondenzblatt, complained of "frozen parliamentarism." The interpretation of strikes as conspiracy against the government is a process of freezing the labor movement. The restrictions upon freedom of speech, assembly and the press are an attempt to freeze thought. To identify education with a certain phase of patriotism is to freeze the mind of the next generation.

The process of solidifying the public mind can be easily studied in the United States during the last two years. It is as if the various interests represented by parties, press, school, pulpit, patriotic societies and propaganda of various sorts were centres of congelation which rapidly extended themselves throughout the mass of public opinion until it became rigid, fixed as a declared policy. Take for example the attitude toward the League of Nations. Two years ago the American public would have accepted the League, with a few limitations, as a worthy result of our participation in the war and the token of victory that was peculiarly ours. Now that the League has in its working become very nearly the sort of association we accepted we will have no word of it. Take the debts of the Allies. Two years ago the American public might have been brought to accept their cancellation as an act of good faith toward our associates and of good will toward the world. Now, when the mischievous futility of such payments from one nation to another has been demonstrated, it is a test of patriotism to insist on them to the uttermost farthing. Take the case of Russia. The doors of the United States have been frozen shut against her, and neither the economic hope of the world, the material profit of this country, nor the need of Russia can melt the ice to open them. The policy coldly announced by Mr. Hughes is the policy which was moulded in ice of Mr. Wilson's freezing. Or Mexico. A treaty as the price of recognition is our ultimatum; the situation is frozen, and the agreeable warmth of Mr. Lamont's personality has been unable to effect a thaw. The treaty with Germany is possibly the best instance of a frozen policy. Although the dishonor and ineptitude of the Treaty of Versailles were fully demonstrated, it was politically necessary when Senator Knox introduced his resolution as an alternative to ratification, to write into it a recognition of our national rights under that treaty; and two years later it was still politically necessary to claim those dead fruits of victory. The public attitude toward the steel strike, the miners' strike, the railroad strike shows a mind frozen with indifference to everything except immediate profit and convenience. In regard to the unemployed the public mind is rapidly congealing under the influence of the press in the form of the gracious opinion that to be without a job is a crime for which the jobless man is solely responsible, and that scientific charity is an ample atonement for unscientific organization of industry.

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In the world in general, over which the genial spirit of Mr. Balfour broods as did Lord Castlereagh's a century ago, we find the same phenomena. England has frozen Ulster and with it the whole Irish situation. It has frozen the Treaty of Sevres, and neither the ruin of the Near East nor the threatening danger in India can melt it. The whole finance of Europe is frozen to the body of reparations, and the knowledge that the body is a corpse makes no difference—so long as it stays frozen. The trade of Europe is frozen by tariffs. Europe like America is frozen against Russia. In what must be considered one great test of the League of Nations the representatives of the governments in this league of humanity listened to the eloquent voice of Frithjof Nansen urging the cause of ten million human beings doomed to die of famine, pleading for £5,000,000, half the price of a battleship, to save them—and remained obdurate. And in another test, the settlement of Silesia, the League showed how futile it is to expect it to revise the Treaty of Versailles, by declining to use powers specifically granted to it and remaining frozen to what it conceived to be the intention of the treaty makers.

This condition is not in the least what was forecast as the aftermath of the war. What was apprehended was a halting of civilization owing to material losses. The immense destruction of capital, of wealth, was expected to prove a handicap for a generation. The loss of human life could not easily be repaired. The failure of productive processes owing to lack of capital, and still more owing to the loss of morale, of the will to work, on the part of labor was deemed a danger scarcely less formidable than active revolution. Hence in the months immediately after the armistice there was the insistent urging of production. "Produce, produce," was everywhere the cry. "Get to work" was the panacea not only for Germany, but for Europe. And the world took this advice with the result that today it has more food, more ships, more goods of every kind, more real wealth and a larger population than before the war. If the material wounds of war have not been healed it is not because of the lack of material means. Wheat is rotting and corn is being burned in America that would feed Russia, and the world is turning to the systematic limiting of production as a release from its economic ills. The difficulty is psychological and can only be removed by phychological means, the free play of thought. Wherever the processes of life are interrupted by frozen policy, it can be seen that such policy is the result of hate, fear, prejudice, distrust, played upon by selfish interests. The fact that the men in power in the world, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, Mr. Harding, Mr. Hughes and M. Briand, are above all the servants of these interests is recognized in the cry that goes up everywhere for real leadership, for men who do not belong to the ice age.

Such leaders are still to seek, but here and there are signs that even under the old leadership the mind of the world is releasing itself from its ice bound rigidity. Here and there the surface is melting and streams and rills are coursing down the glacier. Mr. Lloyd George has put away his election cry of hate and bids Englishmen love the Germans as themselves. He is apparently trying to thaw out Ulster. Mr. Churchill and Mr. McKenna advocate the cancellation of international debts. Mr. Hoover's reports from the Department of Commerce look toward a resumption of trade with Russia. The Irish Conference remains a flowing stream despite obstacles which threaten to hold it back until it freezes again. Above all there is a steady and increasing movement of public opinion in favor of disarmament and in opposition to the next war, whatever it may be. To those who recall the enthusiasm for preparedness and a navy second to none, the change by virtue of which disarmament has become a popular cry is most significant as a sign of mobility and progress. When a popular writer declares amid applause: "If the next war were in Central Park, I would not go to it," we may be sure that the rays of a melting sun are playing on the face of the ice. The Washington Conference owes its inception to the current of thought and feeling against war as a means of settling disputes among nations. One condition of its success is the swift flow of public opinion lest the stream be checked, the ice form again, and the world once more be frozen fast to armament.

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Berlin, September, 1921

VAST energy wasting itself in confusion; visages sombre browed, tight lipped, lined with grim care; voices harsh but expostulatory rather than combative; movements and gestures abrupt, originating, one feels, in the bony structure rather than in the nerves and muscles; such is one's first impression of Berlin today, as one pushes through the crowd at the station to struggle toward a taxi fit to plow through the cross currents and eddies of traffic. One murmurs one's destination in such German as one can muster and receives an answer in much better English. The chauffeur's face is neither friendly nor unfriendly; it is a good firm face, with level eyes and boundless self-possession, something that is reassuring as one gains his first insight into the Berlin rules of the road. "Blow your horn and drive ahead in God's name; and the Devil take the pedestrian who can't jump." Having to jump, or making other persons jump for their lives produces at first one's most vivid sensations in Berlin. After a few days, however, it sinks into the morass of the commonplace.

How far has the city changed since the time when the Kaiser drove down from Potsdam, dreaming monumental dreams that made Nemesis laugh in her sleeve? In physical appearance the change is great. At present Berlin is a dirty city, that is, dirtier than St. Louis but not so dirty as Chicago. It is a disorderly city. Nothing is verboten. You can go anywhere, at your own risk. There are a few policemen, for the most part strangely undersized and unassuming men whose rule of life seems to be to accept anything rather than trouble. They look better braced up, to be sure, when a demonstration is scheduled. Then they tighten their belts and straighten up, in honor of the army rifles they carry. How they would use them in a seething mob they can no doubt imagine. I was assured by men who seemed to know that the very knowledge that a bullet would burrow through six men before it stopped has a quieting effect on demonstrations. It may be so.

Berlin is a busy city today, one of the busiest in the world. All the factories and workshops seem to be on full time, earning vast quantities of paper marks; all the shops are crowded with customers trying to get rid of their marks before they go lower. Prices, computed in marks, are staggering, and the German public, apparently, has never accepted the fact that the mark is nowadays nothing but a polite fiction. Men still do good hard work for marks: they give up usable goods for marks; they rack their brains to devise ways of overcharging you in marks, as if that were still possible. Everybody knows the mark is going to fall lower and lower, and the only person I saw who had a plausible hypothesis as to a final limit was a taxi driver, who soberly assured me that a committee of scientists were working on a motor to be driven by marks.

With such a medium of exchange Berlin ought to be utterly dead, economically. It is not. As I said, everybody is working. You see no signs of unemployment, and the few beggars you encounter are the most hopelessly mutilated wreckage of the World War. Everybody is living, somehow. But the working class, at any rate, is living badly. For some hours I watched a workingmen's political demonstration, which closed up everything in the city for the afternoon. Among the unnumbered thousands of marching workingmen I saw not one in good flesh and color. According to an extremely competent and well-informed American newspaper correspondent the average wage falls about one-third short of any tolerable standard of living. Anyone can observe the effects with his own eyes; that is, anyone, except the occasional American tourist who infers from the abundance and cheapness of food in the international hotels that "there is plenty of food in Germany." And worse times are coming, because the summer's drought played havoc with potatoes and hay and pasturage. From want of potatoes and milk, Germany's bread stock will be exhausted painfully early, and how will she manage to import more, as exchange stands? Grim care has settled down upon Berlin, to abide for a time.

But the lot of the working class is harsh just now in other cities as well as in Berlin. How does the old aristocracy fare in Berlin, the aristocrats who used to think familiarly in terms of Germany's mission and Machtpolitik? To a remarkable extent, they are ruined, completely, irrecoverably. You meet ladies of cultivation and refinement who tell you that they have, in effect, become janitresses. Perhaps they were millionaires, before the war, deriving luxurious incomes from Russian and Austrian bonds, and maintaining spacious houses in town. Now their capital and income have vanished. They still have their houses, in which the public authorities have quartered the proper contingent of the city's excess population, uncongenial tenants, paying fixed rents that do not know of the fall of the mark, and having full right to

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kick about the heat supplied. The rents do not yield enough to pay for coal and janitor service besides. Therefore the proprietress tends the furnace and sweeps down the stairs. One such proprietress told me that her only regret was that the revolution had not moved one spoke further forward, taking the shell of her property as it had taken the kernel. Then at least she would have been freed from care, as most of the population who have nothing to lose.

I heard many tales of the fate of the army officers, those haughty gentlemen who used to consider themselves Germany. Herr X., an authority, not given to overstatement, told me of a friend who advertised for a stable boy. Fifty-four army officers applied for the job. Mostly they were lieutenants, but there were also captains, and two or three colonels. Another person told me where I could find a factory which employed a night watchman who was General Z., whose record on the eastern front had been distinguished. When I discussed the fate of the aristocracy with taxi-drivers and similarly undistinguished people I found that Germans have still a sense of humor. They talked just as lower East Siders might talk if a shift in economic structure were to compel the Union League Club to form in line to apply for the job of stable boy or tenement house janitor. The Berlin proletariat isn't asserting that the Kaiser and the officers brought on the war. They still believe that the war was forced on Germany. But they think the Kaiser and the officers regarded the war as something fine and invigorating. Hence there is a certain satisfaction in aristocratic distress.

It is, however, a faint satisfaction, as with something that happened centuries ago. They tell you where the Kaiser stood when he dictated his ultimatum, just as in Rome they point out the spot where Domitian was assassinated. The pompous monuments of the Hohenzollerns are of whiter marble than the statues of the Flavian emperors. The buildings embodying the Hohenzollern worship of mass and force are scarcely weathered. But for all that the impression of imperial Rome is fresher than that of imperial Germany. The Palatine Hill makes you muse; the royal palace of Berlin bores you, and makes you try vainly to remember something you once knew about it. The sense of dreary oblivion is still heavier at Potsdam, now a city without soldiers or any other reason for existence. A seedy guide, very obsequious to American exchange, takes you from room to room. Here the Kaiser sat down to feast with two hundred persons; here the Kaiserin served tea; here is the table where the Kaiser used to sit, Hindenburg on one side, Ludendorff on the other. Nothing but an undistinguished table and three stupidly designed chairs. You feel moved somewhat, as you would if you saw the nest where the last laying dodo sat on the last egg, sterile, as it turned out, with two other dodos, too old for breeding, solacing its long ordeal with their futile conversation. There is no glory at all hovering around the memory of Wilhelm. He played and lost, and ruined everybody. For that sort of service democracies are ungrateful.

It may be that there is a strong monarchist party somewhere in Germany. There must be monarchists in Berlin, but they are as much under cover as the monarchists of Washington, if there are such. Berlin was not enthusiastic over the Wirth government, whose function was chiefly to eat crow at the behest of the French. Berlin would not be very enthusiastic over any government. The population is composed chiefly of doubting Thomases. The proletariat is well organized for political purposes, and is powerful, but it hasn't a ghost of a notion what to do with its power. If only the reactionaries would start something—then there would be some zest in putting them down. After the Erzberger murder the government excited a momentary interest by closing down various reactionary papers. It was just as if some left-handed Burleson were to close down Industry, the National Civic Federation Review, McCall's, the New York Tribune and the San Francisco Chronicle. At this invasion of the liberty of the press I looked for a great storm of liberal protest. There was none. As I am a liberal, convinced that the way to make an idea, even a reactionary idea, innocuous, is to give it air, I ought to have found my heart bleeding over the wholesale suppression of ideas. Yet my heart didn't bleed one drop.

"But the Germans haven't changed a bit," declares the young lady tourist of the type that played at Joan of Arc during the war. "It's all nonsense about the change of heart." For my own part I don't know anything about the German heart. I do know that in the case of the individual, with prosperity the heart waxes proud and with adversity it waxes the other way. Probably the same thing is true of a people. I can guess how the Berliners would behave if Germany had won the war. Certainly they behave quite differently now. It is a very much less difficult thing to do business with them.

"But they hate us, in their souls. How they glare at me," declares my Joan of Arc. They may, though Joan's face is one to draw many an esurient glance which might be mistaken by an American for a hostile glare. Ask a Berliner, and he is likely to tell you that he does not hate Americans or

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Englishmen or Italians. He is saving his hatred for the French. If he could send them back beyond the Vosges by any means short of war he would do it eagerly. But as to making war, he is disarmed and helpless, and he knows what that would mean in war. And in his heart he knows he will remain in this condition for a long time. His hatred will have to feed on itself.

It is a rare and in some respects a great character that can make an unflagging passion of hatred. Such characters are few in any population, just as few in Berlin as elsewhere. Any Berliner will say automatically that he hates the French, but what is actually occupying his mind is the price of bread and beer—thin beer, he comments wryly—the taxes, the ineptitude of the government, the unreasonableness of workers or of employers, according to his economic affiliations, and above all, the Valuta. The Valuta, that mathematical demon that makes the marks in his pocket swell or shrink, but almost always shrink—if it had a trace of tangible form, how eagerly he would declare war on it.

ALVIN JOHNSON.

America—Holier Than Thou

THE China and Japan mail has just come in, and after wading through the shoals of material printed in this country on the forthcoming Armament Conference I have been reading China's and Japan's views. The contrast has been educative and chastening. It has brought back stabbing little memories of Far Eastern incidents and conversations that had been dulled under the excitement of coming home. It has restored a healthy perspective.

I go back now to these piles of clippings from American publications and re-read them with straightened vision. And in all that has been written here on the Conference I find a significant monotone—the note of self-righteousness. We are about to stand again at Armageddon, again to battle for the Lord. One is reminded of the American peace commissioner's anecdote of Clemenceau's plaint on his doubly delicate task at the Peace Conference, for did he not have to confront Lloyd George, who thought he was Napoleon Bonaparte, and Woodrow Wilson, who thought he was Jesus Christ? There are signs that we are about to anoint ourselves again.

America's aim, say most of our commentators, is to curb Japan, if not to win it back to the path of virtue. Our aim, say the minority, is only secondarily to curb Japan and primarily to curb all the powers, since on all is the mark of the aggressor against China. All of whom are right and all of which is true, only too true. That must be our goal indeed. But if we go to the Conference in that attitude of mind, if we go envisaging that goal only, we shall go seeing myopically. For we must know, and face, and understand this also, that, justly or unjustly, the other powers will come to the Conference with the unspoken but controlling thought: "And who shall curb America, and how?"

I suppose on the whole it is unjust, for undoubtedly America's career in the Far East has been clean. Possibly it has been clean not so much because we have been virtuous as because we have been innocent; we have not yet had a big enough stake to test us. But clean it undoubtedly has been. Nevertheless, as I go back now and gather up the memories of numerous meetings and discussions these last two or three years in the Far East with men of every color, nationality and stripe of opinion, I find running through them all a single motif: fear of America, of America the aggressor of the immediate future. Their dread is of an impending American invasion, an invasion of dollars rather than of men. Capitalistic imperialism, they call it.

I found it underlying all the calculations of the Japanese of the frankly imperialistic class. I found it giving pause to those Japanese liberals whose mental leanings would incline them to more vigorous opposition to the expansionists. I found it unanimous with the certainty of something predestined among Europeans, especially European liberals. In the light of the thou-betrayest-us attitude of American liberals toward European liberals since the Paris Conference and since the recent resumption of European concessioneering in China, there has been something ironical in being thus faced with accusation. Ironical, but enlightening and impressive.

Bertrand Russell, for instance, shares this apprehension. I am guilty of no breach of manners in stating openly views expressed in private conversations, because since I left Peking he has expressed more or less publicly his belief that Ameri-

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ca, though as yet subconsciously, is setting out on a great imperialist career of which the Far East will be the principal stage, and that the Consortium is but the first step. Robert Young of the Japan Chronicle, that mordant and yet kindly and magnificent figure of Kobe who for years has stood at the head of all Far Eastern publicists, has the same feeling even more strongly emphasized. He has expressed it publicly and privately with his usual vigor and penetration. To him therefore the Consortium and all its works are anathema; they are but the substitution of American financial penetration for the territorial and militaristic encroachments of Japan and the western powers.

One night, a few months ago in Tokio, a visiting card was brought up to my hotel room. It was the card of a Manchester Guardian man recently come over from Europe. After chatting generally a few minutes he asked me how I thought the Far Eastern situation would develop. I answered that that would depend on whether the western powers would abandon their old policy of self-aggrandizement at the expense of China and by isolating Japan force it to a similar abandonment; particularly it would depend on whether Great Britain would throw its support to the traditional American view in China rather than to Japan, and thereby maintain the British-American solidarity that had held so successfully in the Far East throughout the war.

"But America has sold the purse," he exclaimed. "How can we?"

I pressed for explanation and got the usual formula: economic penetration, dollar imperialism, dictatorship by financial monopoly. From all sorts and conditions of men I have got the same, from professional Far Easterners no more than from casual students, and I believe it to be spontaneous and independently arrived at. Certainly I have had it from Japanese, which is most important.

These men are not without ground for their apprehensions. In the first place, the savage yawp that went up over America after the war was heard in the far corners of the earth. Its echoes still ring, long after the parrot press and political mountebanks and lunatic patriotistic societies tired and began following after other cries. The rampant jingoism, the blatant chauvinism, the truculent shoutings for the biggest navy and universal military service and intervention in Mexico and defiance to England and challenge to Japan and 117-percentism in general were observed with concentrated attention by men of other nations. They did not understand the power and the momentum of the slogan in American life, and its ephemeralness. They took it seriously, certainly more seriously than it merited. We ourselves may be returning now to sanity, but the evil that has been done is not so soon undone.

More important, those who share the suspicion of America's motives have seen the beginning of what has all the marks of an American Drang nach Osten. They have seen America's rise toward world preponderancy as the result of the war expressed most actively and vigorously in the Far East. What was once a sentimental and negative interest in China has become practical and positive. Powerful American banking interests have invaded the Far East, great American commercial houses and industrial combinations have established chains in the Far Eastern ports, business men of lesser magnitude have come in hordes; the American population in China has doubled, then trebled in less than five years. America brought China into the war under its wing, and though America's President betrayed China at the Peace Conference America's protests have prevented Japan from realizing on the award to it of Shantung. America took the initiative in the formation of the new China Consortium and has claimed leadership since its formation. In every issue that has arisen America has shown its aspiration to the decisive voice in Far Eastern affairs. As it has steadily withdrawn from Europe, it has as steadily taken an increasing part in the Far East. Now it is America that summons the powers to Sinai, there presumably to thunder forth the law.

They will come, but, as I say, they will come with apprehensions, with reservations and with the unspoken aim of obstructing America. They will come not as penitents to make expiation, but as combatants to hold their own against another and stronger combatant. They have consolations in their fears, of course, in the confidence that America is still unsophisticated and gullible and can be bought with sops. Doubtless they will proclaim America's noble idealism and sweet altruism, let us cry lustily and adolescently as in 1917 and 1918 our familiar cries of freedom and democracy and liberty and liberty cabbage, and then go home with all fundamentals exactly as they were. I am not sure that they have anything serious to fear, at least from the Conference, but my point is that they will come with that psychology. I believe that that is the psychology not only of the powers' attitude toward the Conference but of their actions in the Far East since the war. I think that explains the revival of their cynicism toward China, which one really thought during the war had been given up for all time, at least by the western powers. Their failure to relinquish what they

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have won by past encroachments and their efforts to encroach still further now represent, I think, their desire to consolidate their positions and dig themselves in against impending American siege. And their aim at the Conference likewise will be to maintain their positions against America.

Whether this is justified or not is for our purpose irrelevant. It is necessary for us to recognize it. We must understand the motives of those with whom we are to deal in conference if we are to deal with them at all intelligently. If we are to ask of the powers hostages for their conduct in the future, we must be prepared to give them too. We must at least recognize that they are expected of us. We cannot face the problems of the Conference only in self-righteousness. The success or failure of the conference depends, I think, on this as much as on any other one factor.

NATHANIEL PEFFER.

"Proposing an Appanage"

IT is proposed, if a sufficient number of adherents can be found, to establish at Washington, at least for the period of the Conference, an American Colony. This settlement has finally become, and by due process, one of the world capitals. One of the signs and evidences by which you may always know a world capital is its American Colony. Each of them has one. It seems only fitting now that we have come into our full stature we should have one too. Such a colony is the final accessory on the car of state.

But it is not solely as an adornment and a luxury that the establishment of an American Colony is being promoted here. It has been observed of these transplanted and collective expatriates that they are invariably warm partisans of the government of the country in whose capital they have found shelter. They seek to interpret to their fellow citizens of the country they have deserted, the aims, the purposes, the benevolent ends and desires of the people of the capital of their adoption. They can always be counted upon to help to spread the news.

Mr. William Hard has remarked that to him one of the delights of sojourning in London among the English residents of that capital was the entire absence of any obligation to be pro-British, or even any chance encounter with the pro-British state of mind among the natives. That honorable responsibility is supposedly given over to the American Colony with the full confidence that it will not be neglected.

Such then being the observed nature and characteristic of American Colonies in world capitals the need of one here this winter is pressing. Washington is notably kind to and attracted by foreigners. Every itinerant analyst who has come among us with an observing and practiced eye has noted our fondness for the eminent aliens who reside temporarily in these leafy bowers. We like them and admire them and make much of them. As to the response evoked by all our friendly fluttering I will call upon Henry James to testify:

"No small part of the interest of the social scene there consists inevitably, for any restless analyst, in wonder about the 'real' sentiments of appointed foreign participants . . . before phenomena which, whatever they may be, differ more from the phenomena of other capitals and other societies than they resemble them . . .

"It may have been on my part a morbid obsession, but the diplomatic body was liable to strike one there as more characteristically 'abysmal' than elsewhere, more impenetrably bland and inscrutably blank; . . . It is no part of the office of such personages to assist the societies to which they are credited to find themselves—it is much more their mission to leave all such vaguely and, so far as may be, grotesquely groping: so apt are societies, in finding themselves, to find other things too. . . ."

It is a recognition on the part of some of the interested native participants here of this general condition now immensely enlarged, emphasized and accentuated by the fact of the Limitation of Armaments Conference that has brought about the suggestion of the hurried founding of an American Colony. Washington is and will be more than usually full of foreigners this winter, and every special train brings in a fresh contingent. They come in a large sense as our guests, in that they assemble here by our invitation, and it is therefore our obligation to see that they have a good time. There is no lack of desire to do that. Any incursion of distinguished aliens is welcomed here, especially when they come by official invitation and request as in the present instance.

We will do all that we can for them. It has always been said of one treaty negotiated in Washington that it "was floated through on a sea of champagne." That engaging maritime phenomenon cannot be repeated. Synthetic gin, the fiery and colorless "hooch" of the nearby Virginia hills and domestic Scotch whiskey, no matter how reminiscent the label on the bottle of ancient importations, have not the buoyancy and sustaining qualities of champagne in floating an international agreement. And that is all, except in isolated instances and meager quantities, that we have to offer. But that is a matter of small concern for the current report is that they have brought their

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own with them. This will serve to add to the charm with which Washington invests them.

It will be the function of the American Colony, if and when formed, to preserve and present the native and national viewpoint and our own aspirations, aims and desires amidst all the cross-currents and diversions of the Conference. The British, the French, the Japanese, the Chinese, the Italians have all come here amply prepared to state their case and to diffuse a knowledge of their attitude and aims among the people. The atmosphere in which the Conference works will affect its findings and results. The resident world, in which the foreign participants will mingle in their hours of ease and recreation, in their natural solicitude as hosts, may not in some instances be prepared or have any inclination to present for the enlightenment of our guests the views, the aims and the ends to be attained that Mr. Harding and Mr. Hughes had in mind when the Conference was called.

Mr. Harding and Mr. Hughes, and more particularly Mr. Hughes, have taken on an immense task in calling this Conference. They deserve and will need all the assistance and support that an informed and interested public opinion here at home can give them. There need be no illusions about things being done in friendship at this Conference. This is not a Santa Claus party, nor will there be much talk or thought about breaking the heart of the world. What talk there is of breaking more probably will concern the pocket-book of the world than its heart. The distinguished foreign personages who have come here will ask of every proposal that may arise or be submitted to them: What is our national interest in this matter; or in another case requiring mutual concessions or giving ground: What will our people at home say about this; will they agree to it, will they stand for it?

It is the purpose of our delegates in the very porch of the Conference to make it clear and plain that we have no axes to grind, no grudges to settle, no scores to even—to place all our cards on the table, and then to attempt to reach an agreement on all the problems that will be placed before the Conference on terms that seem fair to all the participating delegates and their principals and people. It is to maintain and uphold and spread the knowledge of this attitude that the seemingly fanciful suggestion has been made that an American Colony be established, at any rate for the duration of the Conference.

It would be something in the nature of a novelty to have any group earn for itself the designation of being pro-American. I have heard of and encountered pro-Allies, pro-Germans, pro-Boers, pro-English, pro-French, pro-what not, but I do not recall any considered or considerable group at any international gathering that had won for itself the name of being pro-American. American, yes, but never reaching the ardent stage of being pro-American and that is what the American Colony here must be first, last and all the time. It must have the virtues of a disciple in that it must have the courage of its master's, or principal's, convictions.

There is a place for such a group at this juncture in a town so susceptible to alien charm and foreign good manners. Not to antagonize or even combat our guests, but, say, merely to keep alive and tend the flame lighted by the founding Fathers who resolutely declared, under God, their intention to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. It is in pursuance of the same general idea that we are asking our guests to meet with us here this winter.

EDWARD G. LOWRY.

Washington, D. C.

Industrial Statesmanship

A UNIQUE plan for the stabilization of industrial relations, recently referred to by Edward E. Hunt, Secretary of the Unemployment Conference, as "one of the most significant happenings in American industry," is being worked out in the Ladies' Garment Industry in Cleveland. For perhaps the first time in history, an agreement was signed by a large association of manufacturers and a powerful labor union recognizing not only the responsibility of employers and employees to one another but their "joint responsibility to the consuming public." The public of all communities has a very direct interest in the maintenance of peace in its industries and in the well-being of its workers, who form a large part of its population,—and the recognition by the workers and employers of that interest is an important step forward. In this agreement, the public is protected from the menace of industrial conflict by the provision that there shall be no strike or lockout. Instead, all disputes that cannot be adjusted by conference and mediation are settled in an orderly manner by the decision of the resident impartial arbitrator, after a full hearing and investigation with the labor manager of the Association and the Manager of the Union. In cases of general importance an appeal may be had to an established board of three referees. Grievances are determined as they arise. They are not given time to assume undue and mag-

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nified importance in the eyes of either side. What might otherwise develop into serious breaks are settled at the beginning, so that production on the one hand and employment on the other continue without interruption. It is of the very heart of the agreement that there shall be no cessation of work even pending hearings and decisions.

Not only has this procedure kept peace and fostered cooperation in the industry, but the surrender of the right of strike and lockout was the first big development in the elimination of waste, —a form of waste that hits the very vitals of community life, that involves the economic paralysis of workers and employers, that brings acute suffering and privation to our citizens and frequently actual bloodshed, that stirs the souls of men with hatred and bitterness toward their fellows. This is the most striking form of waste that is being prevented.

Industrial engineers have for many years devoted their efforts to the elimination of every form of waste. To that end, new machinery has been invented and new methods have been perfected. Scientific management was announced as the solution of all production problems,—but the weakness of scientific management has been its failure until very recently to give full consideration to the psychology of human relations. Most of the elements that have been scientific have been impersonal, and nearly all of the personal contacts have been unscientific. As a consequence, workers generally have resented and opposed many of the attempts to avoid waste. It is the recognition of the reciprocal rights of all that has given the workers in the Ladies' Garment Industry in Cleveland that confidence of fair dealing and that readiness to cooperate, essential to the successful introduction of waste-preventing devices. One of the outstanding accomplishments in the development of cooperative industrial relations is the introduction of standards of production in the Cleveland market. It is a difficult matter of negotiation to change the basis of pay of several thousand workers employed in a number of different factories. It is being accomplished in this instance because the industrial engineers charged with the work of installation were chosen and are paid by the union as well as by the employers' association, and are keeping in mind the human values as well as the technical requirements; because there is confidence that these standards, based on the average, and not on either the fastest or the slowest workers, are being installed with a view to accuracy and fairness to both employers and employees. The workers are not treated as parts of a machine. No studies are made on the production of any worker without his knowledge, and it is customary to announce the standards at a joint meeting of management and workers for their approval or criticism. Under this system, those workers producing the standard receive ten percent above the minimum wages previously fixed; the others receive more or less according to their productivity, but all are guaranteed at least the minimum. The increase in efficiency and the decrease in waste, where standards are in effect, has resulted in an increase of from thirteen to thirty-seven percent in the earnings of the workers and a decrease of from nineteen to forty-two percent in the unit production cost to the manufacturers. In a normal year, with fair and accurate standards in all operations, this should answer the demand of the public for a reduction in prices, and that reduction should in turn so stimulate business that the attendant increase in orders will bring additional profit to the manufacturers and additional earnings and more steady employment to the workers.

Partly to compensate the workers for undertaking with their employers this almost revolutionary experiment of production standards as the basis of wages, it was agreed that the workers were entitled to a certain guaranteed minimum of employment. This is particularly momentous because the Ladies' Garment Industry is in its very nature a seasonal industry and it had long been the custom to engage a large number of workers for the peak and to lay them off in the slack seasons.

The plan as accepted and put into effect differs from unemployment insurance in that its primary purpose is not to create a fund which shall increase from year to year to pay the workers while they are idle, but is to provide a sufficient incentive for the manufacturers to keep their workers employed. Each manufacturer guarantees to his regular workers twenty weeks of work during each half year. If he fulfills that guarantee, his obligation is met, but if he does not provide twenty weeks of work, then for the unemployed part of those twenty weeks, his employees become entitled to two-thirds of their minimum wages, with this limitation,—that no manufacturer shall be liable to his workers for more than seven and a half percent of his total direct labor pay roll. To insure the payment of the proper amount, each employer reports this unemployed time of his workers, and deposits with the Impartial Chairman each week an amount equal to seven and a half percent of his total direct labor pay roll for that week. There is no general market fund to pay the workers, for it would be unfair to use the money of the manufacturer who fulfills his guarantee to pay the workers of another manufacturer who does not. The fund of each manufac-

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turer is kept separate, and it is provided that instead of letting the funds increase from year to year, each manufacturer receives back at the end of each six-month period so much of his own fund as has not been needed to pay his workers for unemployed time.

The advantage to the workers needs no elaboration. Manufacturers, to get the benefit of this provision, have sought orders this year which they formerly did not try to get. Even orders on which the manufacturers make no profit involve directly a saving of seven and a half percent of their labor cost, and a considerable overhead; indirectly the employers gain by the increased stability of their labor force,—for continuity of employment means increased production per employee and a much smaller cost of labor-turnover. Manufacturers in any industry would find such saving a big incentive to secure work for their employees.

It is not possible in an article of this length to discuss the many complicated problems that must be met in working out the details of these forward-looking measures to stabilize industrial relations. Experience may show the advisability of modifications to improve the plan for installing standards and the guarantee fund. If their problems are attacked in a constructive, helpful spirit by employers and employees working together, they can be solved. Such was the conclusion of the union and employers' association in the men's clothing industry in New York, who after a bitter fight said in a joint statement: "The disastrous experience of the past six months has conclusively demonstrated to both parties that *cooperation* between the association and the union *alone* can serve their own best interests as well as the best interests of the public and the industry." It should be the aim now to secure that cooperation, without the conflict that inevitably works hardship on employers and workers and on the whole community. Employers and employees throughout the country must recognize that though their interests are not identical, they are reciprocal, that the well-being and prosperity of each is dependent upon that of the other, and that whatever is done for the progress of their industry as a whole will react favorably upon both of its vital elements. With this attitude of confident cooperation, with honest differences decided fairly and justly as they occur, with a joint control and an impartial administration of whatever measures may be developed for the best interests of the industry, the principles that are being worked out in the Ladies' Garment Industry in Cleveland may be profitably adapted to any industry in any community.

WILLIAM J. MACK.

VERSE

The Beating Heart

The heart beats . . .
What does that matter?
The heart beats.
The dead say
"Why is your heart beating so,
Beating
Night and day?"

Would it were not
Beating so, beating
Dark with pain,
Heavy as lead.
I listened. Then I laughed.
"Ha! I give you greeting,"
Said I to the dead.

"It is only for a jest,
For a trick, a riddle,
This tremor in my breast,—
For a pain feigned!
Life's a preposterous legend
Broken off short in the middle,
Left unexplained!"

But the dead would not have my bitterness.
The dead wistfully smiled,
They seemed to say,
"But why is your heart beating so,
Beating in such distress
Night and day?"

"You should know," I answered.
"It beats because of your number
And because of the part of me
That slumbers with the dead.
It beats because it may not break,
Because it longs to slumber.
You should know," I said.

But the dead would not have my misery.
They gravely gazed.
They seemed to say,
"But why is your heart beating so,
Beating interminably
Night and day?"

Then I said, "You know her smile. . . .
You know her loveliness. . . .
You know her trust. . . .
You know . . . you know . . ." I said.
And turned, scorning
Tears that made me blind,—
Turned from the dead.

WILLIAM ROSE BENÉT.

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A COMMUNICATION

The Federal Reserve System and Labor

SIR: The chorus of praise which the Federal Reserve act has received on every hand is a striking thing in the history of American banking legislation. Contrasted with Hamilton's grand plan, the second United States Bank act, the National Bank act, or even the Aldrich-Vreeland law, its fate has been singularly happy. It was prophesied in the beginning that it would obviate panics and even in this very dark hour of business depression few doubts, if any, have been raised as to its efficacy. In 1913, just after the law was signed, the distinguished financial expert, Professor E. W. Kemmerer, wrote with evident satisfaction: "Here we have a mechanism well calculated to develop gradually a great national discount market for commercial paper, make relatively less important speculative call loans as a bank asset, and lessen in the future the probabilities of financial panics." Today an informed editorial writer in the World's Work finds similar gratification in the actual operation of the Federal Reserve act. "Chiefly by virtue of that act" he declares, "our bankers have been able to utilize the credit resources of the country and so to distribute them as to carry business through the dangers of deflation without the usual crashes of big corporate organizations that formerly always accompanied this process."

There seems to be no doubt that the act in question has thus far staved off, at least, the proportion of bankruptcies which has hitherto accompanied financial crises. All students of history know how, in 1837, in 1857, and in the other periodic smashes that accompanied the business process in the nineteenth century, scores of great and established banking and industrial concerns went down in ruin. Prices fell with lightning rapidity, unemployment spread in all the industrial centres, and starvation haunted the homes of working people. Then after a while the circle of production started up again and ran through a similar course. This is all familiar history.

In two important respects, however, the present crisis differs from all preceding panics. There have been relatively fewer bankruptcies and retail prices have been sustained at surprising heights.

The Federal Reserve system furnished unlimited credits for the expansion of industry which the war demanded. Paper money fairly streamed from the printing presses. Instead of Mr. Bryan's fifty-cent dollar which frightened respectable people almost to death in 1896, we have had the joys of a twenty-five cent dollar. Instead of one based on hard, white metal, at least, we have had one resting upon rather uncertain foundations. While the grand show kept up, the printing presses roared and banged away night and day. Then the crash came. The panic was upon us.

Still, there were few bankruptcies. The crisis was evidently upon us by the spring of 1920 if not earlier, but the printing presses were kept busy and the banks poured out money to overstocked manufacturing concerns. We witnessed in the summer of 1920 the extraordinary spectacle of sugar companies, heavily supported by banks, holding sugar up to thirty cents a pound while their warehouses were full to bursting and ruin was staring them in the face. So with many other manufactured commodities. Farm products, less sustained by paper, slid somewhat rapidly down the scale, but today, more than a year after the beginning of the slump, rents have fallen little, if at all, and prices generally are nowhere near the level that will stimulate new and energetic buying.

In the meantime, we are informed that there are over five million working people out of employment. So we see the other side of the shield. Millions of families are thrown upon their savings or deprived of buying power altogether, while prices are still sky-high. I believe that it is just this peculiar conjuncture of things that has not characterized preceding panics. In the "normal" course, that is, without the support of Federal Reserve inflation, many more manufacturing and retail concerns would be in bankruptcy and goods would be thrown upon the market at prices far below the present figures. Industry would have to take as much bitter medicine as agriculture and labor have had to take. It is true that the banks have now cut down on their loans and contracted the currency somewhat, but still they are underwriting a stupendous mass of inflated, if not fictitious, values in industry. In other words, it would seem that the Federal Reserve act has saved business men from bankruptcy and helped materially to sustain high prices, while workingmen have been turned out to shift for themselves, at the same time that the buying power of their savings is seriously curtailed by artificial prices.

If, as in previous panics, the business revival may be expected to appear when prices reach a point that permits buying, when may we hope to escape from the present depression nursed as it is by the very monetary system that helped to bring it about? Is it not too soon to congratulate ourselves on our escape from misfortune on account of the beneficent working of the Reserve law? Are bankruptcies unmixed blessings or wholly undeserved evils? Would it not be better to have the fever and recover quickly from it than to drag through weary months in a half dead condition? And where does labor stand, especially if the government at Washington comes to the aid of the farmers and continues to uphold the prices of food as well as manufactured commodities?

Not being an economist, I refrain from attempting to answer these questions. Indeed, I make no claim that the above analysis is sound, though I am convinced that there are fundamental elements of truth in it. At all events, here is a problem that has not received any extended consideration at the hands of those writers who spread their ink over the broad pages of our financial papers. Perhaps the American Federation of Labor would find it one of the most fruitful topics for its coming program of research.

CHARLES A. BEARD.

New York City.

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CORRESPONDENCE

[The New Republic welcomes communications from its readers in regard to subjects of current interest, and especially concerning articles which have appeared in its columns. Those of 300 words or less are necessarily more available for publication than longer letters.]

For a Negro Theatre

SIR: Wherever the idea of the Negro Theatre has been suggested the response has been so favorable that I am encouraged to believe that the readers of The New Republic will welcome an account of a promising movement for its realization. The Negro unquestionably has those rich qualities of feeling and imagination that are essential to success in dramatic art. His distinctive musical genius is already shaping the development of music both here and abroad. It would be most unfortunate if ample opportunity were not afforded him for the fullest expression in both of these fields. Bert Williams has for years demonstrated the inimitable genius of the Negro as a comedian, and Miller and Lyles in Shuffle Along are giving evidence of the possibilities of the race in musical comedy. But it has remained for Charles Gilpin in The Emperor Jones to be ranked with the greatest artists of the American stage. Yet as Mr. Gilpin has so well stated the real significance of his signal success lies in the fact that there are many others of his race who are prevented from similar achievement only because the doors of opportunity are barred to them. It is interesting to note that of the ten leading persons of American drama selected by the Drama League last year Mr. Gilpin was the only native-born American!

But it is not only as an actor that the Negro has possibilities that are of moment to those who have the future of American drama at heart. The race by long inheritance and varied experience has a store of virgin material for the pen of the dramatist of tomorrow. Ridgely Torrence in his One Act Plays for a Negro Theatre and Eugene O'Neill in his The Emperor Jones and other plays have but scratched the surface of what lies beneath. In Mr. O'Neill's own words, "I am thoroughly in sympathy with your undertaking for I believe as strongly as you do that the gifts the Negro can—and will—bring to our native drama are invaluable ones. The possibilities are limitless and, to a dramatist, they open up new and intriguing opportunities." Art is self-expression and therefore it must be the Negro himself who shall depict in dramatic form his emotions and experiences.

A Negro Theatre where Negro players shall produce their own plays is then the immediate need. What the Irish players have done for the Irish people, what the Jewish players are doing for the Jewish race, the Negro should have the opportunity of doing for his race. May I emphasize the thought that such a theatre would not only have the potentialities of a distinctly new contribution to our native drama but that it would also prove a potent agency for the amelioration of race friction and misunderstandings? Any people must largely win respect and recognition in proportion as it contributes to the higher life of mankind. The sooner the race question is removed from theoretical discussion and political opportunism the better it will be for the Negro and for our country. Let him express his aspirations and his needs in the theatre, not in propagandist plays, but indirectly by pleasing the public with plays of beauty and intelligence and he will soon win the sympathy and support of an ever increasing body of American citizens.

Several years ago Ridgely Torrence was associated with Robert Edmond Jones and others in the organization of a group of Negro players in New York City and the effort was commended on every hand. But the necessary conditions of permanence were lacking. Howard University, situated in Washington, D. C., the largest and perhaps the leading college for Negroes in the world, with an enrollment of some 1800 students drawn from every state in the union and from foreign countries, has undertaken a sincere movement to lay the foundations of the Negro Theatre. It has established a department of dramatic art with Marie Moore-Forrest, nationally known as a director of drama and pageantry, and Cleon Throckmorton, the designer of the scenery for The Emperor Jones and Spring, associated in its direction. The Howard Players have already won the commendation of the public and the dramatic critics by the excellence of their productions. The scenery and costumes are executed by the players in our workshop. In addition to other performances they presented The Emperor Jones with Charles Gilpin in the title rôle at the Belasco theatre in Washington last year. This year plays written by the players themselves will be included in the season's offerings.

Our work has the endorsement of such dramatic critics as Kenneth Macgowan of The Theatre Arts Magazine, Heywood Broun of the New York World, R. C. Benchley of Life and Francis Hackett of the New Republic, and among others of Percy Mackaye, Eugene O'Neill, Ridgely Torrence, and the Provincetown Players.

The discouraging handicap to the proper development of our efforts is in the lack of a theatre or auditorium where the laboratory work in production may be independently conducted. Unless such a theatre can be secured in the near future the further development of this undertaking will be almost impossible. The university itself is unable to give the necessary financial assistance. Fortunately we have at our disposal a brick building, formerly the property of General O. O. Howard, the founder of the university, which for a modest sum can be converted into a little theatre which would answer admirably our present needs.

Such a movement that has so much promise for the future of American drama and for the better understanding of the races will not be permitted to plead in vain for the necessary financial assistance to insure its success. The writer will be pleased to furnish further information to persons interested.

MONTGOMERY GREGORY.
Director of the Department of Dramatic Art,
Howard University, Washington, D. C.

France at the Conference

SIR: As a Frenchman and as a student of international affairs, I took a keen interest in your editorial of October 19th, outlining the part which France might play at the Washington Conference.

Your statement that "as a friendly and disinterested mediator, she can assume the lead at this Conference and come out of it powerful, admired and influential" is to me a sign of your sympathetic disposition toward my country, a disposition which I have never doubted, however severely you may have treated our government.

The French have enough experience of international life, not to expect an immediate and spectacular transformation to occur as a result of the Washington parley; but at the same time, and this is what I wish to emphasize, there is an intense wish that sound cooperation should not again stop with the end of that parley, however limited its first effects may be.

Americans must realize that in the eyes of the world, the next Conference marks the second phase of American entrance into world-collaboration. The first phase was initiated by your soldiers, continued by your statesmen and experts, and terminated by your politicians. Now, if there is any scepticism abroad, it is not toward American principles or their application. To speak frankly, that scepticism applies to the seriousness with which American citizens are willing to support their statesmen in the carrying on of the greatest international task which ever confronted the leaders of a democracy.

The danger is less with foreign diplomatic scheming and trickery than with mental laziness and superstition everywhere. Propaganda is less to be feared than ignorance, because by read-

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ing the propaganda from all sides, you can build a critical opinion (it is the only way I have found yet), while by knowing nothing you can only drift into a series of unforeseen accidents. And besides, it is difficult to know absolutely nothing in these days, in spite of what many people are trying to prove by their example.

Your President has just uttered these memorable words: "I take it [the problem of the Pacific] to be merely a phase of the universal problem of the race, of men and nations wherever they are." This is exactly how the French feel—apart from a few who have not yet understood, and probably will die before they understand. It is not in the Conference itself, it is in the policy which the Conference initiates, that our hopes must be unlimited. For if that policy fails to accomplish the things that the world needs most, who ever will?

Both Europe and America have to step more frankly out of their provincialism. It is the universal problem of the race which is before us, says Mr. Harding. If the Washington Conference does not help to solve it, who ever will?

If no world-wide result can be obtained from cooperation on European soil, because of American distrust of "purely European" problems, and if no world-wide result must be expected on American soil, where shall we then have to meet? On Mount Everest?

PIERRE DE LANUX.

New York City.

The Tariff and the Open Door

SIR: Garet Garrett's article in your issue of October 19th, dealing with the Washington Conference, has this disadvantage, that it seems likely to set up in the minds of your readers some confusion between tariff autonomy and the open door. The two questions are quite distinct. Yet Mr. Garrett, after telling how western nations have raised tariff walls against one another, puts this question into China's mouth: "What has happened to the principle of the open door among the distinguished powers?"

Reading the article left in my mind, and I find on inquiry that others received the same impression, the belief that Mr. Garrett thought tariff the be-all and the end-all of the open door. It is unlikely, in view of the excellent articles and editorials the New Republic has printed on Far Eastern topics, that many of its readers will be seriously misled. But there is such imperative need for a well-informed public opinion about the questions with which the Conference must deal that a clear understanding of the relation the open door policy bears to spheres of influence and interest is important. Whether China's tariff be high or low has nothing to do with it.

That other powers still regulate China's tariff is one of the extremely discreditable things to be charged against them. She should be permitted to determine her own customs provisions with a view to their equal operation against all alien traders; but this has no bearing on the question of a free field of competition within China for all outsiders, once the tariff wall has been passed.

SILAS BENT.

Washington, D. C.

Why "Workers' Education"?

SIR: The several reports you have recently published on "Workers' Education" have interested me greatly, and I should like some further light on this question.

Why does a "worker" (whatever that is) require any different education from anyone else? Why, when the world is progressing slowly but surely away from the idea of education with a view to upholding some particular belief, and toward the idea of education with a view to discovering truth no matter whom it may disappoint—why promote a movement which has no other apparent reason for existence than an assumption, more or less frankly stated, that the standard educational institutions are "capitalistic" in their nature?

In the mouths of avowed disciples of Marx or Lenin, the plea for "Workers' Education" is not surprising, for, if it is indeed the destiny of the wage-working class to take over, at no distant date, the direction of industry, then it is certainly advisable that they receive some instruction to fit them for their formidable task. Few of your readers, however, agree that a wage-worker should look forward to an executive career solely because he is a wage-worker. For the rest of us, then, why "Workers' Education"?

The vast majority of students at the great state universities are workers, learning to be better workers and better citizens. There is no age limit to bar out "adults"; most teachers are disposed to be unprejudiced, to the best of their ability; these institutions are open to all. There are, in practice, two main obstacles lying between the worker and a university education: (1) entrance requirements or "prerequisite" courses, and (2) money. In reference to the first obstacle, it may be stated positively that there is no disposition on the part of the universities, or the legislatures whose creatures they are, to reject students who can handle the work merely on account of inadequate preparation; my own alma mater, for instance, waives all formal entrance requirements where the student's age exceeds twenty-five, accepting anyone who is mentally able to take the course. To be sure, a man who knows nothing of elementary zoology would probably not be accepted for a course in Darwin, Mendel, and Galton. I do not know how many of the "Workers" institutions are accepting students who want to get the last word in science without bothering to study the fundamentals, but I have known enough of such "workers" to know how dangerous a little knowledge may be. If it is the object of the new movement to cater to such frothy learning, the attempt is certainly ill-advised.

There remains, then, the question of expense. When the city and state governments are maintaining, in the face of sectarian critics, splendid institutions where education may be had at a small fraction of its cost to the public, why not encourage workers to avail themselves of these opportunities to a larger extent, rather than cast veiled reflections on their value and advertise educational enterprises which exist more or less for the purpose of supporting certain political or economic theories? To be sure, there are professors in the universities who are prejudiced; are these absent in the "Workers' Colleges"? And, anyway, is an education prejudiced against the working class any more objectionable than one prejudiced against the capitalist class?

The public school system—including the publicly-supported university—is one of the great facts of America; it is one of the few great achievements of collective enterprise in comparison with private enterprise. Why not help it to do what it exists in order to do—give real education to real workers?

H. K. RANDALL.

Chicago, Illinois.

The Unique Governor of Arkansas

SIR: I listened today to the governor of our state. He was talking about education—schools. He never went to school himself, though this bit of autobiography he ignored in making his plea. When he was a boy, in our state there weren't any schools to speak of. There aren't enough of them now. According to the last census only two states "excel us in illiteracy." But without formal education this man succeeded. He became prosperous—a self-made business man, a banker, finally our governor. And today I heard him quoting, with the sincerity of genuine conviction and the force of a determination that will win, statistics to prove the economic handicap of the grammar school as opposed to the high school graduate; of the high school as opposed to the college graduate within our borders. This talk was one of a series as he 'stumps' the state on behalf of the "Forward Educational Movement" in which he is a leading figure. Both avowedly and in fact he is making educational advancement the big thing in his administration. And as I listened to him with approval in my heart, it struck me that he was something unique among governors, not only in this state but in the United States. I live in Arkansas. Its governor is Thomas C. McRae.

MARGARET HANCOCK.

Fayetteville, Arkansas.

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After the Play

THE poverty of the English stage in the mid-Victorian days was abundantly shown by its extensive borrowings from its neighbors across the Channel. Even in his revival of the native drama Tom Robertson leaned heavily on Augier. In the long battle between the theatre and life, between the well-made play of the stage and the drama of reality and ideas, the partisans of the former drew their exemplars chiefly from Scribe, Dumas fils, Sardou, while the supporters of the latter turned to Ibsen. In those days the well-made play was an eminently exportable commodity. The theatre was a cosmopolitan art, and a play written with a single view to taking advantage of its technical resources and emotional appeal was equally acceptable on the stage of Paris, London or New York. Take for example Sardou's Pattes de Mouche, familiar to everybody as A Scrap of Paper. The situation is made by the loss of a compromising note written by a wife in unstable equilibrium, and the development is the hiding and seeking of this elusive document. The play is current in every land where the institution of marriage obtains, and is as universal in its appeal as hunt the slipper. The same is true of Divorçons or Francillon. But with the greater emphasis upon reality and atmosphere on the stage, the well-made play as an exportable product has tended to disappear. The central situation may be carried anywhere, but truth in detail to local conditions and contemporary character, essential in a modern drama, must be replaced by careful adaptation or lost altogether. In the two plays before us it may be set down as lost.

The Claw—at the Broadhurst Theatre—is a translation rather than an adaptation of Henry Bernstein's La Griffe, a play written for Lucien Guitry and acted by him at the Theatre de la Renaissance in 1906, and revived at the Porte-Saint-Martin in 1909. The play follows the career of Cortelon, Socialist journalist, from the day of his engagement to Antoinette, through the successive stages of his ruin through his infatuation for her. Act II is two years later. Harassed by financial difficulties into which Antoinette's extravagance has plunged him, Cortelon dismisses his editor, Leclerc, who will not cooperate in selling the influence of the paper to the capitalists. In Act III, after ten years, Cortelon meets Leclere, who has become leader of the Socialist Party, and abjectly begs him to break off his relations with Antoinette. The last act takes place after four years more. Cortelon is a member of the ministry, accused of accepting a bribe. As he struggles to prepare his defense, Antoinette learns that his exposure is certain and abandons him. He rouses himself to meet her reproaches with curses, but a moment later, with urgent messages demanding his presence at the Chamber, and amid the howls of the mob outside and the shattering of glass of his windows, he thinks only of getting her back, and it is this despair that drives him to madness in Paris, and to death in New York.

Cortelon is a great acting part, consistent according to the logic of the theatre rather than that of life, and Mr. Lionel Barrymore interprets it with a power which invests its strained histrionic appeal with a real pathos. Particularly in the third act he sustains the abjectly pitiful rôle before Leclerc in a single key with never a false note. But upon Mr. Barrymore rests the entire burden of the play, and when one looks away from Cortelon to the world in which he is presented the entire absence of sufficient motive for his suffering and degradation reduces the whole process to unreality. A great man yielding to passion, rotting visibly in his infatuation, this is a theme of universal application; but the surrounding characters and circumstances must be made sufficiently plausible to justify his course. In fact Miss Fenwick as Antoinette is not a sufficient temptation, and the other characters are merely blank misgivings of creatures moving about in worlds unrealized. This is partly due to the economy of the adapters in cutting the minor parts to and beyond the quick. For example, the third act takes place in the studio of Anne, Cortelon's daughter, who has left home after two years of Antoinette's rule. A half nude model is an important accessory, and affords a pretext for some self-expression on the part of two of Antoinette's earlier victims who appear casually; but whether out of deference to moral prejudice or to the star system the model is excluded, and with her goes the atmosphere in which the young Parisians might be made alive. Doulers, Antoinette's father, in Jean Coquelin's hands, is easily conceived as a Ser Pandarus, affording genuine reenforcement to the action, and Leclerc obviously provides an essential element in the tragic betrayal, but it is clear that the American producers know nothing about these people and have selected actors who aid and abet them in keeping the audience in the same ignorance. The net effect is that of a man going mad in a vacuum, surrounded by wax figures.

The Grand Duke is a contemporary comedy by Sacha Guitry. The Grand Duke Feodor Michaelovitch, exiled by the Bolsheviks, has engaged himself as teacher of languages to the daughter of M. Vermillon, a successful profiteer. M. Vermillon is enamoured of Mlle. Martinet, his daughter's music teacher, in whom the Grand Duke recognizes his former mistress, and in her son his own offspring. To complete the circle Mlle. Martinet introduces her son to Marie Vermillon as a teacher of dancing and physical culture. Clearly here is a situation which cannot take root in the stubborn soil of the American stage. The chief dependence of the original is upon the dialogue; the Grand Duke is made to function as raisonneur, and his cynical wisdom is set against the youthful naivetés of his pupil and his son with an irony that is playful and dangerous. But this combination so piquant in the French of Paris becomes insipid in the English of New York. The charm which remains after excision is lost by evaporation. The scene between Marie Vermillon and Michel in his mother's apartment, transformed by imported apparatus into a gymnasium, is a good example of a situation which is sparkling and joyous at the Varietés, but which attenuated to the Lyceum becomes merely childish.

The Grand Duke like The Claw is chiefly valuable as a vehicle for the star. Lionel Atwill plays the title part with the aplomb of a Le Bargy; and Mme. Lina Abarbanell as a cosmopolitan enters her rôle with an apt coquetry which is delicious, but the other characters have nothing by which they can manifest themselves if indeed they know who and what they are. Vermillon is no Poirier, and one wonders why Mr. Achmed Abdullah, who figures as the adapter, did not make him and his daughter American expatriates. That would have rendered at least two of the characters recognizable to themselves and to the audience. As it is, the Grand Duke remains an exotic like the Claw, appealing through its major rôle to interest in the actor's art.

ROBERT MORSS LOVETT.

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The Rational Good

The Rational Good, by L. T. Hobhouse. New York: Henry Holt & Co. $2.00.

BEING a reader and critic of fiction, and also coming to middle age, I naturally turn to philosophy. Philosophy is, in one sense at least, an imagination or picture of a possible scheme of values. It tends all the time, as all pictures tend, to substitute an impossible order for the present actual jumble. It tends to forget actual human nature and to invent a much more ascertainable and obedient arrangement of feelings and purposes, about which one can comfortably predict. Philosophy has its own special temperament and figure. It is calm, sedentary and contemplative. It invents world series in which its Babe Ruths never get injured, in which not only the rules but the probabilities are decently observed. The indecency of chance is somewhat reprehensible in the eyes of most philosophers. They are painters of still life.

In L. T. Hobhouse, however, the untrained and irreverent reader of philosophy discovers a quite unusual temper. In parts of the book, which is short—50,000 words—and immensely compact, one does find a distinct preference in Mr. Hobhouse for what he calls the contrast "between sheer impulse and fully developed will. We can conceive," he says, "that . . . an organized psychic movement will present itself rather as the calm and ordered flow of a deep tide of vital energy than as the fireworks of emotion or the half-sensual flow of impulses." For a philosopher, naturally, this is the easiest psychic landscape in which to garden. But when I read this sort of thing I feel as if a surveyor were asking the Blue Ridge mountains and the Alleghanies to move under the skin of the world in the way that one has seen circus-men move under the collapsing epidermis of the circus-tent, and then to flatten themselves mysteriously out, the way the circus-tent flattens out. That, of course, would give the surveyor a most convenient canal-surface, as prosaic as Ohio. But it would omit the actual datum of geology. Similarly the talk of "fully developed will" seems to me to beg the question of human nature. Given all the will in the world, emotions will be touched off not as "fireworks," but as rifle-shots. Man is not a clam. If he boasts his "fully developed will," it simply means that he sits inside in his stuffy soul with the windows shut and the curtains drawn. To want to gather one's "energy of feeling, of emotion, of conation, into an organized whole, moving in a determinate direction, and capable of bringing its whole force to bear at any point" is, unfortunately, to be an absurd prig and to emulate a certain indoor idealist who was trimmed at Versailles. One cannot arrange a philosophy of fully developed will without considering the accident, the adventure, of life. Life has its weather which makes pre-determination absurd. And, in any case, there is danger in the whole conception of duty treading its path with proud punctilio amid "the tragic complexities of life," our nature "canalized into a deep and steady stream flowing within determinate limits in ordered activity to foreseen ends."

As a matter of fact the best refutation of this still-life of "rebellious desire and the orderly community" is to be found in The Rational Good. Open at any of the later chapters and you are likely to light on such a phrase as, "anarchy may be ended by the steam roller, but such is not the method of permanent progress." Mr. Hobhouse is anything but the exponent of priggishness. His book is one of the best I have ever read.

At the basis of his book, it must be said, Mr. Hobhouse does assume a normal man who is a "normal decent man," in whom moral impulses exist and a sense of moral obligation. "The rational harmony contemplated here," he says, "means neither more nor less than the more perfect adjustment and coordination of the permanent forces that make for betterment in the movement in the world, and which, slowly gathering vitality as civilization advances, now mainly require a fuller and more adequate expression to secure to them the ultimate control of the movement of social life." This asserts a faith in progress which seems to me to be taken as axiomatic rather too readily. But even if this is so (and I retain an impression that this is so after reading the book twice), and even if we are assured that "in the main God is not mocked," some pages before it is implied that there is no God, the impressiveness of the book is not at all impaired by such synchronous moralizing. For the impressiveness consists, I think, in the conception that Mr. Hobhouse has of reason as a faculty wound up with feeling and not, as is so often expressed, divorced from feeling, frowning on it and regarding all feeling as disorderly caprice.

"The conception of reason . . . is not one of a faculty possessed, prior to and apart from experience, of certain clear and indubitable universal axioms with which it confronts a tangled experience proving and explaining so much as can be brought under these axioms and leaving the rest unrationalized. It is the conception rather of a principle operative within experience the work of which is always partial and incomplete, always extending itself, while at the same time pruning and sharpening its own method. Neither proof nor explanation consist in the reference of the experienced order to something outside it, but in the exhibition of its internal coherence, i. e., the system of universal connexions in accordance with which its parts do not merely tolerate one another in mutual consistency, but require and maintain one another. . . . Reason then generically is the principle of interconnexion persistently applied . . . the rational as such is not an established system, but a process governed by a principle, the process by which understanding deepens, error is repeatedly eliminated, and truth constantly enlarged."

No mechanism, then, lurks at the back of Mr. Hobhouse's mind, unless one is to call his process a mechanism. And his process is necessarily a liberating process because it accommodates impulse-feeling and experiment. "For the principle of harmony," as he puts it later, "there is no absolute right short of the entire system of human well-being, no absolute duty except to serve that system to the best of our understanding." And again, "apart from the conception of harmony there is no criterion to decide between the kind of development that would be good and the kind that would be bad."

How does the poor individual (the ego) fare inside this conception of harmony? On the whole, I should say, he is not sacrificed unnecessarily. Mr. Hobhouse is at pains to assure us that "without the notion of rationality the mass of social feelings would be without cohesion, guidance or unity of aim," and "what is in the order of reason to be held good for me, is not finally determinable apart from the good of others whom it will affect." But this does not dictate that the personality must be accommodated to society at the moment. "What we seek to build

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up is something much greater than any individual, but not something in which the individual is lost."

Believing that "the good of the whole cannot rest on the continuous sacrifice of the parts," Mr. Hobhouse applies the lessons of modern psychology to the whole notion of rigid order as opposed to harmony. Taking a social or political case of nationalism, for example, he declares that "what the principle of harmony will tell us is that a national claim, if generic and deep, will, if not satisfied, contain seeds of disharmony which repression will not kill." Similarly, discussing the ordinary run of moral judgments, he vigorously pronounces that "in the very essence of moral censorship there is an anti-social element, a pursuit of the sinner, an exaltation of self, something at times of the hunting instinct, something of 'herd' psychology." The principle of harmony is not a principle of subjection, but of synthesis. And if one wishes to depart from the tribe, "What test is there but in the living?"

In his allegiance to feeling as the principle of action—"there is no principle of action derivable from thought or ratiocination abstracted from feeling"—Mr. Hobhouse gives warm reality to his whole argument. He insists, of course, that "there are elements of order, of restraint, of consecutive purpose in the ordinary life, and the starting point of ratiocination is the conception that these elements are the partial and imperfect incarnations of a purpose which is comprehensive, self-consistent, and complete." This asks for faith, but purpose exists and must start somewhere, why not here? At all events, it is only in this book that I have as yet found the barriers between reason and feeling, egoism and altruism, pleasure and egoism, intelligibly removed. What remains as a problem is the case of Machiavellianism or immoral harmony. And this too Mr. Hobhouse handles admirably.

FRANCIS HACKETT.

Swift's Relations with Women

Vanessa and Her Correspondence with Jonathan Swift. Letters edited for the first time from originals. With an Introduction by A. Martin Freeman. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. $2.50.

"CONTROVERSY," says the editor of the Swift-Vanessa letters, "might have been more moderate in tone and more fruitful of result, if writers had always remembered that, though grounds of conjecture are abundant, the data for forming a judgment are manifestly incomplete." Leslie Stephen, a shrewd and cautious biographer, with a lawyer's gift for handling evidence, says "This is one of those cases in which we feel that even biographers are not omniscient; and I must leave it to my readers to choose their own theory, only suggesting that readers too are fallible."

I propose an explanation of Swift, but propose it only as a conjecture, an hypothesis. I will not even argue it up to the point of positive belief; certainly I shall not push it beyond the line where belief borders knowledge. Conjecture is good if it remains clearly in the realm of conjecture, an honest area of thought, and does not try to sneak over into the land of things proved. I hope some day to review all the evidence in detail and make the case out as completely as the evidence may warrant. In this brief note I merely make a suggestion.

All of Swift's relations with women, and much else in his life, may be accounted for by the supposition that early he discovered or suspected that he was insane, that he believed his insanity might be transmissible, that he was consequently afraid to have children, that he was honest and strong enough to keep himself in check, that the resulting suppression made him irascible and bitter, that he was a vigorous and passionate man, that his quick shifts from tender fooling to savage satire, his friendly and brutal moods, his strutting arrogance that amazed the coffee houses, were not due to any tomfoolery of politics or thwarted ambition in the petty matter of advancement in the church but were due to a conflict, honorably won by Swift, in the place where a man lives. The "early" in this supposition is important. Leslie Stephen, quoting the familar dark prophecy of Swift at the age of fifty: "I shall be like that tree; I shall die at the top," justly observes that "a man haunted perpetually by such forebodings might well think that marriage was not for him." But Stephen is dealing with Swift in middle age and offering an explanation of why, assuming that Swift was not already married to Stella, he did not marry Vanessa. Let us place the beginning of the perpetual foreboding early in Swift's life and see if the main facts, so far as we know them, will lie upon this supposition.

Swift's attacks of vertigo began in his youth. He attributed his illness to an over-consumption of fruit when he was twenty-one. Swift knew better than that. Even if we assume that medical science in the eighteenth century was stupid and backward, Swift was too intelligent to believe that an early period of indigestion accounted for the suffering which afflicted him all his life. He knew, or suspected and feared, what was the matter with him. In 1699, when he was thirty-two, he wrote some resolutions, headed "when I come to be old." Among them is this: "Not to be fond of children or let them come near me hardly." Stephen quotes a friendly commentator as saying: "We do not fortify ourselves with resolutions against what we dislike but against what we feel in our weakness we have reason to believe we are really inclined to." That friendly commentator was right and understood human nature, though he had never lived (Stephen does not name him) to hear about libido, suppression, defence, inversion, and other wise words now current. Stephen goes wrong, it seems to me, in his following friendly commentation: "Yet it is strange that a man should regard the purest and kindliest of feelings as a weakness to which he was too much inclined." I have not space to quote the rest, which is on page 31 of Stephen in the English Men of Letters. Swift was not fighting against a weakness, he was fighting against a strength. He resolves "not to marry a young woman." In a letter he calls a woman's children her "litter," and that has been quoted by some critics as an example of his brutality. He loves Tom, Dick, and Harry but he hates mankind. Is it not clear? He cannot have what he wants, and what he wants is what normally results in children, in more mankind. His resolution, superficially harsh and misanthropic, is a masked, or inverted, expression of desire. Such expression is not of course, peculiar to literary satirists, but it should be remembered that Swift had supremely the ironic trick of thought, the gift of saying a thing by saying exactly the opposite.

The resolution should be read in the light of the fact that Stella was eighteen years old, a grown and comely woman. But the interpretation of it depends much more closely on the termination of his affair with Varina. The

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date, 1699, suggests this. He had proposed to Varina, Miss Waring, in 1696, in a letter which is passionate enough, and had been rejected, at least provisionally, on the score of her ill health and his poverty. Four years later, after he had received the living at Laracor and seemed to be on the way to other preferments, she wished to hold him to his word, and he jilted her. There are three explanations. One is that he had fallen in love with Stella and so out of love with the other woman. The second explanation, Leslie Stephen's, is that his ambitions had not been realized, his advancement had not been brilliant, and marriage would have kept his nose to the grind-stone in an obscure living. That explanation is not good, for, though Swift always had an eye to the main chance and was worried about money, power, and position, it is only men of cool blood or men who have extra-marital opportunities to gratify their desires who are ever deterred by considerations of thrift and economy from marrying the beloved woman. Swift was not cold but passionate. And it is inconceivable that he, a clergyman in a small parish, was finding his pleasure in illicit intercourse.

The third explanation, which I venture to suggest, is that between his proposal to Varina in 1696 and his insulting rejection of her in 1700, between his thirtieth and thirty-fourth years, he had discovered a reason why he must not live with a woman. His resolutions, remember, not to marry a young woman and not to be fond of children were written in 1699. How could Stephen believe that those resolutions, with others "pithy and sensible," were "for behavior in a distant future?" Swift's heading, "when I am come old," means nothing; he is writing from the misery of the moment. Why is the letter in which Swift puts an end to poor Varina so brutal and insulting that, in Stephen's words, no one with a grain of self-respect could accept the conditions of marriage which he lays down? Because he could not tell her the real reason, a reason based on fear rather than on physiological certainty. It is an honestly dishonest letter. It is a perfect example of that perplexing contradiction which appears everywhere in his life and writings, that he was brutally honest, saw through the postures and masks of everybody else, and yet postured, attitudinized and lied himself. He carried his secret agony with fortitude and alternately raged against the world and fooled with it. In relation to the Varina episode Stephen misses the point, though what he says is true enough: "Swift could be the most persistent and ardent of friends. But, when any one tried to enforce claims no longer congenial to his feelings, the appeal to the galling obligation stung him into ferocity, and brought out the most brutal side of his imperious nature." Though a man has but one heart, yet his relations with his friends are quite different from his passions for women. A proud, ferocious and imperious nature is not the whole story of Swift. It does not give us the real foundation of the story of Varina, of Stella, of Vanessa and the man they loved.

On the foundation which I propose the story of Stella will rest securely, intelligibly. If Swift was married secretly to Stella in 1716—the evidence is not conclusive—the marriage was only a legal ceremony performed perhaps for the purpose of securing her in case her fortunes went wrong or gossip or other circumstances made necessary the protection of his name. Almost certainly there was no physical marriage, no union legal or illegal. Why? He was free and she was free. She was, by his own account, a charming person who would have been quite presentable to his friends and in all ways helpful to a man in middle age who is supposed to need a woman to take care of him. The answer is simply that Swift feared to propagate his tainted stock, that he refrained and suffered. And the Journal to Stella is a record of suffering, of passion disguised and writhing. A busy man, with other things to write, does not write that much to a woman he does not love, and he does not write that way to a woman he openly and avowedly loves. The "little language," the silliness, the foolings, the avoidance of direct declaration of love, the semi-paternal injunctions, the gossip about big people, much of it whimsical chatter in which we get only by implication the serious view of Swift and his times that has made it an important historical document, the two or three hintful promises of felicity which commit Swift to nothing, the passages of melancholy and half-humorous old man's grouch—all this is a veiled love-letter. It is tingling and nervous and alert and full of pain, not the idle recreation of a tired man of affairs entertaining a child, but the heart-break of a powerful man of forty-five expressed by indirections to a woman of thirty. Perhaps she understood his spleen and his complaints of ill-health. We may be on the way to understanding them now. Certainly Stephen is off the track when he says that there are "grounds for holding that Swift was constitutionally indisposed to the passion of love." Unless he means by that that Swift knew that there was something in his constitution which made the ultimate realization of love impossible. And Stephen does not mean that, for he speaks of the absence of traces of passion from writings "conspicuous for their amazing sincerity." An amazing example of a sincere biographer missing the trace! Swift's insistence on his "coldness" and his assertion that he did not understand love are precisely an expression of what the words deny.

Now enters the third woman of record—there may have been more—in Swift's unhappy sexual life, Vanessa, Esther Vanhomrigh. At the same time that he is writing his long love-letter, the Journal to Stella, he is seeing Vanessa. Of course. It is all explicable. The man cannot have the woman he wants and is tantalized by another woman who wants him. He plays and he won't play. He is tormented by the same restraint that keeps him out of Stella's bed. He is handsome, virile, and distinguished. The woman is crazy about him. He is unable to keep away from her, but he is fighting, for reasons known to him, against the impulse to possess her. He plays again, as with Stella, a game which, viewed superficially, is fraudulent and unfair. He is teacher, guide, philosopher and Dutch uncle. But she was not a docile, gentle girl like Stella. Mr. Freeman, who handles his documents admirably and is not slanted from the truth by moralistic concerns for hero or heroine, is, nevertheless, naïve and blind to the facts which he has so carefully considered. He says: "The tragedy, then, was inevitable from the day when Vanessa attempted to arouse in him a love of which he was incapable. It might have been hastened, or its form might have been different, if he had sternly broken with Vanessa as soon as he discovered the nature of her desires." Swift was not incapable, in that sense, and he knew the nature of her desires, for he was not a fool. What he knew also was the nature of his own desires and their possible consequences. That is, I conjecture, the heart of the story of Swift's heart.

JOHN MACY.

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American English

American English, by Gilbert M. Tucker. New York: Alfred Knopf. $3.50.

THE workmen of Great Britain, Ruskin admonished them in Fors Clavigera, were to remember that "England taught the Americans all they have of speech," and that the words not learned from England were unseemly, "the vile among them not being able to be humorous parrots but only obscene mocking-birds." That ought to have been silly enough to close the subject; at any rate it is perfect Ruskin. But in so far as such Englishmen as Ruskin and Dean Alford and the rest, who have treated this subject with varying taste, prejudice, scholarship and spleen, have helped to awaken in Americans themselves an interest in their own speech, they have done us a service. We owe them a good deal if they lead to such a book as Mr. Tucker's.

The most important part of American English is the list of 1,900 words supposed to be genuine Americanisms—which is to say they either originated in America or are used there in a sense today that would not be understood in Great Britain; such expressions as ball up, or bonanza, chip in; blow up meaning berate, corn for maize. There is a place, too, for the concise estimate of every important book that has appeared so far on American speech; and the bibliography, almost complete, though Professor Payne's excellent Word List from Eastern Alabama is omitted. A long list of "Exotic Americanisms" is made up of more than 1,100 expressions regarded by Bartlett, Farmer, Clapin or Thornton as peculiar to this country; which Mr. Tucker handles mainly by means of quotations mostly from British authors in whom the supposed Americanisms occur—rather jolly reading. In the list are words like alligator, quoted now by Mr. Tucker from Sir Walter Raleigh, 1614; baggage, found in Shakespeare, Chaucer and Goldsmith; cut up, found in Dickens and elsewhere; and finally the "three American verbs" that, according to the Messrs. Fowler in The King's English, all Englishmen must "take a very firm stand against" as specimens of the "barbaric taste" that prevails in the United States: placate, antagonize, and transpire. But placate was used by Cudworth in 1678; antagonize is defined in Bailey's Dictionary, 1742, and appears elsewhere; and transpire is cited by Murray as occurring here and there from 1597 to 1908. Though of course the British answer to this is simple enough. These words are to be found in English literature at some time or other; granted. That proves nothing. They may be history but they are not good English. Americans should have been more careful in observing just when a word ceases to be used in England, however good it may once have been.

But it is just here that I find fault with Mr. Tucker's book. He has his British critics too much on his mind. As an American concern over our medium of life and literature this whole field is alive and important. There is every sort of interest in it, curious or creative: of folklore, romance, history, or the art of writing; of words invented by Indians, by Dutchmen, or Spaniards, Negroes, Chinamen; expressions peculiar to the West, to the South, to the Church, to politics; or cant words, slang, new terms; the atmosphere of language. This is all living substance, and a book about it is a living affair. But in so far as it is only an answer to English attacks this sort of writing is second-rate; racing for an international etymological cup is hardly worthwhile.

Obviously some of the English criticism of American speech is good for us, helpful enough; and a good deal of it is purely arbitrary, stupid or captious, or merely prejudiced and irascible. But what of it? Mr. Tucker lets all this get under his skin. He needs to remind himself gaily and oftener that prejudices and narrowness and misinformation must always be the unfortunate by-products everywhere of national pride and a strong sense of race. To be so concerned about and so irritated, as Mr. Tucker sometimes is, with British opinion is not urbane; it has even something colonial about it. It suggests a sort of national inferiority complex. Save for this I should enjoy sending his book to some of my English friends. But I can see the Oxford smile now at certain of the passages with their too heavy considerations, reproof and pique, for Oxford, whatever else it may do, goes in for the light touch. The technique of being serious in precisely the right way is one of Oxford's most delicate intuitions. And Oxford might, and rightly I think, find Mr. Tucker a little priggish sometimes when he takes the English to task for things allowed by good usage in England, the only test, after all, for the English. In exactly the same way good American usage must be the test for us. And it must be said in all fairness to the better type of Englishman that he likes you better if you stand on your own feet, though you may be rude about it, as he often is; he prefers a Texas ranchman, without rudeness but wholly and almost unconsciously himself, to a Boston curate falling over himself to do the right thing for London.

We may as well give up any hope that British standards of speech as they arise and develop can be imposed on American usage, since America is more and more a world to itself, of mingled peoples and conditions. Our language is one of our most profound interests, and a passion of craft and imagination may be brought to the study of it. But there is no more argument for our trying to emulate only British developments in speech from now on than for our having only one sauce, however white, to a hundred dishes or one bathtub to a house of thirty rooms. A student of this subject must possess this idea, wear it lightly and surely, and so waste less on the merely defensive.

STARK YOUNG.

Selected Current Books

The Wanderer, by Grant Overton. New York: Harcourt. $2.00.

A novel from the life of Walt Whitman.

Four Years in the Underbrush, anonymous. New York: Scribners. $2.50.

A "novelist of note" gives her adventures as a working woman in New York.

And Even Now, by Max Beerbohm. New York: Dutton. $2.00.

Max Beerbohm collects twenty essays after ten years.

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The New
REPUBLIC
Washington Conference
SUPPLEMENT

The Meaning of the Conference

I

The Abdication of Europe

THE Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments is an unprecedented and a spectacular event in the annals of international diplomacy. Hitherto governments have arranged to hold all important international conferences in a European capital.* The selection of a European city was taken for granted. In the large majority of cases none but European powers participated in the negotiations, and they discussed nothing but European broils. Even when the agenda of a conference included questions in which other than European powers were represented and interested, it was naturally held in Europe. The practice was a matter of convenience for the great majority of the delegates and of propriety and efficiency in reference to the objects of the conferences. Europe might include only a small part of the world in population and area, but it was almost the whole of the world in power and in importance. It was the king of continents. Other continents became internationally important chiefly as the result of European interest and recognition.

The Washington Conference violates these precedents. It is summoned by an American government. It gathers in an American capital. Yet it does not deal with specifically American questions. It is the result of a world war which was chiefly a European war. It is called to discuss and, if possible, to agree upon a general limitation of armaments. Its agenda include questions about the rules of war and the manufacture and trade in arms whose official international discussion has hitherto taken place in Europe. Its specific political subject-matter concerns Asia more than America. When, consequently, the Prime Ministers of the two most powerful European countries decide to represent their nations in Washington at enormous personal inconvenience, it is clear that something has happened to the kingship of Europe among the continents. There are excellent reasons of a kind which have proved to be decisive in the past why a conference on the limitation of armaments should assemble, say, in London, but under existing conditions London would not do. The British government could not have called it and managed it with any chance of success. Neither could the French government. So the European statesmen have had to pack their ribbons and medals in their grips and travel, much against their will, to the upstart continent of America. They can never undo the fact of their coming. It means the surrender by Europe of leadership among the continents—a leadership which began with the conquests of Alexander, which was continued by the victory of Rome over Carthage, which was successfully defended by the defeat of the Saracens at the Battle of Tours and which has never since until now been seriously impaired.

It does not follow that any other continent will take its place. For the moment there is one country rather than one continent which occupies a political and economic position strong enough to assume the initiative and invite the other nations to meet and discuss the disproportion between their meagre assets and their prodigious liabilities. That country is the United States. Our fellow citizens will feel flattered to see their country promoted from the class of a rank outsider at international feasts of conversation into the lonely class of presiding potentate. Their novel eminence will look to many of them like a mere recognition of their

*Algeciras was an accidental exception.

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excellence in power and ability and character. But they should not be over unctuous about it. The American people have not done much to deserve the transfer of the initiative in international politics to this country and they have as little excuse for continental as they have for national complacency. They are only more fortunate and less delinquent than their brethren in Europe.

America has, indeed, been increasing steadily in power and importance as compared to Europe, but except for one fact it would still be far inferior to Europe in power and importance. That one fact, of course, is the war. Europe allowed itself to be rent and shattered by a civil war. Its governments would or could not either settle their quarrel or confine it to their own borders. They preferred to call in America and Asia. With this assistance the Western powers won the victory which was to save the world, but their victory with the help of the United States did not save Europe. It perpetuated instead of healing the European schism. Its result was to dissipate the power, impair the importance and undermine the social self-confidence of the king of continents. Its downfall is not a defeat nor as yet a supersession. It is an involuntary abdication. The European nations are the victims of their own dissensions and destructive violence. Being unable to regulate themselves, they can no longer dominate other continents. They preferred during the war to adopt a strategy of mutual physical annihilation rather than a strategy of political accommodation. They succeeded in pulling down their common power, influence and leadership.

Europe may never regain its former kingship. America, Asia and Africa are increasing relatively in wealth, population and power, and they will insist more and more upon being treated at least as equals in a federation of continents. But it will be a grave misfortune for civilization if Europe does not come back, if the European peoples remain the helpless victims of their domestic dissensions. The early moral and physical recuperation of Europe is indispensable to the happiness and welfare of other peoples and to any sufficient concentration of human attention on improvements in the art of living. Even in misfortune and delinquency Europe continues to be, if not the king of continents, at least a peculiarly interesting and fascinating assemblage of ex-royalty. If its nations go down, they will for the time being tumble civilization down with them. Its primacy has lasted so long and was so bravely carried that it cannot temporarily resign without erecting the causes of its resignation into the chief preoccupation of its successor.

II

The Interest of the United States in Land Armaments

The first and most fundamental business with which the Washington Conference will deal is the sickness of Europe and the route to recovery. The President and Mr. Hughes for reasons to which I will refer later shy away from this matter, but they cannot prevent its consideration and they have not dared to try. Indeed, by including land disarmament in the agenda, they invited the European delegates to propose for discussion both the political dissensions and the economic disabilities of Europe. The European governments know perfectly well that their expenditures on armaments are one of the chief barriers to economic recovery, but these expenditures are only the doctor's bills which their political maladies force them to pay. They will propose, consequently, to discuss the limitation of land armaments in relation to the national conflicts of which these armies are the instruments, and as this proposal will only repeat the proposal of the United States in relation to the discussion of naval armaments, the American delegation cannot refuse.

Yet the inability to refuse will place the American government in an awkward position. For the British and French delegations will, in formulating their attitude towards European armament and its economic effect, focus the discussion upon an embarrassing aspect of the subject. They will insist upon the impossibility of recovery without positive assistance from abroad which the United States is alone in a position to supply; and they will ask the United States to toe the mark. This the American government is extremely reluctant to do. No matter how courteously it refuses, the refusal will look churlish and selfish. What is the justification for the refusal? And what will be its effect upon the outcome of the Conference?

The French argument and policy is ingeniously and persuasively stated by Mr. Sisley Huddleston elsewhere in this issue. It is in substance a refusal to disarm until France can count upon the payment of her bill for reparations and upon absolute future security. She will ask substantially as a price of disarmament that the American government guarantee the payment of the reparations account and enter into a defensive alliance with her against Germany. She does not ask for the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, but she does ask for the ratification of the Anglo-French-American agreement to protect the French frontier against another German attack. She cannot consider any reduction of military expenses and land armaments un-

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less an American army remains actually or potentially upon the Rhine.

An American government controlled by the Republican party cannot acquiesce in this argument without repudiating its declared policy with respect to European entanglements. It rejected the Covenant of the League chiefly because of Article X and the consequent implication of the American nation in European territorial disputes. The proposed Anglo-French-American convention would, far more than the Covenant, constitute a guarantee by this country of the territorial dispositions of the Treaty of Versailles. For France will construe any attempt by Germany to escape from the Treaty as an attack, and as Germany recovers, if she is allowed to recover, she will become increasingly rebellious against the legislation of Versailles. In that event the American nation would have assumed an onerous military responsibility—one which it could not permanently redeem unless it added substantially to the number of its trained soldiers and to its whole military equipment.

The disinclination by the Republicans to ratify the Anglo-French-American convention is dictated chiefly by a desire to keep the American nation out of war, but in spite of its screen of self-preoccupation it makes for a result which is as much to the advantage of Europe as to the advantage of this country. An American guarantee to France against attack by Germany would not bring appeasement to Europe and it would not result, except perhaps for a moment, in the reduction of European military expenses and land armament. It would perpetuate the European civil war by giving renewed vitality to its major causes. Reassured by the American guarantee, France would not feel the need of accommodating her policy to the susceptibilities and the interests of Germany and Russia. Her convention with America would mean to her the confirmation of military victory, obtained as the result of American intervention, and a relief from the necessity, which she is now increasingly feeling, of seeking security by means of an agreement with Germany.

The American nation cannot guarantee security to a France whose insecurity is rooted deep in European dissensions. It cannot pledge its military power to safeguard France against the consequences of a foreign policy over which it exercises no control. The European nations, if they wish for security and recuperation, must first deal remedially with the causes of their own dissensions and move in the direction of a political reconciliation with one another. French opinion, faced with the impossibility of collecting reparations from Germany and the necessity of choosing between a policy of accepting this fact or using it to destroy Germany, is hesitating. If France decides to carry on the destruction of Germany, she will almost certainly isolate herself and bring what remains of Germany nearer to Great Britain, America and Russia. It is a very dangerous course which she may well shrink from adopting. But what is the alternative? If she does not wish or dare to destroy Germany and yet is not protected against ultimate German resentment, is she not bound in the long run to seek an accommodation? Will not the logical and realistic French mind understand the force of this alternative and act on the understanding? Would not a defensive alliance with this country cloud the issue and tempt her to pursue a temporizing policy of preventing the recuperation of Germany regardless of its effect upon Europe and the world?

When the American friends of France and Europe urge an immediate political intervention in Europe by the American government, they are performing a poor service for the object of their solicitude. What they are really proposing is an assumption by the United States of a responsibiilty for European welfare and a leadership in European affairs, which, if it were successful, would be tantamount not only to the abdication of Europe as the king of continents, but to its supersession by the chief American nation. No doubt if the American people devined the opportunity of dominating the civilized world for a few generations which now lies within their grasp and if they were ready to subordinate the use of their economic and military resources to that end, they might by a colossal tour de force impose a temporary equilibrium on Europe and pose as its paternal rescuer. But the American people are not capable of such an effort of the imagination and the will, and if they were, they would commit themselves to an adventure ultimately disastrous to themselves and to Europe. Before it can accept American aid with safety or profit, Europe must mitigate its domestic animosities and dissensions. European recovery is primarily a European problem. It will take a European conference, in which Germany and Russia are represented as equals, to engineer the work. The only way in which the European peoples can regain anything like their former power and prestige is to forget about France d'abord and Deutschland über Alles and become first of all good Europeans. When they have become better Europeans, they will have a sufficient excuse to ask the American people to become better citizens of the world.

Two years ago the advice to the European nations to earn assistance by becoming first of all good Europeans would have seemed like a fan-

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tastic impossibility. It does not look very practicable today, but it is not as fantastic as it formerly was. Fellowship in adversity has diminished some of the animosities, egotisms and conflicts which Europe inherited from the war; and adversity will, I am afraid, continue until the Europeans renew and increase their conviction of common interests and destinies. The American nation can and will alleviate the resultant suffering, as it did last year in Central Europe and as it is now doing in Russia. But it cannot take over responsibility for the condition or for the cure. If France will not reduce armaments without the presence, actual or potential, of American troops on her eastern frontier, then France will have to remain armed and both France and Europe will have to pay the bill. The French are not the only people in the world who are entitled to security. They will never get it for themselves until they are willing to share it with others.

As long as the Treaty of Versailles is the foundation of European public law and the French attitude remains what it is, there is little or no chance of land disarmament. Neither can the American government take the lead in bringing it about. The American army is already reduced to the volume of a police force; and the French proposal, whatever its temporary effects on European military expenditures, would increase the military responsibility of this country. The European nations have no sufficient excuse for passing the problem of diminishing land armaments on to the American people. America may eventually help in reducing them to manageable limits, but only in case the European nations will themselves move towards the conversion of Europe from a bigger Balkans into a greater Switzerland.

In so far as the United States can help the European peoples in reducing their land armaments to manageable limits, it should use for that purpose an economic rather than a political leverage. The case for American economic assistance to Europe is much stronger than the case for political and military assistance. An enormous proportion of the immediately available financial and economic power of the world is concentrated in the United States. The proportion is so large that European recovery will be unnecessarily and deplorably delayed unless it can obtain American cooperation. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that without active American aid it will be impossible for the European nations to balance their budgets, stabilize their currencies and restore their credits. Of course the United States cannot by any display of generosity bestow solvency upon economically bankrupt governments any more than it can bestow security upon nations whose political liabilities far exceed their political assets. But it can, should, and in the end must help Europe to write off financial liabilities which, if written off, would enormously alleviate the existing political exasperation, and in the end the military expenditures. France and Great Britain would willingly scale down the German reparation account whose size is a source of so much of that existing political instability, provided the American government would not insist on collecting the debts due by them to this country.

The American government is as little prepared just at present to cancel any considerable part of its loans to Europe as it is to guarantee the Rhine frontier, but we trust that in this second respect the Conference will have an educational effect both upon Congress and the administration. The delegates from the major European countries will have excellent reasons and opportunities to call the attention of the American delegation and American public opinion to the partial dependence of their political and military upon their economic liabilities, and the demonstration, if submitted with tact, will little by little dissolve the existing obstacles to the acceptance of the truth and will soak in. Inasmuch as the subject is not specified in the agenda, the Conference cannot very well spend much time in discussing the financial predicament of Europe, but the European delegates can call attention to the paramount importance of these economic questions, and they can pave the way for the summoning in the near future of an economic congress.

Will the assumption by the American government of the attitude towards European problems which I have indicated wreck the Conference? Will the refusal to guarantee Europe against the consequences of its dissensions result in a refusal by the European governments to consider on their merits the American proposals to limit naval armaments and to remove the causes of disorder in the Pacific? It may have this result. There is a disposition among European diplomats to consider national politics as necessarily the trading of exclusive advantages, and if this disposition prevails in Washington, and if the American government will not consider the European claim for economic assistance, the Conference may increase instead of diminishing international disorder. But there is a good chance that it will not. The American government may prove to be open to conviction about its share in the economic disabilities of Europe. For its own part it is not asking Europe to accept and approve an egotistic national American policy in the Pacific, but to help in defending and eradicating the existing causes of disorder and the excuses

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for naval armaments. The European governments can lend a hand without assuming American or Asiatic liabilities or imperilling any assets which belong properly to themselves. If they are candidly and wisely approached, they will, considering the predicament of the world and the pressure by public opinion for concrete results, be likely to consent.

III
The Interest of the United States in Naval Armaments

The United States cannot at present take the initiative in bringing about the reduction of armies, the cost of which is ruining Europe. Its inability to deal with the causes of the disorder and dissension in Europe, the expression of which is the Treaty of Versailles, prevents it from dealing with their effects in insecurity and armaments. But it occupies an entirely different position with respect to the reduction of navies. It is qualified in all probability to bring about a limitation of naval armament and to give permanence to a holiday in the building of battleships by removing the reasons which have prompted its own and other governments to compete for the control of the seas. Naval armament is a matter in which the American people are unavoidably and overwhelmingly interested.

They have emerged from the war with a navy which will soon be on paper either a little inferior or a little superior to that of Great Britain. The United States is one of the three great naval powers in the world, and if it decided to become the first, it could afford to outbuild both Japan and Great Britain. It is one of the ironies of history that the actual outcome of the competition in naval armaments between Germany and Great Britain is the construction of a fleet by the United States which forms a more serious threat to British naval supremacy than the German or any other fleet has been since the Napoleonic wars; but in this as in many other respects the war only precipitated a result which was likely some time to take place. The American nation is the creature of maritime exploration and traffic. During the pioneer period when we were conquering the continent, our eyes were fastened on the land, but sea power, its distribution and deportment, must always remain one of our chief objects of national and international solicitude. We have already fought a war with Great Britain over what we took to be her bad maritime manners. We entered the late war as the result of a quarrel with Germany about a violation of the rules of the sea. We are not as yet dependent on the sea for subsistence, as are the British Isles, but it is only a question of time. A hundred million people with thousands of miles of coast line on both the Atlantic and the Pacific and with the welfare of its people increasingly derived from foreign commerce is, in a disorderly world, bound to need and demand a navy big enough to challenge the control of the seas.

During the century between 1814 and 1914 the American nation, except for a few years during the Civil War, did not possess a formidable navy. It did not seriously feel the need of such a navy. It cherished no serious grievance against the control exercised by the British Empire over the waters of the Atlantic Ocean. It did, indeed, in the case of the Monroe Doctrine proclaim a national policy which was unenforcible without an American fleet strong enough to protect the American coast line against European intrusion, but the discrepancy was not an object of anxiety in this country. Ever since Canning had approved the original promulgation of the Doctrine, Great Britain had not disputed it. During the nineteenth century the Monroe Doctrine as an effective political policy rested on the British fleet and on the tacit approval of the British nation. As long as the mistress of the seas respected it, America had no reason to be restive under the British maritime over-lordship. There remained a possible bone of contention in the different views, officially asserted by the two countries, with respect to belligerent and neutral rights on the high seas during war, but that difference did not look serious until the Great War broke out. Many British authorities on international law tended to approve of the American assertion of neutral, as opposed to belligerent, rights. Early in the war the two countries began a sharp controversy over the British violation of pre-established neutral rights. If the United States had remained neutral, this controversy might have waxed serious; but after its declaration of war against Germany the American government acquiesced in the drastic British treatment of the European neutrals.

The American fleet was not built for the purpose of disputing the control of the seas with the British fleet. It was built as the result of a vague but intense feeling that the world was becoming an increasingly dangerous place, in which nations must arm for their own defence. Was there any justification for this apprehension? Not so far as Great Britain is concerned. American public opinion is not in my opinion any more apprehensive of danger from the British Empire than Canada is of an attack from the United States. If the American and British fleets were the only powerful navies now in existence, the two governments could negotiate to reduce their size without raising any

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outstanding or serious difference of political policy. But there is another powerful fleet in existence—that of Japan; and about the Japanese fleet American public opinion takes a different attitude. If the world is a dangerous place in the eyes of an American, it is chiefly because of the Japanese navy and army. He would not hesitate to approve any expenditure which his government might consider necessary to provide for naval protection against Japan. In his mind the American fleet has of recent years come to exist chiefly for that purpose.

The situation with respect to naval armaments is, consequently, something like this. There are three formidable fleets in existence—those of Great Britain, the United States and Japan. In spite of the existence of some friction between the United States and Great Britain, neither at present is afraid of the other's navy as a threat to its own safety. The statement is even more true of the relations between Japan and the British Empire. They are in fact allies for certain definite purposes. But the United States is afraid of Japan, and Japan is even more afraid of the United States. Why cannot the two governments quiet these fears by reaching a joint agreement to cut down their fleets by a third or a half or even two-thirds? And why can they not reach such an agreement without raising any differences of political policy?

IV

Why Bring in the Far East?

They could, were it not for a fact of major importance. Japan is, of course, exclusively a Pacific power. The United States possesses long coast lines on both the Pacific and the Atlantic. The American people have had no reason to fear the British fleet, because unlike the German fleet it was not associated with a dangerously large army and because Great Britain tacitly approved of the Monroe Doctrine which protected the Americans against the aggressive designs of European powers. But it is different in the Pacific. That part of Asia which is washed by the shores of the Pacific has endured fifty years of systematic foreign exploitation in which all the large European powers, except Italy, participated. Something over twenty years ago the American government started to protect China, and since then and particularly since the victory of Japan over Russia, the European nations abandoned the political penetration of China and confined themselves to economic penetration. Thereafter the only power which continued a policy of political aggression on the Asiatic mainland was Japan. In 1910 the American government proposed the neutralization of the Manchurian Railways for the purpose of freeing China from the worst threat to its independence and giving reality to the policy of equal economic rights for all nations in China, but Japan would not consider the proposal and allied herself with Russia in opposition to American interference. Later she used the occasion of the war to impose the Twenty-one Demands on China, to seize Shantung and to occupy part of Siberia.

The Japanese navy is, consequently, the instrument of a policy of aggression, which looks in the direction of giving Japan political suzerainty over eastern Asia. The United States has reason to fear and resist this policy to an extent to which she has no reason to fear and resist the imperialism of the European powers in Africa or in western Asia. She has historic interests and rights in China which Japanese aggression endangers, but that is not all. If during the next few generations Japan continues to expand along the lines on which she has expanded during the last generation, she will become a danger to all free nations with a coast line on the Pacific. She will become a nation with engineers, capitalists, sailors and soldiers at its head, who have occupied territories on the mainland in order to obtain access to raw materials and an abundance of cheap labor, and who will seek to keep for their own benefit both these natural resources and the vast undeveloped market of the Chinese people. This Japanese Empire will need for its security a conscript army and a fleet strong enough to control the waters of the Pacific —a fleet which in the end will be commensurate with the size of this huge enterprise in political and economic imperialism. Such a fleet controlled by the same government which commanded the second largest army in the world and designed to safeguard a policy which deprives between three and four hundred million people of political independence, is a menace to human liberty which it would be foolhardy to ignore.

Let us suppose the American government agrees with the British and Japanese governments to reduce their fleets to one-third of the size which they will have reached in 1924, but ignores the differences of political and economic policy between Japan and the United States, what would be the result? Japan would still possess a fleet large enough to protect her water communications with the mainland and the transmission of soldiers and commodities which the carrying on of her continental Asiatic policy demands. She could continue her policy of economic and political domination in China without any fear of hindrance and could snap her fingers, as she did in 1910, at the protests

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of the United States. Assuming the success of her attempts to industrialize China, she would accumulate resources in capital, industrial equipment and technical skill, which would enable her, if necessary and when the time came, to defend her economic conquests with a fleet much more powerful than that which she can now afford. A limitation of naval armament, that is, without any attempt to do away with the economic and political aggression which renders Japan dangerous immediately to China and ultimately to the United States, would not do anything permanently to diminish either the chances of war or the expenses of armament.

The limitation of armaments as a physical fact is important, but it is not decisive as an agency of peace. National armament is the creature of national policy. If a nation cherishes policies which impair the freedom and prevent the development of other nations, it is bound to arm in self-protection against the resentment and the fear of other nations. It may agree temporarily to limit its armaments provided those who suffer from its aggression or are opposed to its pretensions agree to a similar limitation. But in that event disarmament is an advantage to the aggressor. It frees his hand. The helplessness of China has provided her aggressors with their opportunity. In the end she will assume the job of protecting herself, but in the meantime those who understand the disastrous consequences of an indefinite continuation of the exploitation of the past must try to provide for her protection. If they disarm without raising any question about the results of their disarmament on the political and economic conditions of the Far East, they may be as powerless to protect China as China is to protect herself.

The British Empire with its fleet occupies an extremely significant and important relationship to the strategic strength of Japanese political aggression on the Asiatic mainland. Some twenty years ago it entered into an alliance with Japan whereby Japan, in exchange for the protection of Great Britain against an attack by a combination of European powers, guaranteed British possessions in the Far East. The bargain promised to be of enormous benefit to both countries. It promoted Japan from the position of a suspected inferior who was never invited to dine with the diplomatic swells into a regular member of international good society who could not be ignored without giving offence to the Dowager Empress of the High Seas. It protected her in the event of war with another power from what had happened to her after her victory over China. On the other hand, it enabled the British Empire to reduce its fleet in the Far Eastern waters without compromising the safety of its Asiatic colonies; and this was a most important consideration to a power which was, as a result of the expense of maintaining its supremacy in European waters, already feeling the need of naval concentration in the North Sea. It proved to be even more serviceable than it promised. It protected Japan during and after her war with Russia from European interference, while it enabled Great Britain, when the German fleet became a grave source of danger and the need of concentration paramount, to withdraw all capital ships from Far Eastern waters.

But its very success has involved undesirable and unexpected consequences. Its declared object with respect to the Far East was to ensure stability and to guarantee the open door into China and the territorial integrity of that country. Its result has been to assist Japan in disturbing the stability of the Far East and to prevent China or the United States from daring to set up an effective resistance. During the twenty years of the alliance's existence Japan has come to be the greatest single danger to Chinese political independence and the actual equality of economic opportunity in China. The British Empire is chargeable with a clear responsibility for this result. It has gradually withdrawn its capital ships from the Far East, and by virtue of the alliance, it has conferred on the Japanese fleet in the Far Eastern waters the function of maritime police which its own fleet has filled in the Atlantic. But in the Far East the police has also played the part of the aggressor. Japan has adopted a policy of continental conquest and expansion which depended for her security and continued prosperity upon the control of the seas. Her ally, the boasted Mistress of the Seas, is necessarily the accomplice of this policy. In 1910 American government tried by proposing the neutralization of the Manchurian Railways to protect China and to check Japan. It depended for the success of its diplomatic enterprise on British cooperation. But that cooperation was not forthcoming. In spite of the declared sympathy of the British Foreign Office with the political and economic objects of the American proposal, it was obliged when the conflict came to favor its ally and to consent to the defeat of the intrinsically sound American proposal.

Thus Great Britain looms as large as either Japan and the United States in relation to the discussion of the disorder in the Far East and the bearing of the disorder on naval armament and disarmament. The British Commonwealth is as much interested in the pacification of the Pacific as it is in the pacification of the Atlantic. It is in-

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terested not only because of its possessions and concessions in China and because of its alliance with Japan, but because three of its self-governing dominions expose long coast lines to the waters of the Pacific and have as much reason as the United States to dread the unchecked growth of Japanese military, naval, economic and political imperialism.

Perhaps the reader will now understand why the American government associated a Conference on the Limitation of Armaments with a consideration of the political and economic problems of the Far East. It hopes by means of this association to remove the causes of suspicion and misunderstanding among the three great naval powers. If it succeeds they will agree to limit naval armaments not merely because their fleets cost too much or because armaments are a danger to "civilization," but because they have nothing to gain by maintaining them and nothing to lose by giving them up. It may not succeed, but it is adopting the most promising way of associating the reduction in naval expenditures with the prevalence in one part of the world of socialized standards of international conduct. It seeks to convert disarmament from a temporary expedient to rescue "civilization" by saving money into a more enduring source of international security and peace. In so far as it succeeds it will set up in one of the major territories and oceans of the world an understanding which may develop into a permanently sound working relationship. It will begin to do for a particular neighborhood the work which the League of Nations was supposed to do for the whole world. Its authors hope by limiting the area of the liability and the size of the problem to accomplish a more satisfactory job.

The adviser of President Harding who proposed and carried out the idea possessed the vision of a statesman. He was reviving the best article in the traditional American diplomatic creed. It was the article which John Hay first defined when he asked the European powers to accept the open door as the foundation of their relations with China; the article which Philander Knox amplified when he proposed the neutralization of the Manchurian Railways, and the article which Woodrow Wilson repudiated when he consented to the cession of Shantung to Japan. An international agreement which initiated a promising settlement of the problem of China would accomplish as much for the future peace of the world as would a healing of the quarrel between France and Germany. It would enormously increase the feeling of general security and the confidence in the method of conference and consent, as opposed to the method of force, in the adjustment of international differences. It would disarm the three great naval powers not merely in the flesh but in the spirit. It would not only do something to save western civilization but it would make western civilization better worth saving.

V

The Test of American Good Faith

It will not be easy for the American government to succeed. The obstacles are prodigious. The pitfalls are many, dangerous and carefully camouflaged. The keen desire for success may prove to be the worst pitfall of all. It may persuade the American delegation to sacrifice more obscure but fundamental and enduring benefits for a tangible and definite but superficial achievement. When the Conference comes to an end, it may be difficult to decide how far it has succeeded. After the Paris Conference equally competent people declared Mr. Wilson's work to be both a brilliant success and a flagrant failure. Mr. Hughes' management of the Washington Conference may provoke equally sharp differences of opinion.

Mr. Hughes' best chance of success depends upon the adoption by the American delegation of a vigorous initiative with respect both to the limitation of naval armaments and an understanding about the political and economic future of the Far East. There will exist in the minds of the foreign delegates and particularly in the minds of the Japanese a profound suspicion of the American motive in precipitating a discussion of the Far Eastern problem. They accuse the United States of promoting an aggressive policy, dangerous to the future security both of Japan and China, under the pretence of protecting China. It is important, consequently, to establish early in the Conference the good faith of this country by some unequivocally self-denying, disarming and soothing proposal. Its substance should consist in a plan for the drastic reduction of naval armaments in the Pacific, this reduction to be shared on practically equal terms by the three powers and to endure for a definite number of years. But it should be explicitly affirmed as part of its agreement to disarm that the object of the reduction is to remove the obstacles to the creation of a concert of Pacific powers based upon an understanding about the future of China.

The American government, if it is seeking in good faith to lay the foundations for peace and order in the Far East, has much to gain and nothing to lose by starting the Conference with a proposal of its own for partial disarmament. It can

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use its existing navy as the instrument of two possible strategic objects in the Pacific. One would be the protection of its own coasts and the Panama Canal against offensive operations by a hostile fleet. The other would be the defence of the Philippines and China against an attack by a combined fleet and army. The first of these objects would be accomplished even more effectively by a general limitation of naval armament than it would be by the existing American navy. The other object places an excessive strain upon the American navy as it exists or as it will exist when the present program of new construction is finished. The defence of China or the Philippines against Japan exceeds the power of any American fleet which is not a half larger than that of Japan and which is not provided with a capacious and impregnable naval base on the other side of the Pacific.

In this connection every American who wishes to understand the conditions of naval power and the problems of naval strategy in the Pacific should read the book of Mr. Hector C. Bywater which is reviewed on another page of the present issue. According to this authority the existing Japanese fleet would in the event of a war between Japan and the United States be unable to operate on the American side of the Pacific. The United States and the Panama Canal are sufficiently safe against Japanese attack. Unless the handling of the American fleet was wholly at fault, the Japanese Admiralty would not dare to send its capital ships into American waters. They could not keep alive as an effective fighting force without a naval base on or near the American coast. The same statement is no less true of the American fleet in Far Eastern waters. It could not keep afloat on the other side of the Pacific without a base on some such island as that of Guam—a base which was fortified and equipped to refit, re-fuel and shelter practically all the capital ships in the American navy. In the absence of such a base not only would the defence of China against Japan and the effective blockading of the Japanese ports be impossible, but the American navy and army could not defend the Philippines against Japanese attack. Those islands would as things are now inevitably pass into the military possession of Japan within a few weeks after the outbreak of war.

If the United States prepares to defend either the Philippines or China in the event of war with Japan, it will have to build a veritable Gibraltar on the island of Guam and to seek a greater preponderance in capital ships than its existing program of new construction provides. The Navy Department has frequently proposed for this reason the creation of such a base in Far Eastern waters, but Congress has never consented and it never should consent. For if the United States was adequately prepared to defend China and the Philippines, it would be equally well prepared to attack Japan. An adequate American naval base at Guam would be as dangerous to Japan as a Japanese naval base somewhere on the Mexican coast would be dangerous to the United States.

The American nation cannot afford to flourish such a threat against the Japanese nation. Japan in spite of her large armament is a poor and much less powerful country than the United States. She has more reason to fear us than we have to fear her, and for that reason the American government should carefully refrain from giving her justifiable cause for alarm. If the Japanese government should lease Magdalena Bay from Mexico and announce its intention of building on its property a naval base, the American government would consider the act an evidence of a hostile intention and declare war rather than allow the operation to proceed. The fortification of Guam and the establishment of a naval base on that island would be almost as dangerous to Japan as would the occupation of Magdalena Bay by Japan for military and naval purposes be dangerous to the United States. The two cases would possess minor differences of some importance. Yet if Congress appropriated the money for the fortification of Guam, Japan would have as fair an excuse in the interest of her safety to declare war on the United States as the United States would in the other event to declare war on Japan.

In managing the coming Conference the first object of the American government should be to prove to Japan that she has no reason to fear us, that we do not propose to use the defence of China as an excuse for attacking her. The American government can allay Japanese suspicion by promising not to fortify Guam or to establish any naval base on the other side of the Pacific which would enable the American fleet to assume control of those waters. Such a promise coupled with a proposal to limit existing armaments would begin by placing the discussion on the plane not of a contest of forces but a meeting and a comparison of minds. Unless the discussion takes place on a plane of this kind, it can only harvest a meagre, a specious or a fugitive success.

By explicitly and finally renouncing the plan of building a fortified naval base on the other side of the Pacific, the United States would finally renounce the idea of coercing Japan by means of a naval victory, but it would not renounce the idea of defending China against foreign aggression. It would merely have to devise other and better

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means of providing the protection. A war between Japan and the United States undertaken for the defence of China would create conditions likely to increase her subjugation. If Japan won, the Japanese government would apparently be entitled to seize China as the prize of victory as it seized Korea and in part Manchuria as the prizes of a victory over Russia. If the United States won, its victory would be so enormously costly that it might well seek compensation at China's expense as well as Japan's. It could hardly fail to become as dangerous to the independence of its ward as was its enemy. He who proposes to protect China by a costly war is a poor friend of China. War about China between two foreign powers would increase China's dependence not her independence.

The only real security for her independence must come from an understanding among foreign nations about her status and future. A war would not promote such an understanding and every American friend of China should recognize this truth. But the renunciation of naval and military coercion of Japan would not imply consent to Japanese economic and political aggression in the Far East. It would not imply the renunciation of explicit and stubborn resistance to Japan on the part of the American government. It would not even prevent the American government from bringing, if necessary, another kind of pressure to bear upon a Japanese government which treated beneficial American proposals with respect to China as Japan in 1910 treated the proposals of President Taft. The alternative pressure which the American government can use, if necessary, is the economic political and moral isolation of Japan.

The isolation by American diplomacy of a stubbornly unamenable Japan would inflict on the Japanese nation a calamity almost as intolerable as military and naval defeat. The psychology of Japan is that of a newcomer in the society of civilized nations. The Japanese people are imitative, adaptable and most anxious to please. They would dread more than anything else the loss of the friendship and the esteem on the part of Europeans and Americans which during the last generation they have gradually earned. If once they were convinced that the continuation of their past and present policy in China would bring down upon them the hostility and disapprobation of the major part of the civilized world, they would soon become more amenable. They cannot afford isolation. Their existing power is built up on European assistance or connivance and if that assistance were withdrawn, they would lose both prestige and self-confidence. Their policy, as they very well know, has made them most unpopular on the continent of Asia. As long as they are allied with the British Empire, they are not afraid of the consequences of this unpopularity, but once they are isolated they would, notwithstanding their powerful army and navy, have good reason to be afraid.

Japanese imperialism in China is the creature of its European predecessor in the same region. The Japanese government copied its foreign policy from European models just as it copied its ships, its steel mills and its whole technical equipment. It has played the game of international politics according to the rules which prevailed when it entered a generation ago. Those rules, although they still prevail in European diplomacy, have brought a hideous calamity upon the world. They do not possess their former authority. It is necessary that they be revised. The American nation wants to have them revised. Its government has called this conference to see whether they cannot be revised with respect to a region near the United States but remote from Europe. This region is nearer to Japan than it is to the United States. It is most disturbing and dislocating for Japan to accept the new rules, but if she must she will. She cannot play a lone hand and she cannot afford to be excluded from good international society. And in the long run the new rules will benefit Japan no less than China and the United States. They will save Japan from the fate which overtook Germany and which sooner or later overtakes all peoples who make their own prestige and welfare dependent upon the domination and exploitation of others.

VI

Anglo-American Cooperation

The problem, then, of the American delegation after it has proved its good faith by taking the initiative in disarming, is the problem of persuading the European governments to join the American government in providing for the protection and the future welfare of China. The political objects which American diplomacy has always sought to accomplish in the Far East are objects which can only be thoroughly accomplished by means of general and loyal consent.

There is, however, one European government and people who need not only to consent to the plans of the American government but whose consent must, if those plans are to succeed, assume the form of active cooperation. I refer, of course, to Great Britain. If the British Empire remains allied with Japan it is of comparatively little importance how cordially the other European powers cooperated with the United States. Japan would possess the kind of association and moral support

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which would render it unnecessary for her to yield. On the other hand, if Great Britain decides that she cannot afford to lend to Japan the encouragement of the alliance, Japan would find the aid and comfort of any other European power a poor compensation for what she had lost. Great Britain remains the most formidable sea power in the world. She is the only European state, unless we include Russia, whose interests in Asia and in the Far East are as important as those of the United States. The British and American fleets, acting together, would form an irresistible preponderance of naval force, and the adoption by the two governments of a common policy in the Far East would make it perilous for Japan to oppose that policy.

Until recently the prospect of any effective diplomatic cooperation between Great Britain and the United States in the Far East looked extremely doubtful. The British Foreign Office was wedded to the alliance with Japan. That control was its most conspicuous diplomatic achievement. It had during a troubled period been extremely useful to both partners and British statesmen were most reluctant to give it up. British newspapers talked, consequently, about broadening the alliance with Japan to include the United States, and by the use of such phrases exhibited minds entirely untouched by the American grievance against the alliance. Recently, however, the British government has, according to the newspapers, taken a decision which looks in a much more encouraging direction. It has decided to concentrate a large portion of its battle fleet in Far Eastern waters. Such a decision, if it proves to be true, can have only one meaning. It means a reversal of the policy adopted by the British government of using the Japanese fleet as its agent in the Far East. Great Britain again becomes an actual instead of a potential naval power in the Pacific. As an actual naval power she can, if advisable, disagree with Japan and abandon the alliance without exposing her Far Eastern possessions to Japanese attack.

It looks, consequently, as if the British government were prepared at least under some conditions to give up the alliance with Japan and seek a new basis of security in the Far East. If she is, the one insuperable obstacle to the success of the conference has disappeared. Anglo-American cooperation then becomes possible. As a consequence it also becomes possible to bring pressure upon Japan to let up on China without threatening war in the event of her refusal. The two chief maritime powers could isolate Japan morally and physically and deal a fatal blow to her prestige and self-confidence.

It does not, of course, follow that the two English-speaking powers will cooperate because they can. Their cooperation will depend on their ability to agree upon a joint definition of policy with respect to China and upon a joint method of rendering the policy effective. They may very well fail to agree. If they do agree, they may pay an excessively stiff price for the agreement. The Chinese problem is extraordinarily difficult and complicated. If the reader wishes to understand how difficult and complicated it is, let him turn to the well-balanced and exhaustive analysis of it which Mr. Nathaniel Peffer has written for the November issue of the Century. When dealing with a political and economic jungle as dense, as obscure, and as dangerous as that of China, equally well-informed, intelligent and disinterested men are bound to differ. In so far as the negotiation falls into the hands of statesmen who are not well-informed, intelligent and disinterested, the area of difference threatens to be hopelessly unmanageable. Such being the situation, how much can be reasonably expected in the way of agreement? And what would be the salient characteristics of a good as compared to a bad agreement?

VII

A Supreme Council for the Far East

The most formidable obstacle to the negotiation by the governments represented in the Conference of a satisfactory agreement about China consists in the necessary discrepancy between the declared purposes of their Chinese policy and their actual position and interest in that country. Inasmuch as they represent civilized Christian peoples who must always look morally impeccable to themselves, the statesmen assembled in Washington will have to assume and proclaim that their national policies in China respect the independence and contribute to the welfare of the Chinese nation. The proclamation will not be entirely true. All these nations will by cajolery, fraud or force have obtained political or economic concessions which impair Chinese independence and which contribute not to the welfare of the Chinese people but to their injury. They, none of them, can come to the Conference with entirely clean hands. Japan has merely carried further and longer a policy which all foreign powers have practised in China. Formerly the next worst offender to Japan was Russia. Now that Russia is down and out the British Empire is the power whose vested interests in China are most inimical to the welfare and independence of that country. Is it likely that a group of governments which themselves profit from Chinese polit-

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ical impotence will agree upon any thoroughgoing and satisfactory plan to cultivate her political and economic independence?

Almost equally formidable is the obstacle presented by the lack in China of any one authoritative central government. The Chinese nation is undergoing an economic, political and social revolution which will last a long time and during which all kinds of disorder will thrive and the country will be torn by many conflicting centres of political authority. The revolution is caused by the penetration of an old and in some respects a high civilization by modern industrial nations which have achieved more than the Chinese have in the way of applied science, technical equipment and physical order. These foreign nations have hitherto used the comparative political inefficiency of China as a sufficient excuse for invading and appropriating Chinese political and economic territory. The increasing political disorganization of the country offers them a better excuse for carrying on these invasions than they ever had during the Manchu regime. Yet at the very moment when China is more disorderly than she has been since the Tae-Ping rebellion, these governments are invited to relax their pressure of China and to guarantee to the Chinese people a large opportunity of self-development.

Under such conditions it is extremely improbable that the Conference will or can reach a satisfactory detailed settlement of the problem of China. Any specific settlement which the conferees could now reach would have to recognize and perpetuate too many undesirable vested political and economic interests. It might take the form, for instance, of confirming the Japanese grip on Manchuria and Siberia as the price of withdrawing from Shantung, or of recognizing British interests in and about Hong Kong in return for the surrender of Weihaiwei. A bargain of this kind, no matter how many powers recognized and signed it, would not constitute a settlement any more than the Treaty of Versailles was a settlement. If the Conference gives birth to such an abortion it will, no matter how much it accomplishes in the way of limiting armaments, make eventually more for war than peace. The friends of China and of order in the Pacific should oppose anything of the kind as uncompromisingly as they opposed the cession of Shantung to Japan. The only possible settlement is one which looks in the direction of assisting the Chinese people to become as much the master of their own house as is the American people. If the Conference cannot forge a specific agreement which points in this direction, the American government should at least block any agreement which would prevent the ultimate adoption of such a program. It should insist on the exclusion of any provision which would increase the obstacles to the ultimate restoration of Chinese independence.

Anglo-American cooperation, however, even though it cannot effect a wholesome detailed settlement of the Chinese problem may still induce the Conference to move towards rather than away from the ultimate emancipation of China. The American government, for instance, with English backing may succeed in doing away with such a gross abuse as the occupation of Shantung and such an intolerable violation of Chinese independence as the Twenty-one Demands. It should insist on the necessity of these renunciations as the only decent way of vindicating the reality of the principles which both Japan and Great Britain have repeatedly recognized as binding on themselves—the principles of the political independence of China and the equality of all nations in their access to Chinese markets. Then after having restored a little vitality to the principles of right which have been so often repeated and so little practised, the American government could propose as the next logical step the constitution of a permament council of the Pacific powers,—the object of which would be to take any further measures which may be desirable to give future reality to the rules of conduct which they have promised to observe.

This Council of Far Eastern powers would consist fundamentally in a permanent edition of the Conference itself. By bringing it into existence the Conference would recognize at once the limitation of its possible achievement at any one sitting, yet the necessity of keeping alive a similar body to deal with any and all common phases of the Far Eastern question. The several members of the Council or Concert of Far Eastern powers would simply agree to consult one another about their future policies with respect to China and to recognize as the foundation of their common action the twin principles of cultivating Chinese independence and of opening the door into China to all nations on equal terms. They would constitute in effect a political consortium which would supplement the financial consortium and which would shut out independent action by any one member of the group. But this political consortium would have to prove its good faith from the start by admitting China to representation in its councils. The effective value of the Chinese representation would depend upon the amount of coherence which the Chinese are able to infuse into their political organization, but

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even if in the beginning the Chinese delegation represented only a weak and doubtful centre of authority, some Chinese government should, if possible, be admitted to consultation. The fact of its admission would give to the Chinese a strong motive to compose their differences and to establish a recognizable state.

Almost as important as the representation of China in the consortium is the representation of Siberia. At the present moment the independence of Siberia is being threatened quite as much as the independence of China; and the continuation of the threat would be equally dangerous to future peace and security in the Far East. The Siberians are a people of European blood and culture who are resident in the East and who like the Australians will eventually form a useful medium of communication between the East and the West. They would have the value of contributing to the Pacific Concert a point of view analogous in economic outlook to that of China—the point of view, that is, of an economically immature land power which needed capital for development. Their presence in the Concert would diminish the preponderance in that body of the maritime as contrasted with the land powers and so help to strengthen its balance.

Many American friends of China will doubt the advisability of such a council for the same reasons which persuaded them to oppose the financial consortium. They will not even consider the admission of China and Siberia any sufficient guarantee that the Concert might not become a huge international agency of exploitation and gradual subjugation. They will fear that it will tie the hands of China's friends and subject them to the obligation of compromising and bargaining with China's enemies. These fears may be well founded. The beneficial effect of such an agency as the proposed Pacific Concert will depend upon the future triumph of humane and liberal ideals in the domestic political life of its members. But the objection is not conclusive. The United States and China can always smash the Concert by resuming their liberty of action. In the meantime it binds the powers which are preying upon China no less than the powers which are not, and the aggressive powers are those which for the present need binding. It is extremely important during the period of revolutionary dislocation in China that individual governments be prevented from using the political disorder as an excuse for isolated intervention. If the Concert endures there can be no intervention without general consent; and this will enormously increase the difficulty of obtaining a decision in its favor. The friends of China could veto any proposal to interfere. They would, considering the positive differences of interest which the discussion of intervention would bring to the surface among the members of the Concert, possess a fair chance of blocking it.

But, of course, the Concert would fail, if in the long run inertia was the result of the obligation of its members not to act without consultation. There is as much need of positive orderly change in the world of international facts as in the world of domestic facts. In the past the recognized method of producing change in the world of international facts was a successful war, and nations which were coming on and proposed to create a larger place for themselves in the world, such as Germany or Japan, built up armies and navies for the purpose. But the changes produced as the result of armaments and successful wars are unstable, costly and often undesirable. The conscience of mankind is in revolt against such a barbarous and clumsy agency of international legislation. That is why it is insisting on disarmament. But in so far as it succeeds in limiting armies and navies, it must provide some other agency for producing positive changes in the world of international facts. If, for instance, the Washington Conference does effect a considerable reduction of the navies of the great maritime powers, it must create some permanent agency of international legislation in the Far East other than armament and war. The Pacific Concert must in the long run be able to bring about needed and desirable changes as the result of conference and consent or else it will fall apart. Once it falls apart the inevitable alternative is re-armament and war.

The argument that the Pacific Concert, if it is to survive, *must* become an agency of beneficial regional international legislation does not prophesy that it will. Perhaps the Washington Conference may prefer a false and inadequate "settlement" to the promotion of an understanding by means of future consultation. Perhaps if it does set up a Concert, the Concert will degenerate into a monotonous repetition of meaningless sounds or will finally dissolve into an outrageous discord. In these matters statesmanship is taking long chances with slippery cards. It is important not to expect the impossible. But it is still more important to expect and to demand all that is possible, and to understand what your demand means. American public opinion is demanding the limitation of armaments as a long stride down the road to appeasement. It does well to demand a limitation of armaments, but if the governments limit armaments without providing a political as well as a moral

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equivalent for armies and navies and wars, the road to peace through disarmament will prove to be a blind alley. The only possible political substitute for armies and navies and wars is organized international conference. It is a dubious and clumsy substitute, but it is the best there is, and if it is not better than it is, that is not entirely the fault either of the method of conference or the good faith of the conferees. It is far more the fault of public opinion which asks politicians to provide a political substitute for war without itself having provided a moral substitute for war.

VIII

The Test of Success

In starting to place an estimate on the success of the Conference, people should beware of subjecting it to a rigid and a narrow test. It meets for the purpose of limiting armaments, and unless it succeeds in limiting naval armaments, it will most egregiously fail. Yet the amount of money it saves in naval expenditure will not constitute a dependable test of its success. It meets for the purpose of reaching an agreement about the political and economic problems of the Far East. Yet the completeness and definiteness of its agreement about the future of China would not constitute a dependable test of its success. If it is to succeed it must combine some measure of beneficial legislation on behalf of China with some measure of disarmament. Yet even if it succeeds in effecting this combination, a friend of international appeasement would have reason not to remain entirely satisfied. The final test of its success does not consist in definite achievements, important as these are, but in the extent to which it vindicates and reassures the spirit and method of Conference in the conduct of international affairs. It is only by a vindication and reassertion of the spirit and method of Conference that the democratic nations can lay out and keep moving on the roads to peace.

The extent to which it vindicates and reasserts the spirit and method of Conference will depend less on what it achieves in limiting naval expenditures and in legislating about the Far East than in the moral and mental atmosphere in which these specific results are obtained. Any legislative body, if it reaches an important decision, has to pay for the decisive result by a discontented minority. A Conference is a legislative body whose success depends on unanimous consent, and the obtaining of unanimous consent demands a sacrifice and usually a defeat for some one or more of its members. The Washington Conference will be no exception to this rule. If it is to agree, either the American or the Japanese government must yield, and the loser must yield as the result of both persuasion and pressure. The Conference will succeed if the government which yields creates as the result of the yielding a condition of international understanding and confidence which will help to the future adjustment of similar clashes by the same means. It will fail if it pays for its unanimous decisions with grievances, irreconcilable animosities and mutual distrust.

The Paris Conference failed not merely because so many of its decisions would not work and were prompted by fear and ill-will, but because it created by its legislation an atmosphere in which future conference became abortive. Three years of peace have left the vanquished unreconciled and almost ruined. It has left the victors as much divided one from another as they are from their former enemy. The prevailing temper of European nations with respect to one another is one of impatience, animosity, suspicion and recrimination. They are prevented from flying at one another's throats by impotence rather than goodwill. If this atmosphere continues to prevail, it is hard to see how the whole of Europe can escape the ruin which is already descending on the vanquished. It must not be allowed to continue. The European nations have not yet come to see the necessity of assembling in another conference and in writing a new body of public law which may at least obtain its sanction from consent rather than force. But they are headed in that direction; and the Washington Conference, even though it cannot deal directly with European problems, may be of great assistance to them by affording to the world an example of the kind of leadership which can make conference a successful instrument of international appeasement.

President Harding and Secretary Hughes have, I think, a rare and a good opportunity of displaying the needed leadership. They hold strong cards and if they play them well they can make the Conference a success according to the only final test of success. They can prove that conference, wisely, shrewdly and firmly managed, is capable of becoming a substitute for navies, armies and wars. The vindication in Washington of conference as a substitute for war is for the American delegation a great, a relevant and an entirely possible achievement. Their fellow countrymen have the right to ask for as much and they should not be satisfied with any less.

HERBERT CROLY.

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Public Opinion in Japan

WHILE in Tokio I listened to an interesting conversation between a Japanese and a visiting Chinese educationalist. The former was a true, not a pseudo-liberal. He had been in China and had kept his eyes open. Ever since his visit he has been a critic of Japan's course in China; he admitted freely the wrong policy of his own country and the need of going further in the changes which, he said, Hara the prime minister had already entered upon and which he would extend were he not hampered and checked by the militarists. But he insisted that China and Japan were so near to each other and so intimately connected with each other, that Japan must have a relation to China different from that of any other country. For, he insisted, everything that happened in China directly influenced the well being of Japan, while even extraordinary events there had next to no reverberations in other countries.

The reply of the Chinese was to say that Japan worried altogether too much about China and what happened there, that its anxiety was almost morbid, and that the Japanese would best serve their country by caring less about what was going on over on the mainland, and permitting the Chinese to do more of the worrying about their own affairs. And when my Japanese friend reiterated the fact that the close connection of the two countries made such indifference out of the question, our Chinese friend retorted that the Japanese would do better to pay more attention to their own problems and worry more about their own troubles; that the problems and evils of Japan were quite as serious as those of China, the only difference being that the former were covered up while the latter were exposed to all the world.

I am not sure that the retort, which with its counterattack reduced the Japanese liberal to silence, was not exaggerated. But it is worth quoting as an indication of the great difference between Japanese and Chinese public opinion. Intellectually China has the advantage of a weak and corrupt government. Publicity regarding the country's evils, domestic and international, flourishes. The uniform attitude of the educated class toward their government and toward social affairs is critical. Perhaps the most significant single fact about the present culture of China is that not only the reactionary but the conservative class has no intellectual spokesman. Every thinker, every writer, every articulate conscious influence is liberal. The fact is the more striking because the reactionary and militaristic faction is in control of every branch of government save the foreign office. I do not know whether the world offers a parallel for such a combination of political power in actual control with intellectual and moral weakness, futility, non-existence. Even the traditional Confucian thought of China has no first-class representative at the present time. Confucianism is of course still strong, but its strength is that of custom, not that of thought or intellectual influence. I have referred in earlier articles to the "Literary Revolution," the movement to substitute the words and style of the vernacular for that of the classic writings. The leaders told me that they expected to have to struggle and be highly unpopular for at least ten years. But to their surprise the movement went like wild-fire; all of the younger educated classes rallied at once to their standard. The movement has slowed up in the last year or so; but its lessened pace is due to the unconscious inertia of stubborn custom rather than to any articulate intellectual opposition or criticism. This incident seems to me typical. There seems to be no country in the world where students are so unanimously and eagerly interested as in China in what is modern and new in thought, especially about social and economic matters, nor where the arguments which can be brought in favor of the established order and the status quo have so little weight—indeed, are so unuttered.

This state of affairs suggests by contrast the obstacles with which the development of an enlightened liberal public opinion in Japan has to contend. In Japan the government is strong, administration is centralized and organized and opinion is drilled and disciplined. As a consequence critical thought is timid and on the defensive, while the natural course is to defend the existing status and national policies. Not only is patriotism a religion, but religion is literally patriotic and nationalistic. Patriotism and institutional religion are both of them so notoriously hostile to critical thought and free discussion that it is almost impossible to picture to oneself their suppressive and silencing effect when they are combined in one. It takes more force, more moral courage to be an outspoken critic of the politics

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and social condition of one's nation, to be a dissenter, in Japan, than in any other country in the world.

All the more honor, then, to those liberals in Japan whose insight and courage is slowly forcing a change. We were not long in Japan upon our return trip to America and I do not profess to speak with any authority, but the change in atmosphere since we were in that country two years ago is unmistakeable. The ominous hush that seemed then to have settled down is now punctuated with words spoken aloud and some of them shouted forth. Whether the number of liberal critics or their concrete influence has increased, I do not know. But it is evident that the taboo which surrounded articulate discussions of Japan's foreign policies and of fundamental domestic conditions is breaking down. I do not refer to those official apologists and semi-official propagandists who meet you more than half-way with their candid assertion that Japan is human and has made mistakes—"blunders" is the favorite word—in China, Korea and Siberia, and that till towards the end of the war the military bureaucracy had too much power, but that Japan is now engaged in remedying these mistakes as fast as she can. Regarding such talk a certain amount of cynicism is justified. It comes from those whom the Japan Chronicle calls tame liberals, and of whom it says in effect that while they indulge in academic criticism of the militarist party, they rush to arms the moment it is a question of a surrender of any of the concrete advantages which the militarists have secured for Japan in China and Siberia. Reference is rather to the gradual breaking down of the conspiracy of silence, the relaxation of that tension which made allusion to certain subjects an unholy thing, and which forced one who wished to be courteous, to confine his conversations about Japan to the many things upon which one could be conscientiously complimentary.

To give a specific illustration. Two liberals of Japan without connection with each other expressed substantially the same fear regarding the Pacific Conference. They said in effect that they were afraid President Harding would not have the courage to carry the discussion of principles and policies far enough; that he would be satisfied to win a cheap victory for his party and throw a sop to the disarmament sentiment by securing an agreement for moderate limitation of arms, without bringing the whole question of China and Siberia to public attention. They were *afraid* of this result. For, they said, the hope of Japan's being able to loosen the grip of militarism upon the country lay in the growth of such an enlightened foreign public opinion about Japan as would react upon domestic public opinion.

In the language of apologetics, Japan *is* a "sensitive nation" and in spite of the mouthings of its Jingoes is extremely susceptible to the danger of isolation before the bar of the world's opinion. Now I do not think that the growth of ability to express such a critical and free opinion would have been possible on the part of moderate and truly patriotic Japanese, such as these men were, were there not in existence a marked change in Japanese public consciousness.

In the absence of adequate opportunities for study, the reasons for the changed attitude can only be roughly sketched. In a general way the greatest force is doubtless the reverberations of the war. It is conceivable that the intellectual and moral lessons of the war have been felt in the Orient in inverse ratio to actual participation in it. I should say that this is true of China, and I fancy it is true in some measure of Japan. Specifically, the whole Siberian expedition has been unpopular from the start. It has become increasingly so as expenditures have mounted—the lowest estimate I heard was half a billion dollars—and there were no tangible results of advantage, for the taking over of Saghalien and Vladivostok has not affected the popular imagination except to create an uneasy feeling that there may be a day of reckoning ahead. Again the continuing volume of protest from China has had an effect, and the boycott, even if it turned out largely a practical failure, still gave the Japanese furiously to think about their Chinese relations. The free growth of liberal thought in China has had some effect. The contrast of Bertrand Russell as a welcome, honored and influential figure in China, and as entering Japan only to the accompaniment of an apology from the chief of safety for permitting him to enter at all, is acutely impressed upon the minds of Japanese intellectuals. Then the inevitable growth of a scientific spirit among the highly educated is a factor. The home of the liberal movement is in the universities, the normal and lower schools not being as yet much affected; and it is said that a majority of the faculty of Political Science of the Imperial University are now active liberals. A more tangible factor is the persistence of labor troubles and the growth of a class consciousness on the part of laborers in shipyards and factories. And the steady increase of taxes due mainly to the enlarged naval budget is not without influence.

A westerner may deplore the rudimentary and distorted character of public opinion in his own country. But, after all, he is so used to the operation of regular organs of discussion that it is al-

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most impossible for him to realize the spasmodic, immature and disorganized nature of political opinion in the Orient. Hence in judging events he fails to make proper allowances, and often finds design where there is only ignorance. In Japan the nation, the emperor, is about the only enduring and organized centre for public opinion. Naturally this fact accrues to the advantage of imperialism; there is so little of anything else about which people can feel and think in a consistent and unified way. Moreover the military-bureaucratic party is the only organized group which has a definite and permanent policy. The present prime minister, Mr. Hara, is the first commoner to hold that office, and this fact has been advertised as the beginning of real democracy in government. But the one thing upon which observers agree is that Hara has had no policy except opportunism of a very immediate sort whether as to foreign affairs or as to the acute internal labor and industrial problems.

And if one stops to think, one will find it difficult in the present condition of Japan to construct even in imagination a coherent and unswerving working policy for a truly liberal political party in that country. An avowed liberal course would almost assuredly arouse general popular hostility. For no matter how pacific is the great mass of the Japanese people—and I think that temperamentally they are peace loving—there is no gainsaying the fact that every step in the advancement and consolidation of Japan as a political unit has come as a result of war. The war with China had the abolition of extra-territoriality as its result. The war with Russia gave to Japan Korea, a foothold in Manchuria and a standing among the powers. The last war—which some Japanese publications uniformly refer to as the Japo-German war—made her one of the five powers, besides giving her a hold on Shantung, a goodly number of Pacific islands and a big accretion of bullion and trade. In addition, the people themselves have never experienced the horrors of modern war. Add to these positive facts the outstanding fact that even a Japanese liberal has good reason to believe that in the predatory expansion of modern imperialistic Europe, her army and navy have alone saved Japan from becoming another India or China, and one begins to sense why in any crisis public opinion moves to the side of the militaristic party. Over and over again newspapers which indulge in harsh general criticisms of the military party take the side of the militarists in any concrete issue that arises—the case of Siberia is the only exception that occurs to me.

On general principles one might have thought that the economic development of Japan—her industrialization—would have created a definite trend of opinion, formed a positive centre and organ of sentiment and thought, which in some respects would be as coherent as the imperialistic centre and organs, even if not actively opposed to it. But in Japan there is no definite line between private and government economic activity. Japan has outdone Germany in mixing governmental support and aid with all capitalistic enterprises. The big corporations engage in a combination of mining, shipping and banking activities, along with manufacturing and continental concessions, and the government, or some group of families which is influential in government, is definitely allied with the big corporations. Hence up to the present the industrialization of Japan has not created any definite trend of public opinion. There is no mercantile or financial consciousness as such. If things go on at the present rate, the laboring class will crystallize a new centre of opinion in the near future, but at present it is inchoate.

I do not know that any clear moral emerges from this survey. If there is one, it is in line with the remark made earlier about the importance of enlightened foreign publicity and opinion in its reflex influence upon Japan. Japan needs sympathy, not abuse; but it is an unkind sympathy which exerts itself in justifying the existing order, and in effect maintains the policy of secrecy which keeps evils covered up. True sympathy will pursue the opposite course of revealing the dominating hold which military bureaucracy has upon Japanese life, internal and international. This course will, however, be comparatively ineffectual in influencing the formation of public opinion in Japan unless it is united with a firm stand against every kind of racial discrimination. Young men in Japan who are genuinely hostile to existing militarism say frankly that when it comes to discriminations against the Japanese simply because they are a yellow race, they will fight to the last, even if it means uniting themselves with a militaristic party which they abhor.

It was a tragedy that the Versailles Conference could not find a formula of race equality consistent with securing to every country the right to determine its own reception of immigrants. If the United States in the Pacific Conference really wants to lessen the hold of the militarists upon public opinion in Japan it will not wait for Japan to introduce a formula of equality of racial rights, much less turn it down when it is introduced. A slight amount of ingenuity combined with sympathy can readily find a formula which will indicate that *because* of racial equality, not in spite of it, each

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country has the right to decide its own policy of immigration. One can sympathize with the attitude of the Pacific Coast upon the matters of the restriction of Oriental immigration, and yet believe that every step taken by a Coast state which involves inequality of treatment for immigrants already in residence involves the danger of an ultimate explosion in the Pacific. Not that Japan would go to war about the Californian issue, but that every move that partakes of racial discrimination strengthens that public opinion which in the last resort is the reliance of the military group in Japan. The rankling sense of injustice is played upon to secure support for a big army and navy. The indirect outcome is the continuation of a predatory policy in China and Siberia. And it is the latter policy which carries with it the menace of future war. A frank facing of the question of racial equality is good diplomatic tactics. It is the poorest of policies to hand gratuitously a grievance to a potential opponent. But the issue is deeper and broader than that of diplomatic tactics or even strategy. Until the world in general and the United States in particular does the square thing about racial discrimination, the militarists will remain the formative power in Japanese public opinion. Liberal and pacific opinion will be crippled.

JOHN DEWEY.

The British View

ALL sections of British opinion, except perhaps that of the extreme Left, welcome the significance of the official title which has been given to the forthcoming Conference at Washington. It was better to be precise at the outset, and to call it, not a "disarmament" Conference, but one "for the Limitation of Armaments." There may be something to be said for the policy of aiming at the moon to hit the top of a tree, but good marksmen take a different view. What indeed has been the chief fear of practical British statesmen is that the Conference should ride off on platitudes, and spend itself ineffectively. There is serious business to be done. When, therefore, the American Ambassador in London declared that "disarmament" at the present time necessarily means nothing more than the limitation of armaments, we received solid confirmation of what we had always believed to be the case, that the Washington Conference was to be a business-like affair.

1. PROCEDURE

It is a responsive business-like spirit which makes British opinion attach great importance to the question of procedure, and to hold definite views thereon. When it was announced from Washington last month that the agenda would consist (1) of discussions on armament, (2) of the political issues in the Pacific, it was not taken in official quarters here to imply that these main subjects would be dealt with strictly in that order, or even that they would be dealt with separately. Indeed it was assumed that there would be no attempt to disintegrate what is in effect a single whole. So single is the problem awaiting the Conference that to British eyes it is a little difficult to see how any progress can be made towards the limitation of armaments unless and until an agreement has been reached on the political problems of the Pacific. Granted the latter, the former becomes easy.

2. A POST-WAR EXAMPLE

A frank statement of the British case could not be made without first recording the impression made on British opinion, both official and unofficial, by American policy since the war. The British people are quick to appreciate sportsmanship. By all the rules of international opportunism, as they have traditionally held good, the United States would have been justified in driving home her post-war advantage. She could have decided to build a navy of decisive superiority, and to present the world with a fait accompli. She could have done it easily, and would not thereby have transgressed the accepted canons of international form. Instead she chose to organize a conference with the object of arriving at an understanding which would relieve both herself and her possible rivals of the insensate burden of competitive armaments, and by the same token would make good sense, and not brute strength, the arbiter of the future. Such is the true idealism of the United States.

Nor need British appreciation of it be an empty sentiment. We too have practised disarmament. The British army of 1918 no longer exists. Conscription is gone. The Admiralty has consented to abandon the traditional policy of the Two-Power standard, and has already taken the necessary steps to reduce the number of capital ships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines in this sense. If disarmament at the present time means in effect the limitation of armaments, Great Britain may claim a prominent place in the movement. To appreci-

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ate this, it must be remembered that the British navy in the past has had more than one duty to perform. It is not only necessary for maintaining the security of the Empire, for maintaining the communications between the British Isles and the Dominions and between the Dominions themselves, but the forty-seven millions who live in the United Kingdom are dependent in the last resort on the British navy for their food. Four-fifths of our bread, and one-half of our meat come from overseas.

3. BRITAIN AND JAPAN

The crux of the Conference is to be the future relations of the United States, Great Britain, Japan and China. It is frankly recognized here that the discussion must centre very largely round the question of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Before the British attitude to this question can be understood, it is necessary to recall the significance of a recent development in the evolution of the British Empire. In July of this year there met in London a conference of British Empire Prime Ministers. They met as equals in the discussion of a common foreign policy. As Mr. Lloyd George said at the beginning of the conference: "There was a time when Downing Street controlled the Empire; today the Empire gives orders to Downing Street." That is a fact of importance which has clearly to be kept in mind whenever the question of British foreign policy arises.

At that conference there were three main points of view expressed. The first is what may be called the view of the London government. Mr. Lloyd George himself has since crystallized it in words which are perhaps worth quoting in some detail. On July 11th he said:

> In Japan we have an old and proved ally, and the Agreement of twenty years' standing between us has been of very great benefit, not only to ourselves and her, but to the peace of the Far East.
>
> In China there is a very numerous people, with great potentialities, who esteem our friendship highly and whose interests we on our side desire to assist and advance.
>
> In the United States we see today, as we have always seen, a people closest to our own in aims and ideals, with whom it is for us not merely a desire and an interest, but a deeply rooted instinct, to consult and cooperate.
>
> The object of our discussions (at the Empire Conference) was to find a method of combining all these three factors in a policy which would remove the danger of heavy naval expenditure in the Pacific, with all the evils which such expenditure entails, and would ensure the development of all legitimate national interests in the Far East.
>
> . . . The first principle of our policy was friendly cooperation with the United States, and we were all convinced that upon this more than upon any other single factor depend the peace and well-being of the world. We also desired to maintain our close friendship and cooperation with Japan. We also aimed at preserving the open door in China and at giving the Chinese people every opportunity for peaceful progress and development. In addition to these considerations we desired to safeguard our own vital interests in the Pacific, and to preclude any competition in naval armaments between the Pacific Powers.

These of course are general sentiments which remain to be translated into practical politics. First let us face the difficulties created by the special views of the Canadian and Australian delegations as expressed at the London conference. There was a certain divergence between the two.

Canada was opposed to the Anglo-Japanese alliance on the grounds that (1) it conflicted with our friendship with America; (2) it rendered difficult the problem of Japanese immigration; (3) it had in any case done its work; (4) there was no more call for an Anglo-Japanese alliance than for an alliance with the United States, France or Italy, if its only object was to safeguard friendly relations; (5) that, in general, entangling alliances are in conflict with the new spirit of international relations as expressed in the Covenant of the League of Nations; (6) that the renewal of the alliance with Japan would bring with it the crushing burden and the certain disaster of an armaments race with America. In support of her general contention Canada pointed out with great effect that she had a common frontier with the United States of more than five and a half thousand miles, unguarded on both sides; what better proof of the efficacy of mutual confidence as an alternative to military alliances, even from the point of view of security?

Australia on the other hand defended the Anglo-Japanese alliance on the double ground that (1) it was disloyal to throw over a proved friend, and (2) the alliance was the best and most economical means of eliminating possible misunderstandings with Japan, and of safeguarding the security of Australia.

In view of these divergent points of view, what is the composite policy of the British Empire in the Far East?

It should be understood as an axiom that the British Empire, by the very nature of its composition, can admit of no argument based on the color division between East and West. The British Empire is a "piebald" empire. Mr. Srinivasa Sastri, for instance, will attend the Washington Conference as the representative of the Indian section of the British Empire delegation. The Empire is a bridge between East and West. It may be

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wrong for it to be so; but it is so. For a hundred years the British Empire has aimed at the elimination of race-war and race-discrimination, and at the fostering of race-understanding. The opinion is moreover strongly held here, both in government circles and generally in the country, that the whole peace in the Pacific is dependent on such an understanding between the white and the yellow races. Mr. Lloyd George has lately said that there could be no greater calamity for the world than a further aggravation of race-hostility; that the British Empire has in the past done much towards smoothing out such hostility, a fact which is attested by the loyalty of Asiatic peoples to the British King; and that to abandon such a policy now would not only increase the danger of war, but would divide the Empire against itself.

4. THE INTERESTS OF CHINA

It is true that Great Britain has to face, and is prepared to face, the question of China. There will be no difficulty in arriving at an agreement in principle between the United States and Great Britain that the interests of China must be protected against Japanese designs, or against anybody else's. But what are the practical steps to be taken? Is the United States prepared to take any practical measures, military or otherwise, to protect China against Japan? Probably not. What then can be done? Great Britain answers that the instrument is ready at hand. A definite understanding with Japan, whether in the form of an alliance or in some other form, carries with it an influence on the conduct of Japan. A square deal towards China on the part of Japan can be made a condition of the advantages which Japan enjoys as a result of such an alliance. Great Britain at this moment has an influence over Japan, and therefore a practical means of protecting China, which the United States has not. British opinion holds that there can be no hope of any kind in merely saying to Japan "You are a dirty yellow dog" (or its diplomatic equivalent) and doing nothing further. Far better be friends.

5. AN ESCAPE FROM THE BRITISH DILEMMA.

When the British Empire Conference found itself in the dilemma produced by the issue between Canada and Australia, President Harding's invitation to Washington came as a deus ex machina. A general agreement on the problem of the Pacific, to which the United States, Britain, Japan and China were alike parties, would have the happy effect of satisfying the demands of the British Isles, Canada and Australia alike.

Let me anticipate a very natural American objection to this argument. Many Americans are quite frankly irritated by it. "Consider (they say) Japan's action in Shantung; Japan's 1915 ultimatum to China, with its 21 points—'every one of them a gaping wound';—why talk of a general understanding with such a background as this? The effect of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is on the one hand to enable Japan to do her worst in the Far East and not to suffer for it, and on the other hand, to prevent Great Britain from taking her natural place side by side with the United States in condemning such enormities."

To this British opinion would answer that she yields place to no one in her stand for the square deal and for fair play. It is what she has been struggling for in the European peace settlement since 1918, often at heavy sacrifice and to the risk of former friendships. She would gratefully have welcomed American help in many a recent crisis produced by this very determination to secure fair play all round. Let the United States formulate any concrete program for the protection of Chinese interests; Great Britain will not only support it, but will probably add to it, if that were possible. But by the same token, Great Britain will not consent to any violation of the square deal as it affects Japan.

6. FAIR PLAY FOR JAPAN

How then, it will be asked, do Japanese interests enter into the question of the square deal? On this point it will probably be found at Washington that the British delegation will urge two main considerations:

(1.) Japan took an honorable and valuable part in the war. Her cruisers escorted Australian troops to Europe. But for Japan Vancouver might have been bombarded. Quite simply and quite frankly Great Britain feels that it is not playing the game to make use of Japan, and then to throw her over.

(2.) Japan is entitled to adequate scope for her reasonable needs, no less than the other Asiatic peoples. Look at the map, and see how much of the littoral has been appropriated by the white nations. Is Japan to be wholly excluded? The Monroe Doctrine has two edges.

It is the chief business of the Washington Conference to decide what is fair for all the parties concerned, and to give effect to it without fear or favor.

7. MILITARY DISARMAMENT

There are powers, such as the United States, Great Britain and Japan, which are naval in character. There are others, such as those on the Con-

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tinent of Europe, which are mainly military. If, as all sections of opinion in Great Britain devoutly hope will be the case, the Washington Conference succeeds in reducing naval armaments, will the movement end there, or will it rather be extended to military armaments? The risk, if risk there be, is no greater in one case than in the other; the advantages are equal. It is at least arguable that the limitation of naval armaments is conditioned in the long run by a corresponding limitation of military armaments. To British eyes this is especially clear, because fate has made us a European, as well as a Pacific, power.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

What France Wants

PROBABLY the funniest remark that has ever been made about France's military situation is that of a French delegate to the Assembly of the unhappy League of Nations. Germany, declared M. Noblemaire, has, it is true, disarmed in a material sense, but then she has not disarmed morally; whereas France, though materially keeping a large army, has long ago disarmed morally. I do not know whether Washington will applaud as heartily as Geneva. France of course has a case, and it is, from a certain viewpoint, an excellent case. But it is obvious that if one begins to draw distinctions between what is material and what is moral in armament and disarmament, it is open to each nation to pretend that its material forces are of no consequence since morally they do not exist. If this audacious paradox is admitted, the Washington Conference will have an easy task. Japan will be able to assure the American people that the number of ships is totally irrelevant, since they have been morally dismantled by Japan. The United States will be able to proclaim that the material figures in the budget are unimportant, since America is morally not going to increase her fleet. England can show that her navy is purely a material thing. It is unfortunately to be feared that sceptics will not be satisfied. No one can deny that the spirit of a nation matters more than the exact size of its army and navy, but one is compelled to judge the spirit by its material expression.

For France the Washington Conference really resolves itself in advance into a discussion of land forces. It is true that France has possessions in the Far East and is even attempting some kind of economic penetration of China—though the collapse of the Banque Industrielle de Chine dealt a sad blow to her credit in the Far East and was announced at the same moment that Germany resumed her banking operations in China. But France cannot be said to have any special concern with the Sino-Japanese quarrel. Politically, France would regard the fate of Shantung and other Chinese provinces with comparative indifference. I am afraid that conscience has not yet been put into diplomacy and therefore were the struggle to be between one weak and disintegrating yellow people and another strong and expanding yellow people, it would indeed be hard to raise a headline.

But France begins to take notice of Pacific problems for various reasons. In the first place, it is a matter of prestige: she must take her place as an equal among the great powers meeting in Washington. France quite rightly has been somewhat troubled about her rank since she suspected Great Britain of assuming a sort of overlordship of the Continent. Such symptoms of diplomatic diminution as the relegation of the French language to the second place, grieve her greatly. Again, the Pacific problem is one which directly affects her friends. It affects England and it affects, above all, America. Now although it is not yet clear when and how America will return politically to Europe, France has not lost hope of American aid in Europe's restoration, and of American guarantees against German aggression. I will not dwell upon the sentimental ties which undoubtedly exist between the two great Republics. It is certainly the case that France has never reproached America for her disillusionment as she has reproached England. While she loses no opportunity of emitting malicious little articles against her neighbor across the Channel, she never ceases to laud her associate across the Atlantic. Apparently a ménage à trois is just as difficult in the international sphere as in family life. The Matin offers a remarkable instance of how propaganda on behalf of America is understood to imply hostility towards England. One rejoices to see this newspaper strengthening the bonds of friendship between France and America, but one wonders why the directors should consider that a necessary corollary is Anglophobia.

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Because it believes this, the Matin is rendering not good but pernicious services to humanity. There is a great deal of propaganda in France on behalf of America and a great deal of propaganda in America on behalf of France. All kinds of associations send delegates and these delegates are loudly and conspicuously fêted. Statesmen and generals pay visits, and the ceremonies are recorded in many columns. This is (except that one must make reservations about the efficacy of official propaganda) as it should be; but it is inexplicable why there should go hand in hand with praise of America abuse of England. Psychologically, perhaps, one might suggest that America forfeited France's friendship much less in withdrawing completely from the treaty partnership, than did England in remaining in the treaty partnership only to embarrass French action.

However this may be, there is certainly a genuine warmth of feeling for America in France as there is in America for France. Political calculation plays a very small part in this, and not much notice should be given to indiscreet remarks in such papers as the Intransigeant, suggesting that France should take advantage of the delicate situation in which Anglo-American relations stand to play off one Anglo-Saxon nation against the other. Such a vague unworthy notion could in any case hardly be developed precisely, and is in no way countenanced by France's responsible politicians. Obviously France must be, though indirectly, keenly interested in any measures which will prevent a Pacific catastrophe. She could not look on without emotion and watch America drifting into a war with Japan—a war which, whatever the result, would at any rate divert attention from European needs and would destroy all chance of American cooperation with Europe. In this sense she is vitally concerned with the success of the Washington Conference—and that success depends largely on Anglo-American friendship, since England by reason of her relations with Japan possesses a controlling influence.

It remains true that for France the chief question to be discussed at Washington is not a naval holiday but land disarmament. Any proposal for an immediate drastic reduction of armies touches her personally and peculiarly. This is why, on the one hand, it is considered essential that she should send to Washington her most authoritative defenders. This is why she must be represented by men with winning tongues, capable of explaining her policy with the utmost clarity. Certainly it is inconvenient, on account of urgent domestic difficulties, in the interplay of opposing Parliamentary forces, for her principal statesmen to remain long absent. But they must be spared for a time sufficiently long to enable them to deliver from the platform of Washington a speech or speeches which will show that French vigilance is justified. But this is why, on the other hand, a certain section of French opinion deprecates the risks that French statesmen will run of being asked awkward questions. This section thought it better, not indeed for France to keep out of the Conference—that is impossible—but for France to be represented by less showy functionaries.

I have recently met in Europe American financiers and business men who have visited most of the countries of Balkanized Europe which stand in need of long-term credits. Whatever America as a whole may think of Europe there is one simple, solid thought fixing itself firmly in the minds of these travelled American business men and financiers. They see that bankruptcy and armaments go together. They are aware of the multiplied frictions which necessitate the maintenance of immense armies, armies greater than existed in pre-war days, and they are aware that it is precisely in those countries which cannot buckle their budgets that most money is being poured down the sewer of armaments. Unanimously they demand, as a preliminary condition of confidence and credits, less spending on armies, an attempt to reduce the annual deficits, some assurance of peace, and corresponding political stability. The material basis of credits, the material justification for big business, big undertakings, big exploitation of concessions which would be readily granted, is not wanting; and therefore the unemployment problem which is so devastating in America could be largely solved in Europe. But what is lacking is precisely a European peace policy. The first thing to be done is to reduce land armies, and thus relieve budgets, and thus obtain financial and political security.

That is the problem expressed in general terms. But it is not only Poland and Rumania and Hungary and Jugoslavia which make American financiers pause, and which furnish arguments to those who oppose the cancellation of war debts. France herself has not yet fixed her military policy. For my part I believe that France as a nation, as a people, is entirely pacific. The charge that she is desirous of embarking on adventures, that she has imperialistic ambitions, is not well-founded. What troubles her is that she is still in peril. She does not wish to attack but she is determined to defend.

One may differ totally about the wisdom of her methods: one may ask whether preoccupation about self-protection does not sometimes singularly

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resemble defiance and distrust that are bound to express themselves violently beyond the borders of France. But the group of politicians who would dislocate Germany, who would disannex (but not annex) the Rhineland from the Reich, is small if noisy, and cannot in my opinion do otherwise than decline in importance. There are, of course, militarists in all countries and France does not constitute an exception. Everything however points to the eventual adoption of a specific policy of pacification if France is not made to feel herself in a dangerous solitude, if she is made to feel that she has friends.

Still, France has not yet decided what shall be the future duration of compulsory universal military service. She has three-quarters of a million men under arms, and M. Albert Sarraut the other day intimated that the period of service could only be finally reduced when a native army of 300,000 men had been raised. At the same time M. Balkanowski, the reporter for the Finance Commission of the Chamber, is calling attention to the prodigious sums (18 milliard francs) which will have a few years hence to be disbursed annually for the service of the public debt—sums which sensibly approach what has hitherto been regarded as the limit of state revenue from taxation. It is certainly not my purpose to criticize France, but these facts have been freely cabled. They are notorious and require explanation.

Now the explanation which France will furnish at Washington is exceedingly simple. It is that it would be folly to disarm until it is seen clearly what is to be the political configuration of Germany. It would be folly to invite the revanche of the hereditary enemy. It would be folly to surrender the means of pressure upon her recalcitrant neighbor until it is certain that Germany will make such reparation as is possible. She cannot throw away lightly the only weapon which she possesses, any more than America can scrap her navy until she is assured that there will be no sanguinary quarrel with Japan. To ask her to do so in present circumstances is, she believes, unreasonable.

The circumstances which are of chief importance are these: Germany is still swayed by contrary impulses, still hesitates between pacific republicanism and militaristic monarchism; France agreed to the limited occupation of the Rhineland on condition that there was a tripartite military pact between herself, England, and America—a pact which fell through because of its non-ratification by America, leaving France without either her natural frontiers on the Rhine or the assurance of Allied help against subsequent aggression; while the League of Nations as constituted is without effective power and is unable to control events in Europe.

Certainly the policy of so-called security is sterile. But in view of the desertion of France by her former Allies, how can she forget that her future safety depends, as she argues, on her possession of force? The Temps in an admirably balanced article has just deplored France's isolation. The incidents in Italy, where a French Mission, headed by a French Marshal, was hooted and molested, emphasize the inevitable break-up of the coalition of war. I have, I think, sufficiently pointed out France's diplomatic aberrations to be allowed to draw attention to the responsibility incurred by her former associates in leaving her in the lurch, without any assurance of solidarity should voluntary disarmament make her again a victim.

Of the serious consequences to France of this necessity, real or imaginary, of maintaining large armies, there is no need to say much. It is obvious that France cannot afford her army. Overburdened as she is, the direct cost is crushing. The indirect cost is colossal. Germany has an immense economic advantage over France inasmuch as she has few soldiers; that is to say, few idlers. Not only are these young Frenchmen non-productive during the period of service, but they are demoralized in barracks. Just as the Frenchman reaches the threshold of manhood, just as he is finishing his studies or is about to become a proficient workman, he is compelled to leave all, to forget all, to waste his days in the useless occupations of soldiering. The effect on his after-life in many cases is ruinous. Not until the system of compulsory universal military service is abandoned, can France make the most of her intellectual and industrial potentialities.

It would indeed be strange were Frenchmen not to see these things. They do see them. They only support them because there seems to be no other way. Is it too much to hope that Washington will point out the better way? America has a great moral responsibility for Europe. She is truly her brother's keeper. Even though no definite solutions of European problems are reached at Washington, at least the doctrine of solidarity —economic, financial, and military—should be preached from the Washington platform, and a new conception of Americo-European relations take shape.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

Paris.

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A Japanese Rebuttal

ON the eve of the Armament Conference it is undeniably true that public opinion in the United States is in general hostile to and suspicious of Japan. The three outstanding reasons for this are the California exclusion question, the action of part of our press in urging that war with Japan is inevitable, and most of all the widespread belief that Japan is playing the rôle of villain in the Far East, having conquered Korea by the sword, overrun Manchuria, and pursued in China a course of economic penetration, disruptive political intrigue and seizure of territory and concessions altogether incompatible with American ideals.

Whether our animosity is well founded, or not, it is discouraging to those who hope that genuine accomplishment may grow out of the Washington Conference. To a peculiar degree this gathering is the result of the pressure of public opinion. Inspired at least in part by the demand of the taxpayer for relief it will be influenced largely by popular sentiment. If the American public dislikes and mistrusts Japan, and vice versa, the problems of the Conference are made more difficult.

In this juncture it seems no more than fair that Japan's point of view should at least be stated, impartially and fully. I have therefore obtained a statement of what he considers to be his country's attitude from a distinguished Japanese who has been carefully watching the trend of public opinion in both countries. The thoughts which follow are his, though expressed in my words. Needless to say, his views are reported without endorsement either by this journal or the writer.

All the chief naval powers which are sending their representatives to Washington have indicated a desire for the limitation of naval armaments. Such limitation should therefore not be difficult of accomplishment. The burden of military and naval expenditure in Japan is oppressive. Every truly patriotic element in the nation would welcome the opportunity to decrease it. Our eagerness for this, however, must not make us lose touch with reality. Throughout recorded history nations which have neglected national defence have been trampled under foot by ruthless foes. If Japan abolishes the single plan which has succeeded in the past, this can only be done if her national safety is guaranteed in some other way. The hope or the confident expectation of safety is not enough. Her position must be one regarding which there is no doubt.

American hostility to Japan is based on a complete misapprehension of Japanese policy toward China. The presumption is that Japan wants a clear field in order to carry out unhampered a process of spoliation. Both ideas are wrong. Japan does not wish to wreck China. She wishes to see China active and prosperous and above all energetic in the development of her natural resources. In an economic sense Japan has become an occidental nation. She lives today upon her manufactures. She must get raw materials from China, her best and nearest source. She must sell her manufactures in China, her best and nearest market. Like England, Japan must export goods and import foodstuffs or she will die.

The development of China is therefore a paramount necessity to Japan. But China is so big that it is folly to expect Japan to direct this development alone. The aid and cooperation of all the leading powers is necessary, and will be welcomed by Japan. If the open door policy is to mean a real open door, and not an attempt to shut Japan out and let the other nations in, she will gladly continue to endorse that policy.

It is true that the Japanese have done many things in China which are deplorable. But it is not fair to judge a nation by the acts of a few representatives even though some of these are government officials. There are scoundrels in all nations, but the majority of men everywhere are decent. Japanese officials and business men have been under a peculiar temptation to intrigue in China because there are so many warring factions in that country and because the personal character of many Chinese officials readily breaks down under temptation. These are regrettable facts, but nothing is to be gained by demanding with indignation from the Japanese a moral standard never yet attained in practice by any nation.

Moreover, the amount of Japanese intrigue in China, and its depravity, have been exaggerated for American ears. Some of the evil practices have been ended by the Japanese government. There was undoubtedly smuggling of opium and morphine. It was a scandal, but an international one, since British and American business men participated in it. Japan has now done everything in her power to end the illicit trade.

The case of Korea is another count held by

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America against Japan. It is true that the Japanese military authorities have been guilty of some brutal acts toward the Koreans. Do you recall any military occupation not marked by similar incidents? Korea is now, and must be a part of the Japanese Empire. For her territory to fall into the hands of an unfriendly power would be as intolerable for Japan as a similar seizure of Ireland by a hostile nation would be for Great Britain. This is a foundation stone of Japanese policy, and the key to her action in Manchuria. It has been necessary to defend Korea against the aggression of Russia or China, with both of whom Japan has fought—and won—over this issue.

Americans cannot seem to remember that the history of the Far East for the past forty years has been a record of conquest, of the forcible seizure of territory and economic privilege, in which all the leading powers except the United States have taken part. Japan has been no more and no less guilty than every other nation. These actions may not agree with the morality of Utopia, but they have been the invariable practice of all countries throughout history. These policies should be overthrown; but they are too deeply rooted for this to be done in a day. John Hay recognized this. When he first enunciated the open door policy he specifically declared that the vested rights of other nations in the Far East should be respected. Of such character were the German rights in Shantung, which were taken over by Japan in due and legal form, an action approved by France and Great Britain and confirmed by the Paris Peace Conference. Japan said then, and has never wavered in her declaration, that the territory of Kiaochau, as distinct from the economic concessions which the Germans possessed, would and will be returned to China. The recent proposal of Japan for the transfer of Kiaochau and the settlement of the Shantung questions are proof of her sincerity.

Enemies of Japan declare she is bent on a policy of "Asia for the Asiatics," that she would be glad to see a warfare between the white race and a combination of the yellow and brown. The supposition is not only false but nonsensical. Such a conflict is an impossibility. Look at Asia today: India is in the hands of the British. The French control Indo-China. The United States holds the Philippines. Siberia is Russian. Part of China is controlled by the various western powers. To secure the cooperation of the yellow and brown races would require half a century of intrigue. In a military sense such an aggression would be doomed to failure from the start. Suppose India, for instance, broke away from British control. The result would be chaos tomorrow, and that is the last thing Japan wants in any quarter of the world. Her industrialized state can only survive if the civilization of Asia is increasingly well ordered and productive in an economic sense. It is true that the Japanese have seen the march of the white man around the globe. They have watched him come to the eastern shores of North America, drive out the Indians, and advance to the Pacific. They have seen Alaska, Hawaii and the Philippines taken. In the other direction they have seen Europeans move into Africa, Asia Minor, India, Australia and the islands of the South Seas. Japan could hardly be blamed if she felt that only the accident of her rapid adaptation to occidental standards, including military power, has preserved her independence. However, Japan does not fear the white race per se. She fears any force which threatened to cut off her access by the sea to foodstuffs and raw materials. And she feels the absolute necessity of finding an outlet on the continent of Asia for her increasing population, which has already outrun the economic resources of her islands.

As for the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the feeling of Nippon toward it is: Why not? It has been in existence over a period of years and has apparently caused no trouble to anyone—except Germany, who found it extremely annoying during the war. The alliance could not, under any group of circumstances which comes within the realm of possibility, be a menace to the United States. There is a clause which exempts Great Britain from the necessity of standing with Japan in a war against America. That the conditions would be reversed, that England would make war on the United States and demand Japan's assistance, is unthinkable. Why then does America object? One interpretation is that the American people, who wrongly think that Japan alone among the nations is engaged in an orgy of criminality, believe that if England signs the alliance again, she underwrites and condones Japan's acts. Both the premise and the inference are wrong.

Australia, which is close to the scene and in a position to judge, has endorsed the proposal that the alliance be renewed. For that matter, she has good reason to do so, since the agreement saves her the cost of building a fleet of battleships of her own. Canada, it is true, opposes the alliance; but Canadian policy is predicated upon the desire to maintain harmonious relations with her big neighbor in the south.

The real reason for American dislike of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is probably the naval situation created by it. In spite of the clause in the

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alliance to prevent a combination against America, the United States views with apprehension the possibilities of a combined navy. Japan's answer to such fear is: If you don't like the alliance as it stands, come in yourselves and make it a tripartite agreement. Write the terms of it as you will; Japan and Great Britain will probably not hesitate to agree to them. With these three powers in harmony and working on a fixed plan in the Far East, Japan would gladly consent to any degree of disarmament that seemed feasible. Under such a three-fold alliance, she would yield to majority sentiment on practically any phase of her continental policy. The only exception would be in regard to the economic concessions Japan now enjoys, which she believes to be vital to her existence.

A three-power alliance of this sort would be able to solve nearly all the difficulties of the Chinese problem. There seems to be a fundamental weakness and instability in the character of Chinese public men, which makes their policy far different from that which would be followed by an occidental under the same circumstances. China should have asked Theodore Roosevelt to come and serve as her president. In three or four years he could have wrought a transformation in the people, who need the mental and spiritual discipline he would have given them. The same thing might be accomplished today by Mr. Root or Mr. Hughes. It is because the Chinese people lack discipline of this sort that such chaos and disunion as we witness today become possible.

The problem which Japan keeps constantly before her is: The resources of China must be developed for the welfare of the world. How can this best be done? She would be willing to submit to the collective judgment of the powers as to the answer to this question. She stands ready to go as far as the nations will go toward disarmament and the giving and taking of guarantees for the maintenance, in general, of the status quo. She asks only the same degree of fairness and altruistic interest in the common good which the other powers, and America in particular, are asking of her.

Parts of this argument will seem specious to many Americans. The proposal to "freeze" the status quo appears highly impracticable, in the light of history. There are also whole volumes to be said about the morality of forcing an unwelcome new type of civilization upon the Chinese, no matter how beneficently it might be done. However, in undertaking to give expression to the viewpoint of a Japanese on his country's policies, I limited my function to reporter, not debater. I have no doubt that plenty of persons will come forward to reply. BRUCE BLIVEN.

Private Enterprise and Public War

EVEN the munition makers do not want war! We have it on high authority. "The truth is that no one realizes as clearly as do we makers of war necessities the grave financial dangers of modern conflicts." Thus, the chairman of America's oldest munition firm in the latest number of The Nation's Business. How the realization is acted upon, what the makers of war necessities do to prevent modern conflicts, we are not told.

But "truth" and the perception of it often differ. In this instance they seem very far apart. For in many parts ofthe world, private interests engaged in the production of war materials are continually charged with responsibility for armament competitions and war panics, if not with responsibility for directly inciting armed conflicts. In the earlier stages of the past war, it was commonly believed in Allied countries that munition makers had played such a large rôle in Germany's affairs as to be a factor in precipitating the war itself. "Krupp" became almost a household byword, and it continues so, long after the Treaty of Versailles has forced the notorious German firm to give up the munition business altogether.

The existence of this suspicion is in itself a factor in the problem of armaments. So long as it continues, so long as no effort is made to dig out its roots, the full measure of public confidence will be lacking for any program of "disarmament." Distrust of the interests to whom public defence means private gain feeds the Frenchman's "German menace" and the American's "Japanese peril." It is part of the task of the Washington Conference to ferret out the reasons for such distrust, and to seek some method of destroying it.

The swollen profits made by the larger munition firms in Europe—the Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabrik is reported to have paid thirty-two percent dividends in 1912 and 1913—are not wholly responsible for the denunciations of the "armaments ring" and the "war trust." Satisfactory evidence of the activities of munition firms has never been available. The firms themselves do not publish their own incriminations. But several incidents just

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before the beginning of the war, for which we have tangible proof, have led to the fear that if all the facts could be known it would be found that many munition makers were banded together before the war, in an international trust operating in various secret and sinister ways to increase the orders for arms and ammunition. A report on some of these incidents was prepared during the war by a commission of the Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad, under the chairmanship of a neutral military leader, General de Meester.*

The obvious danger in the manufacture of war necessities by private enterprise, that in order to further their business some interested individuals may seek to corrupt public officials, has not great international significance. But disclosures in various countries before the war indicated the length to which such an evil may go. In 1913, a sensation was produced in the German Reichstag by charges as to the bribery of German officials by the Krupp firm. The accused persons, including four officers, defending on the ground that they thought that "Krupp's and the State were one and the same thing," were convicted of betraying military secrets to the Krupp agent. In June and July, 1914, a Japanese court-martial convicted a number of Japanese military and naval officers of accepting bribes from the English firm of Vickers, Ltd., and the German firm of Siemens-Schuckert. The charges and findings were published at the time in the Japan Weekly Chronicle and in the Japan Weekly Mail. It was revealed, for instance, that in connection with the construction of a single battle cruiser £110,000 had been paid out in Japan as commission money.

Of greater international significance are the accusations that certain armament firms have been responsible for spreading misinformation for the purpose of goading governments to enlarge their military establishments. The so-called "Mulliner incident" in England figured in a number of important debates in the House of Commons. It was alleged that in framing the naval budget of 1909, which resulted in an Anglo-German naval crisis, the British government had relied on false information as to the secret acceleration of naval preparations at the Krupp works in Germany; and that this information had been supplied by Mulliner, a director of an English ammunition firm which was soliciting government orders, who had been admitted into the government's innermost councils. Similarly, in early 1914, the "Poutiloff affair" aroused great excitement in the French press and increased the general feeling of uneasiness in France. Rumors became current in Paris that a controlling interest in the Poutiloff factories at St. Petersburg had been acquired by Krupp and the Deutsche Bank. French agents from Creusot were said to be employed at the Poutiloff factories in manufacturing artillery for Russia according to French secret designs, which would thus fall into German hands. The denial of the rumor by Krupp agents and by the Russian government did not allay its effect on French opinion, nor on the French military program. Frequent allusion is made, also, to a letter which the Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabrik is alleged to have written to its agent in Paris, directing the publication of false reports in the French press in order that they might be used to stimulate preparedness in Germany.*

The danger that some armament firms may operate in different countries to play off one government against another was accentuated by the international character of many of the larger firms before the war. English firms, for instance, were interested in munition plants and armor factories in Austria-Hungary, in France, in Italy, in Russia, in Spain, and even in South America. The Harvey United Steel Co., Ltd., formed in 1901 and dissolved in 1913, had extensive holdings in the armament firms of various countries. Many Englishmen were astonished shortly after the outbreak of the war, when it came out in evidence before an English court that the Krupp firm held shares in English companies to the value of £200,000. The result of this "internationalism" was that during the days of keenest naval competition between England and Germany, the English firms supplying the British government were also interested through their affiliations in supplying Germany's chief allies, and the chief producer in Germany profited not only from Germany's increases but also from England's efforts to overcome them!

Important also, though perhaps less sinister, is the influence of munition makers on the national policy of their own governments. The course of the Bethelem Steel Corporation in 1915 and 1916, in conducting a campaign of opposition to the proposal that the United States construct a government armor plant as recommended by Secretaries of the Navy since the days of Secretary Herbert, was an understandable pursuit of self-interest. And the explanation in the Corporation's annual report for 1915 that "on a matter of this kind"

* This report is published in Rapports de l'Organisation Centrale Pour Une Paix Durable, 1916, Vol. II, pp. 315-355.

* The alleged text is given in Dickinson, The Choice Before Us, p. 208.

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the Corporation "has an important obligation to the nation of which it is a citizen" is interesting as a contribution to our national store of humor!

It is not surprising that the pre-war situation should have led to general incriminations against munition makers. General Smuts has given clear statement of the objections to uncontrolled private manufacture. In his celebrated pamphlet on the League of Nations, published in 1918, he says that

> as long as the production of munitions of war remains a private commercial undertaking, huge vested interests grow up around it which influence public opinion through the press and otherwise in the direction of war. There is no doubt that the influence of Krupps has been harmful to the great peace interests of the world, and, in a less degree, the same could probably be said of most other similar undertakings. The very success of that sort of business depends on the stimulation of the war atmosphere among the peoples. The press, influenced by the large profits and advertising enterprise of the armament firms, whip up public opinion on every imaginable occasion; small foreign incidents are written up and magnified into grave international situations affecting the pacific relations of states; and the war temperature is artificially raised and kept up.

Perhaps adequate data for establishing such a general statement beyond controversy cannot be assembled. But the incidents of which evidence is available tend to produce the impression that many more exist for which proof is lacking.

Whether true or false, such allegations are widely believed. They constitute a part of that general stock of vague impressions upon which voters rely and by which governments are moved. A recent report of the Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments of the League of Nations recapitulates the current allegations as follows:

> 1. That armament firms have been active in fomenting war-scares and in persuading their own countries to adopt war-like policies and to increase their armaments.
> 2. That armament firms have attempted to bribe government officials, both at home and abroad.
> 3. That armament firms have disseminated false reports concerning the military and naval programmes of various countries, in order to stimulate armament expenditure.
> 4. That armament firms have sought to influence opinion through the control of newspapers in their own and foreign countries.
> 5. That armament firms have organized international armament rings through which the armament race has been accentuated by playing off one country against another.
> 6. That armament firms have organized international armament trusts which have increased the price of armaments sold to governments.

But what can be done? How can the evils, or the possibilities of evils, be prevented? How can the public suspicion be destroyed?

General Smuts proposed "that all factories for the manufacture of direct weapons of war shall be nationalized and their production shall be subject to the inspection of officers of the Council" of the League of Nations. His suggestion led to the consideration of the subject at the Paris Peace Conference, and in President Wilson's first draft of the Covenant a provision was included wholly interdicting the manufacture of munitions and implements of war "by private enterprise or for private profit."

The abolition of private manufacture would clearly bring some advantages. It would wipe out the pocket interest of private individuals in armament competition and thus remove their temptation to encourage large public expenditure for motives of private gain. If they should not become less frequent, war panics would certainly become less profitable. The loss to individuals and the circumscribing of their initiative, if existing plants were taken over with compensation, would probably be viewed quite lightly in a country where a large brewery industry was suddenly destroyed without compensation.

But objections come first from the smaller states which are not able to supply their own munitions. General Smuts thought that

> to keep up the high temperature of the war atmosphere all over the world for the sake of indulging the small Balkan and other states in their favorite form of sport will not appeal to the great democracies of the world. It will materially assist the peace policy of the League to cut off the supply of arms and munitions from these small states, whose little fits of temper are too costly to the world, and whose security could be more safely entrusted to the League.

Coming from one who had long experience in conducting war on behalf of a small state, such a view must be considered. But does it cover the case?

If private manufacture were forbidden, each state which maintains naval or military forces would have to provide itself with facilities for the manufacture of arms and munitions by state enterprise. In time of peace, some governments might purchase from other governments, though they might lack assurance of continued supply and they might find themselves called upon to accommodate their policy to the views of the supplying governments. But in time of war, a belligerent would be unable to get supplies from foreign governments unless they should join it as co-belligerents. For as international law stands today, the supply of munitions by a neutral government to a belligerent

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would constitute a violation of neutrality. A belligerent would have to depend upon its own production and that of its allies. It could import the raw materials from neutral countries, if its trade routes were kept open. But dependence on such imports would require the maintenance of plants adapted for or susceptible of being adapted for manufacturing war necessities on perhaps short order. If this were impossible—to a small agricultural country like Siam it would be very expensive—or if sudden attack were feared, it would be necessary for a belligerent to keep on hand sufficient stores for sudden emergencies. The result might be that all states maintaining naval or military establishments would feel themselves under the necessity of becoming producers of arms and munitions. The number of munition plants would be greatly increased. Large stores might be accumulated. And some small states might become wholly dependent on larger powers for protection, unless they were content to seek security in the League of Nations.

If all production of munitions were put into the hands of governments, without other changes in international law, the situation in time of war would be much the same as if neutral individuals were forbidden to ship munitions to belligerent governments. When Austria-Hungary protested in 1915 against the shipment of arms to the Allies from America, Secretary Lansing's reply stated that

> The general adoption by the nations of the world of the theory that neutral powers ought to prohibit the sale of arms and ammunition to belligerents would compel every nation to have in readiness at all times sufficient munitions of war to meet any emergency which might arise and to erect and maintain establishments for the manufacture of arms and ammunition sufficient to supply the needs of its military and naval forces throughout the progress of a war. Manifestly the application of this theory would result in every nation becoming an armed camp.

It was for these reasons that the Paris Peace Conference did not attempt to abolish private manufacture forthwith. But in its final form the Covenant recognizes that some action is necessary:

> The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

How can these "grave objections" be met? Short of abolishing private manufacture, is it possible to control it so as to prevent its "evil effects?"

Most of all, publicity is needed—publicity as to the production and distribution of arms and ammunition throughout the world. The existence of armament is a potential danger to the whole world; in time of peace every people should have information as to where the armament is and in what amount. Secrecy means not only the necessity of preparation against sudden manoeuvres. It makes possible the excited fears of which panics are made. It creates an atmosphere in which false rumors are readily believed. So long as governments may conceal the sources of their munitions, their rivals will feel insecure. The reports current in France as to Germany's secret manufacture of arms have had a big influence on European politics during these past two years.

The measures by which necessary publicity is to be achieved are not simple to devise. They may be even more difficult to execute. The report of the League of Nations Commission, already referred to, makes some interesting suggestions as to possibilities to be studied. These include the possibility of requiring government license for the manufacture, import or export of any arms or munitions, with arrangements for each government's reporting periodically to some international bureau on all licenses issued; of requiring all shares in companies engaged in the munition business to be nominative, transferable only by public record, and non-transferable to aliens; of requiring public audits of the books of such companies; of taking measures to prevent individuals interested in such companies from owning or controlling newspapers; and of forbidding the issuance of patents on munitions or implements of war to non-nationals.

Some progress has already been made toward controlling the trade in arms. Austria, Bulgaria, Germany and Hungary have undertaken in the Treaties of Peace to prohibit the export of war materials altogether. Since 1912, the President of the United States has had authority to forbid the shipment of arms or munitions to any American country where "conditions of domestic violence exist." For two decades the United States has been a party to the Brussels act which is aimed against the "boot-leggers" who created such a scandal by selling arms to the natives in certain parts of Africa.

But though the Brussels act is still in force, it has long been out of date. At the Peace Conference, the Arms Traffic Convention of St. Germain was drawn to supersede it. This convention goes much further than to prohibit the export of arms

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and munitions to prescribed territories in Africa and the Near East. It requires the signatories to prohibit all export of arms and munitions except under special government license, and to publish annual reports concerning licenses granted and the quantities and destination of exports permitted. It was signed by twenty-three states, and has now been ratified or adhered to by at least nine states. But the larger producing states have only signified their willingness to ratify the Convention when it is ratified by the United States, and in Washington it has not yet been submitted to the Senate.

Although it is a distinct step forward, the Convention of St. Germain was not framed with a view to preventing the evils of private manufacture. When measures to the latter end are formulated, a single convention might be drawn to forbid all shipments of arms to prohibited areas, and to embody measures which will protect the world against the possible evils of both private manufacture and the traffic in arms.

The next step is clear. A general international conference must study the whole problem of private manufacture, the possibility of its abolition and the possibility of its control, as well as the problems of the traffic in arms. The second Assembly of the League of Nations has decided in favor of holding such a conference to be convened by the Council at the earliest possible date, and to which all members of the League and all interested states not members of the League are to be invited.

Can the Washington Conference undertake this task? If all the producing states were to take part at Washington, the question might very well be considered there. But some notable producers will not be represented—Czecho-Slovakia, for instance, which has the important Skoda works. Moreover, some states whose resources would easily admit of their becoming producers, such as Rumania, will not be represented. It is difficult to see how the Washington Conference could deal with the subject adequately.

Yet the reduction and limitation which may be achieved at Washington will need the full confidence of the peoples of the world, if they are to last. For this reason the prevailing attitude toward "war trusts" cannot be ignored. In addition to the problem of reducing and setting limits for the future, assurance must be obtained that under no circumstances will the world renew that armament race from which a holiday was so vainly sought before 1914. If competition is allowed to continue at all it must be brought out into the light of day. Secrecy must cease to serve as seed for suspicion of other peoples and their good faith. The Washington Conference should recognize the necessity of dealing with the possible evils of private manufacture and the traffic in arms. It should go further, and plan a general international conference at which both subjects can be considered and an adequate convention can be framed. In such a matter, the country which is least dependent on private enterprise in other countries can afford to take the lead.

MANLEY O. HUDSON.

The Rules of Warfare

ON Armistice Day, November 11th, the Conference on Far Eastern questions and the limitation of armaments will meet at Washington. It seems altogether likely that its achievements will constitute the constructive record in international affairs of President Harding's administration. How much the Conference may achieve, and how completely it may fail, are both foreshadowed in the tentative program which Secretary Hughes has recently submitted to the powers.

The Hughes program outlines the problem before the Conference under three heads. First in the order of importance, although last on the tentative agenda, is the question of the Pacific and the Far East. This includes, of course, such topics as the mandated islands, Siberia, the integrity of China, railways, concessions and monopolies, and the open door. Next in the order of importance, although first on the agenda, is the question of the limitation of armaments, including both land and naval forces. Finally, inserted between the sub-head naval armament and the sub-head land armament, there is included the question of "rules for control of new agencies of warfare." Questions one and two, broadly conceived, summarize the purpose of the meeting. They indicate its tremendous opportunities for achievement. Question three, at once incongruous and futile, suggests a dismal alternative to failure.

The paramount problem before the Conference of Washington, it will be generally agreed, is to find some more satisfactory basis for mutual understanding with reference to the Pacific and the Far East. If this can be accomplished, a substantial reduction in naval armament may be possible. Unless this much can be accomplished, it seems vain to hope for lighter armament burdens.

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Now let us conceive, without prophecy, that the delegates should find this paramount problem one of extraordinary difficulty. Let us suppose that they should discover it complicated by racial antipathies, by commercial and political rivalries springing from ineradicable economic and social conditions, and by jealousies, suspicions, and hatreds which have been bred of past injustice. Let us assume that in this situation they should finally accept lip service to formulae as the most convenient palliative. If this, unhappily, should be the outcome under the first head, it is quite unlikely that anything substantial can be accomplished under the second. France and Italy may be trusted to point out that the situation in Europe does not warrant present reductions in their land forces, while Japan and America, failing some real adjustment of their more important rivalries, will certainly emerge from the conference chamber more determined than ever to reinforce diplomacy with sea power. In such a hypothetical impasse, the Conference may still formulate "rules for control of new agencies of warfare."

Whether regarded as an alternative to failure under the main head or as an opportunity for supplementary achievement, the formulation of such rules seems to promise, at best, a repetition of wasted effort and futile illusion. "New agencies of warfare" have provoked detestation in all centuries, and "rules for control" have been attempted repeatedly in the vain effort to keep pace with invention. The more common form of so called rule has been a flat prohibition enforced by refusing quarter. In 1139, for example, a Catholic council forbade the use of the cross-bow against Christians, pronouncing its employment an art "death-dealing and hateful to God." It is significant that little more than a century had elapsed, however, before this anathema was construed to mean that one must not use the cross-bow against Christians unless one's cause were just. The cross-bow was soon replaced by the musket, and the musket in its turn was universally stigmatized as an unfair innovation contrary to the rules of lawful warfare. For two or three centuries it was a common practice to slay musketeers without mercy as a penalty for employing forbidden weapons. Le bon chevalier Bayard, when mortally wounded by an arquebus ball, is said to have died thanking God that he had never given quarter to a musketeer. But the prohibition was futile. The introduction of fire-arms was followed by the invention of an extraordinary variety of new projectiles. The statement may be hazarded that there is hardly a projectile known to military science which has not, at one time or another, had an anathema pronounced against it. Chivalric commanders forbade the use of hot shot or hollow shot against the enemy in the eighteenth century in curious contrast with the charges and recriminations of the dum-dum bullet controversy in the twentieth. On occasion, indeed, such inhibitions have seemed to contribute a restraining influence, but generally the restraint has been more apparent than real. More often than otherwise, either the inhibition has soon become obsolete with the progress of invention, or it has been overridden by the inexorable exigencies of war.

And it must always be so. Cannibalism was not cured by teaching cannibals to use knives and forks of an approved design. Nor will war ever be eliminated or even made appreciably more tolerable by regulations intended to control its instrumentalities. For one thing, such regulations are formulated in peace time. They are static. Yet in time of peace science and invention are busily preparing for the next war. Only the next war can adequately test the regulation, and the regulation is likely to be shattered in the test. It is as certain as any so called law in reference to the agencies of warfare can be that the employment of the submarine against merchant shipping in 1915 was unlawful. Yet the submarine made its own atrocious code in the years that followed and it is now taken for granted that it will be employed even more effectively in the next great maritime struggle. Poison gas was a "barbaric means of warfare prohibited by the laws of war." It was used by an unscrupulous belligerent, retaliation followed, and today the government laboratories are discovering its possibilities as a super-horror of the next conflict. The same is true of explosives dropped from aircraft. Effective "rules for control of new agencies of warfare" simply cannot be devised today because we do not know what the "agencies of warfare" will be tomorrow. For another thing, as has been pointed out many times, the very nature of war makes effective legal regulation of its agencies impossible. War is abnormal, the negation of law and order, the exaltation of force. Detailed rules are certain to prove as futile as the curious provisions found in the mediaeval marine ordinances in regard to jettison of cargo in case of storm. The ordinances distinguished regular and irregular jettison with neat regulations as to the persons to be consulted and the goods first to be thrown overboard. Targa, an old Genoese magistrate of sixty years experience, is said to have remarked that he had known in all that time of only four or five instances of regular jettison and these instances were suspected of fraud because the forms had been too well ob-

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served. Detailed rules as to jettison were simply worthless in the emergency of storm. War is a seething storm.

This does not mean that codes of war law, so called, have no place or function. In the manuals which governments issue to their armies and navies, such codes form a useful part of the equipment of the professional soldier. They are an aid in preserving discipline and a safeguard against some of the more brutal forms of retaliation. They help to maintain a healthy tradition in the service by conserving something of the old chivalry. By whatever emphasis they may place upon considerations of humanity, they contribute to save the inherent brutalities of warfare from degenerating into unmitigated savagery. There may even be advantages in working for a degree of uniformity among the manuals as they are issued in the different countries. If undertaken, however, such a task ought to be referred to a conference in which both first and second rank powers are widely represented and also one which can command the talents both of professional soldiers and of publicists who have made the conduct of warfare a special study. And when the work is done there should be no illusions about its significance.

The Conference of Washington should spend no precious effort upon such a task as this. Not only is it ill-fitted for such work by its constitution, but it has vastly more important business to attend. The intended "rules for control of new agencies of warfare" have no real relation to the tremendous problems of the Pacific and the Far East, nor are they more than superficially relevant to the problem of armaments. Within the scope of these major topics there is enough of opportunity as well as responsibility. There will be no real disappointment if the Conference should contribute nothing to the code which Richard Hooker long ago described as "the laws of arms, which yet are better known than kept."

EDWIN D. DICKINSON.

A Baedeker to the Conference

THE grand trunk highway to the Disarmament camp-meeting in Washington, as some who have watched bandwagon after bandwagon roll by have seen, is not without curves and grades. In the five months since Senator Borah first opened the road to disarmament with his "naval holiday" amendment to the navy appropriation bill, they have seen the American bandwagon rollicking both downgrade and upgrade, the Japanese speeding up to keep pace, the British veering off toward a lesser camp, but winding around eventually to the middle of the broad road.

That Borah "naval holiday" resolution, if it deserves a place among the milestones to Camp Disarmament, does so because it was the first brief sign to catch the public's eye. The administration claims its intentions antedated the Borah idea, but the administration was weak in signs. The first milestone to catch the public eye was the Borah resolution, simple, sans Pacific problems, or other accoutrements, through which Congress declared:

> The President is authorized and requested to invite the Governments of Great Britain and Japan to send representatives to a conference, which shall be charged with the duty of promptly entering into an understanding or agreement by which the naval programs of each of said governments, to wit, the United States, Great Britain and Japan, shall be substantially reduced annually during the next five years to such an extent and upon such terms as may be agreed upon, which understanding and agreement is to be reported to the respective governments for approval.

That brief reminder from Congress to the President focussed attention upon naval disarmament. It was followed by a State Department announcement that "the President, in view of the farreaching importance of the question of limitation of armament, has approached with informal but definite inquiries the group of powers heretofore known as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, that is, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, to ascertain whether it would be agreeable to them to take part in a conference on this subject to be held in Washington at a time to be mutually agreed upon."

> If the proposal is found to be acceptable, formal invitations for such a conference will be issued. It is manifest that the question of limitation of armament has a close relation to the Pacific and Far Eastern problems, and the President has suggested that the powers especially interested in these problems should undertake in connection with this conference the consideration of all matters bearing upon their solution with a view to reaching a common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the Far East. This has been communicated to the powers concerned and China has also been invited to take part in the discussion relating to Far Eastern problems.

Obviously, that milestone greatly enlarged upon the mere "naval holiday" idea. As a competent government spokesman amplified this formal statement, "the administration looked out over all horizons and the only international situation which threatened war of importance in the next forty years was that in the Far East. We resolved, if possible, to remove the causes of friction between the nations out there on the Pacific." The reaction to this step was magnetic. As expressed by the press and letters to the White House, the public looked forward to successful accomplishment at Washington of everything undertaken, but only partially done by the Paris Peace Conference, the League of Nations and the Hague Tribunal. This was one of the curves on the highway to Camp Disarmament, which the President and the Secretary of State look back upon as most dangerous. They felt and still feel that the American nation expected too much from the Conference. Another dangerous curve was that round-

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ed when the British proposal to hold an advance conference with the United States and possibly with Japan was headed off without loss of amity. Yet another is revealed in the State Department memorandum to the Imperial Japanese government forestalling efforts to limit the scope and tie the hands of the Conference, almost before it was called. That memorandum follows:

> The Government of the United States deeply appreciates the readiness of the Imperial Japanese Government to accept the invitation to attend the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments.
>
> The Secretary of State of the United States in the course of informal conversations with His Excellency, the Imperial Japanese Ambassador at Washington, has expressed the hope that the Imperial Japanese Government would not press its inquiry as to the nature and scope of the Pacific and Far Eastern problems to be discussed at the proposed conference in view of the fact that it is desirable that the full acceptance of the invitation of the American government leave this matter open for adjustment in the precise agenda to be arrived at later.
>
> The Secretary of State is willing to proceed with exchanges of opinion regarding the agenda prior to the meeting of the conference. He considers it inadvisable, however, at the present moment to hamper the program and in particular to delay the arrangements for the conference pending an agreement regarding this matter.

That was on July 23rd, and a few days later, the Japanese government replied by unconditionally agreeing to accept an American invitation to a conference, the agenda of which, it was suggested, should be outlined in advance. The Japanese reply was:

> It has been brought to the knowledge of the Japanese Government that the Government of the United States is willing to proceed with exchanges of opinion regarding the agenda prior to the meeting of the conference and that it considers it advisable to adjust in that agenda the nature and scope of the Pacific and Far Eastern questions to be discussed at the proposed conference. The Japanese Government, on that understanding, are happy to be able to inform the American Government that it is their intention gladly to accept an invitation for a conference which shall embrace the discussion of the Pacific and Far Eastern questions.
>
> The Japanese Government have been made aware through the communications and published statement of the American Government and the conversations between the Secretary of State and Baron Shidehara that the proposition of the American Government to discuss the Pacific and Far Eastern problems is based on the close bearing they have on the question of limitation of armaments which is the original and principal aim of the conference, and that therefore, the main object of discussing these problems is to reach a common understanding in regard to general principles and policies in the Pacific and the Far East. Desiring, as they do, to contribute to the establishment of an enduring peace and to the advancement of human welfare, the Japanese Government earnestly hope that the proposed conference may attain the expected results and their ideals may be thereby brought nearer to realization.
>
> In order to ensure the success of the conference, the Japanese Government deem it advisable that the agenda thereof should be arranged in accordance with the main object of the discussions as above defined, and that introduction therein of problems such as are of sole concern to certain particular powers or such matters that may be regarded as accomplished facts should be scrupulously avoided.

A month after the calling of the Conference had been officially announced, informal negotiations had brought the governments of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy to general agreement on agenda, purpose of the meeting, and the date for opening the Conference in Washington, Armistice Day, November 11th, enabling the President, on August 11th, to issue the formal invitations. The texts, one of which follows, plainly revealed that the disarmament idea had grown to proportions where, despite the alarm of Senator Borah over the enlargement of the purpose of the Conference, the President and Secretary Hughes could see almost limitless possibilities in the Conference they were to guide, though, as the invitation said, "the question of naval armament may naturally have first place." The text of the invitations to Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy, which were identical, follows:

> The President is deeply gratified at the cordial response to his suggestion that there should be a Conference on the subject of Limitation of Armaments, in connection with which the Pacific and Far Eastern questions should also be discussed.
>
> Productive labor is staggering under an economic burden too heavy to be borne unless the present vast public expenditures are greatly reduced. It is idle to look for stability, or the assurance of social justice, or the security of peace, while wasteful and unproductive outlays deprive effort of its just reward and defeat the reasonable expectation of progress. The enormous disbursements in the rivalries of armaments manifestly constitute the greater part of the encumbrance upon enterprise and national prosperity; and avoidable or extravagant expense of this nature is not only without economic justification, but is a constant menace to the peace of the world rather than an assurance of its preservation. Yet there would seem to be no ground to expect the halting of these increasing outlays unless the Powers most largely concerned find a satisfactory basis for an agreement to effect their limitation. The time is believed to be opportune for these Powers to approach this subject directly and in conference; and while, in the discussion of limitation of armament, the question of naval armament may naturally have first place, it has been thought best not to exclude questions pertaining to other armament to the end that all practicable measures of relief may have appropriate consideration. It may also be found advisable to formulate proposals by which in the interest of humanity the use of new agencies of warfare may be suitably controlled.
>
> It is, however, quite clear that there can be no final assurance of the peace of the world in the absence of the desire for peace, and the prospect of reduced armaments is not a hopeful one unless this desire finds expression in a practical effort to remove causes of misunderstanding and to seek ground for agreement as to principles and their application. It is the earnest wish of this government that through an interchange of views with the facilities afforded by the conference, it may be possible to find a solution of Pacific and Far Eastern problems, of unquestioned importance at this time, that is, such common understandings with respect to matters which have been and are of international concern as may serve to promote enduring friendship among our peoples.
>
> It is not the purpose of this Government to attempt to define the scope of the discussion in relation to the Pacific and Far East, but rather to leave this to be the subject of suggestions to be exchanged before the meeting of the Conference, in the expectation that the spirit of friendship and a cordial appreciation of the impor-

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tance of the elimination of sources of controversy, will govern the final question.

Accordingly, in pursuance of the proposal which has been made, and in the light of the gracious indication of its acceptance, the President invites the Government of Great Britain to participate in a Conference on the subject of Limitation of Armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions will also be discussed, to be held in Washington on the 11th day of November, 1921.

The invitation to the Chinese government, cabled at the same time, was identical except that the second paragraph, alluding to disarmament, was omitted from this text, and the closing paragraph invited the Republic of China to participate only in the discussion of the Pacific and Far Eastern questions.

France was the first to accept formally the American invitation with a brief note communicated to the American Ambassador in Paris. The Chinese government at Peking also expressed hearty approval with the purpose of the Conference, commending the American government in that efforts to limit the scope of the parley had been forestalled. And finally, Great Britain's reply, forwarded through the medium of Ambassador Harvey, expressed the hope that all parties would approach the Conference in a spirit of courage, friendliness and mutual understanding.

The lengthy reply of the Japanese Minister, accepting the invitation to the Limitation of Armaments Conference, stressed three points; first, satisfaction that the United States had taken the lead for reduction of arms burdens; second, Japan's eagerness to remove causes of international misunderstandings; and third, Japanese vital interests in the affairs of the Far East. The Japanese note follows:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 13th of this month in which you intimate the gratification of the President of the United States at the cordial response which has been accorded to his suggestion of a conference on the subject of limitation of armament and cognate topics and in which you communicate the President's invitation to this Government to participate in such a conference to be held in Washington on the 11th of November next on the subject of limitation of armament in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions will also be discussed.

In communicating to you for transmission to the President the hearty and appreciative acceptance of this invitation by the Japanese Government, I would ask you to be good enough in the first place to say to Mr. Harding with what pleasure the Government see him take the initiative in this all important matter; his great office, the pacific traditions of your Republic, and his own high personal qualifications invest his act with a personal appropriateness which must be universally felt and recognized.

The peace and welfare of the world have long been a chronic object of solicitude to the Japanese Government and people. That attitude has not remained a platonic policy—it has been followed out in action. It results naturally from this pacific attitude toward world problems, that government and people alike should warmly welcome the idea of limitation of armaments, and the removal of the deadening burden on industry and cultural development which swollen and competitive armament creates.

This Government is also completely sympathetic to the valuable suggestion advanced in your note, that it may be well and desirable that the use of novel agencies of warfare should be controlled.

The discussion and removal of any causes of misunderstanding which may exist, and the arrival at an eventual agreement with regard to general principles and their application which will ensure friendship and good mutual understanding between the nations, are regarded as of great value and importance. My Government would emphasize the preeminently vital interest which Japan has in the preservation of the peace of the Pacific and the Far East. She has devoted her utmost efforts toward securing its permanence and its maintenance might well be to her a matter of prime concern. She therefore, finds it to accord entirely with her utmost desires, to reach in conference a measure of understanding which shall ensure peace being placed once and for all upon a permanent basis in these regions. It is earnestly hoped, therefore, in Japan, that the conference will secure really useful results and prove a practical success.

The Japanese Government gladly concur in the proposal of the United States Government that the scope of the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern problems shall be made the subjects for a free exchange of views prior to the assembly of the conference. They hope that the agenda of the conference will in this way be arranged in harmony with the suggestion made in the memorandum of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs of July 26, 1921, bearing on the same subject, in order that the labors of the conference may meet speedily with the fullest measure of successful achievement.

The undersigned cannot conclude without again expressing the thorough and hearty sympathy of his Government with the thesis, so clearly and justly stated in your note, of the crushing encumbrance and menace which modern armaments present to civilization. No efforts can be too unremitting to reduce that menace and encumbrance. In the fullest consciousness of this fact, the initiative of the President of the United States is warmly welcomed and deeply appreciated, and I would ask you so to assure the President.

The Italian reply, the last to come, for unexplained reasons was not made public by the State Department. Interest by this time, however, was centred in a new series of communications, the requests of other powers interested in the Far East for participation in the conference. The first, that of the unrecognized Far-Eastern Republic of Siberia, was refused, but out of that refusal developed the following State Department policy toward Russian interests on the Pacific:

In the absence of a single, recognized Russian Government the protection of legitimate Russian interests must devolve as a moral trusteeship upon the whole Conference. It is regrettable that the Conference, for reasons quite beyond the control of the participating Powers, is to be deprived of the advantage of Russian cooperation in its deliberations, but it is not to be conceived that the Conference will take decisions prejudicial to legitimate Russian interests or which would in any manner violate Russian rights. It is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the Conference will establish general principles of international action which will deserve and have the support of the people of Eastern Siberia and of all Russia by reason of their justice and efficacy in the settlement of outstanding difficulties.

Belgium, Portugal and Holland were more successful. In identical invitations, sent on October 4th, they were invited to participate in the Washington Conference on Pacific problems, which they promptly accepted. The invitations extended them read:

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The invitation of the President of the United States to the Governments of France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan to send representatives to a Conference to be held in the city of Washington on November 11, 1921, on the subject of Limitation of Armaments, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions will be also be discussed, has been graciously accepted. The Government of China has also been pleased to accept the President's invitation to participate in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions.

It is the earnest wish of this Goverment that with the facilities afforded by a Conference it may be possible to find a solution of the Pacific and Far Eastern problems, by a practical effort to reach such common understandings with respect to matters which have been and are of international concern as may serve to promote enduring friendship.

In view of the interest of Belgium in the Far East, the President desires to invite your Excellency's Government to participate in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions at the Conference, and I have the honor to enclose herewith the tentative suggestions as to the agenda of the Conference, relating to the Pacific and Far Eastern questions, proposed by the Government of the United States.

In the meantime, informal discussion of agenda, between the participating governments, had been making some headway, and on September 21st, the State Department, to correct impressions created by press dispatches from abroad on what purported to be the official text of the agenda, issued the following outline of topics:

LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS:

One: Limitation of Naval Armament, under which shall be discussed, (a) Basis of limitation; (b) Extent; (c) Fulfillment.

Two: Rules for control of new agencies of warfare.

Three: Limitation of land armament.

PACIFIC AND FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS:

One: Questions relating to China: first: Principles to be applied; second: Application of Subjects; (a) Territorial integrity; (b) Administrative integrity; (c) Open door—equality of commercial and industrial opportunity; (d) Concessions, monopolies or preferential economic privileges; (e) Development of railways, including plans relating to Chinese Eastern Railway; (f) Preferential railroad rates; and (g) Status of existing commitments.

Two: Siberia (similar headings).

Three: Mandated Islands (unless questions earlier settled); Electrical Communications in the Pacific.

Under the heading "Status of Existing Commitments" it is expected that opportunity will be afforded to consider and to reach an understanding with respect to unsettled questions involving the nature and scope of commitments under which claims of rights may hereafter be asserted.

This practically completed the formal communications relative to the calling of the Conference, except for the following letter from Senator Don Beltran Mathieu, Ambassador of Chile, and Dean of the Latin-American diplomatic corps, offering the Pan-American building and the support of the Pan-American Union for the Washington Conference. His offer was accepted at once. It read:

It affords me great pleasure to inform Your Excellency that my honorable colleagues of the Pan-American Union have authorized me to write to Your Excellency and let you know that they would be very glad if Your Excellency will use the building in which the Union has its headquarters to hold the meetings of the forthcoming Conference on the Limitation of Armament, providing that Your Excellency should find it suitable for the purpose.

In making this offer, the members of the Union believe that the Government of the United States, in calling the Conference, has interpreted an aspiration common to all Republics of the American Continent and that its success—which they ardently hope for—will correspond not only to economic interests but also (which is more important) to the high morals that have inspired it and which they strongly endorse.

Replying, Secretary Hughes, after thanking the Pan-American Union for the gracious offer of the most beautiful assembly hall in the United States, said:

Not only is this building admirably adapted for this purpose, but the sentiment which has inspired this generous proposal cannot fail to meet with the most cordial response from all our people. It must be recognized that the republics of this continent have a deep interest in the success of this effort to lighten the burdens of armament and to secure, through a better understanding among nations, the maintenance of peace and of the essential conditions of our common prosperity.

Some observers feel that the selection of the various delegations, however, throws more light upon the spirit and motives behind governments participating in the Reduction of Arms Conference than do warm diplomatic phrases. This being true, the British and Japanese personnel may be taken as good omens for the success of the Conference. They are hailed as strong, commendable selections. If that cannot be said of the American delegation, it can at least be accepted that the Americans were chosen for business, the business of carrying through the United States Senate whatever pact is the outcome of the Conference.

At least one-half of the delegation was chosen for that purpose, with the shrewd sanction of Secretary Hughes, who enters the Conference in the difficult rôle of combattant simultaneously to two different groups of opponents. He must deal cards in two games at the same time, as it were, the more important one with alert visiting delegations, and the minor but more difficult contest that with the ever suspicious United States Senate. As foreigners see our delegation, and as political minded Americans see it, that is the outstanding feature of its position. On Mr. Hughes and his cohorts rests the major responsibility for guiding the Conference, yet they may not assume the offensive aggressively, for fear of senatorial repudiation. The most they can say of Charles E. Hughes, chief American spokesman, former lawyer, governor, judge, Presidential candidate, counsel, Secretary of State, is the oft-heard remark, "They will pull no wool over his eyes." The least to be said is that his precarious political position, with relation to the Senate, will oblige him to permit Premier Lloyd George to assume the dominant leadership of the Conference.

Turn to the British delegation. When it arrives in Washington to establish headquarters at the old Lafayette Hotel and the new Hadleigh, all eyes will be centred upon "The Right Honourable David Lloyd George, O. M., Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury," as the State Department catalogs him. A catch-phrase has swept Washington and become an axiom almost, that "if Lloyd George comes to the Conference, it will succeed; if he doesn't, it means that there is not a chance of limiting armament." To the British observer, the success of

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the Conference means a new lease of political life for Lloyd George, the alert opportunist, the statesman, always with an ear to the ground for public sentiment, veteran of many an international round-table, with a reputation for winning what Britain wants. The remark, "Well, the British got what they wanted at Paris," regardless of the percentage of truth or untruth it contains, bodes ill for Lloyd George's leadership in Washington, Britishers are predicting.

The British delegation will be unique among others at the Conference in that participants in each session will be chosen from the panel of eight delegates, four from England and four from the colonies. On many questions the latter group is expected to exercise authority quite independent of the former. Lloyd George's leading colleague from England will be Arthur J. Balfour, Lord President of the Council, septuagenarian scholar, author, and handy man at public affairs, when conservatives are in demand. However, according to British informants, the "pinch hitter" for Lloyd George at the Washington Conference, will not be Balfour, but Sir Auckland Geddes, British Ambassador at Washington, and trusted lieutenant of the Prime Minister. Lord Lee of Fareham, First Lord of the Admiralty, occupies the position least definitely clear of any of the delegates of Great Britain.

Of the colonial British delegates, Sir Robert Borden, former Prime Minister of Canada, comes nearer than any other to personifying the average American political leader. A power in Canadian politics for years, he comes to Washington leaving an election in his wake. That election may serve as the first opportunity for expression of popular sentiment on the work of the Conference in session at Washington. From Australia comes Senator George F. Pearce, Australian Minister of Defense, a man of toil who has worked up from the ranks of day labor, sent to Washington, it is said, because Prime Minister Hughes, his chief, after long absence at the many Paris conferences, must repair political fences. The same is true of Sir J. W. Salmond, New Zealand Supreme Court Justice, an internationally known jurist, but in Washington as spokesman for Prime Minister Massey. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, member of the Vice-Regal Council of the Government of India, is an enigma politically even to British observers, who recognize in him so far only a recognized Hindoo barrister of English culture and training. The personnel of the British technical and advisory staff, as this is written, is unavailable from any authoritative source.

The other delegation of the "Big Three," as Great Britain, Japan and the United States are rapidly becoming known in connection with the Washington Conference, was chosen early. The Japanese cabled to Washington weeks ago a list of more than one hundred names, their delegates and experts. Apparently they were not so taken by surprise at the American call to reduce arms as reports indicated. Premier Takashi Hara, the man of the plain people, the "Japanese Lloyd George," as some of his countrymen choose to describe him, though not coming to Washington himself, is sending what is deemed a strong delegation. In many respects Premier Hara's position is that of Lloyd George. Japanese forerunners of the official delegation say that Premier Hara's political tenure will be determined by the outcome of the Washington Conference. If it fails to find a basis for reducing Japan's armament and for eliminating the bugaboo of threatening war across the Pacific, the Premier and his party, the Sei Yukai, are expected to fall. This is the test of the liberal party in Japan, which the Nipponese delegation represents, according to Japanese.

Japan's three delegates, Prince Iyesato Tokugawa, President of the House of Peers; Vice-Admiral Tomosaburo Kato, Minister of the Marine, and Baron Kijuro Shidehara, Ambassador to Washington, have equal status at the Conference, their government is careful to explain. However, Prince Tokugawa is looked upon as their dean, if not chief. His selection is regarded in Japan as a stroke of diplomacy for Premier Hara. Direct successor of the Shogunate family, in feudal Japan the fighting clan of Nippon, Prince Tokugawa for half a century has spurned political appointments, hearkening to the advice of his family rather than to the call of the Emperor to political office. A wealthy landowner, he has been Japan's leading figure for benevolent and pacific movements ever since his graduation from Cambridge University in England. Though a leading liberal, he has shunned political appointments, until prevailed upon to join Japan's delegation to Washington.

Vice-Admiral Kato, though affiliated with the liberal movement in Japan, represents the naval point of view. He is described as an able statesman by Japanese in Washington. His influence with the militarists in Japan is great, and he is depended upon to "sell" reduction of armament to the militarists of his country if this Conference is successful, just as Senators Lodge and Underwood must convince their senatorial colleagues of the merits of the pact expected to grow out of parleys this winter. The Japanese consider Baron Shidehara an independent in politics, their diplomatic appointments being independent of party. Ambassador Shidehara, a comparatively young man, under fifty years of age, is credited with possessing a more expert knowledge of the English language, as it is written, than any other foreign diplomat at the American capital. Previous to his Washington post Baron Shidehara served as minister to Belgium, and later as Under-Secretary of foreign affairs.

The Japanese have engaged extensive quarters at the Shoreham and Powhatan hotels for their expert staff of more than a hundred members. Prominent in that imposing list is Sennusuke Yokota, Field Marshal for Premier Hara in party politics, and Masanao Hanihara, Vice-Minister of foreign affairs, long a resident of Washington, where his fellow citizens say he is the only oriental diplomat to have acquired with ease and nicety the American way of administering a slap on the back, that absolute requisite to the word good-bye in local political circles. Recognized in Japanese are also Tsuneo Matsudaira, foreign office American and European expert; Kiroku Hayashi, councillor of the foreign office; Toru Takao, Consul General, Masunosuke Odagiri, Director of the Yokohama Specie Bank, and champion in Japan for the Consortium.

Prime Minister Aristide Briand, who is also French Minister of Foreign Affairs, will head the delegation for France. Extensive accommodations at the Hotel Willard indicate that the French will match the British and Japanese contingents in numbers at least. M. Briand, long active in French politics, radical spokesman in his earlier days, still a recognized liberal, would be expected to match wits with Lloyd George, as occurs at Supreme Council parleys, except for the uncertainty of his position at home, where the French Prime Minister is constantly menaced by leaders of a more militaristic point of view. M. René Viviani, second of the French delegation, is credited by his people with having made valuable connec-

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tions with American political leaders in the course of his visit to the United States earlier this year. He is a former Prime Minister. M. Albert Sarraut, Minister of Colonies, is France's leading spokesman on Far Eastern affairs for the delegation, while M. Jules Jusserand, French Ambassador to Washington, is credited with knowing and understanding American ideas and politics better than any other foreign diplomatist in this country. M. Philippe Berthelot, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office, will serve as secretary to the delegation. The French technical staff is uncompleted, as this is written, and perhaps the most influential of the French advisers, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, former generalissimo of the Allied Armies, will serve in an unofficial capacity.

In contrast to the policies of Japan, Great Britain, and to a certain extent, France, where success of the Conference is gambled upon as political planks with which to bolster up existing organizations, Italy has been seeking to appoint a colorless delegation which will not be affected by the coming elections, that is, colorless so far as internal politics are concerned. Officially the State Department had not been notified of the selection of an Italian delegation, when this unofficial list was cited as the probable Italian roll at Washington: Signor Carlo Schanzer, ex-minister of Finance, chairman; Deputy Filippo Medo, leader of the Catholic Party; Senator Abertino, editor of Corriere de la Sera, Milan's powerful Socialist daily, and Signor Rolandi-Ricci, Ambassador to Washington.

Formal naming of the Chinese delegation is likewise delayed by internal strife between the Peking and Canton governments. The latter, though unrecognized, is desired to participate in the Washington Conference by the white nations, at least. The probable but unofficial list of Chinese delegates would include Dr. Alfred Sze, Minister to Washington—a Cornell graduate, by the way, well versed in American habits and politics; Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Minister to Great Britain, and chief of the Chinese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference; Wang Chung-hui, Chief Justice of the Chinese Supreme Court, and C. C. Wu, son of Wu Ting-Fang, former minister to the United States. The latter delegate is expected to provide the liaison with the Canton government, if the latter will permit Wu's appointment to the delegation. The Peking government's reservation at the Cairo Hotel in Washington is sufficient for a numerous body of Chinese officials, once China's internal strife enables the government in power to formally name its delegation.

As yet the delegations of the lesser powers, Belgium, Holland and Portugal have been but unofficially named. They are, for Belgium, Baron de Cartier de Marchienne, Ambassador to Washington, Felician Cattier, prominent Belgian banker, and Jules Jabot, engineer, long with the Belgian Railways of China. Holland's prospective delegation includes the name of H. A. Van Karnebeek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Belaerts van Blokland, Secretary of the Foreign Office, and former Minister to China, and Dr. E. Moresco, Secretary of the Ministry of the Colonies, and former vice-president of the Dutch East Indian Council. Portugal semi-officially announced her delegation to consist of Mello Barreto, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ferreira da Rocha, Minister of Finance, and Augusto de Vasconcelor, former Prime Minister, but no confirmation of this list had been received when this was written, since the overthrow of the government in Lisbon on October 19th to 20th.

So much for personnel. If the barometer of success for achieving settlement of Pacific problems and reducing armaments bears any relation to the quality of "best minds" gathered in Washington by November 11, prospects are good. It should be borne in mind, also, that the "best minds" will not be limited to invited guests to Washington. Practically every nation, small or large, from Galicia to Korea, will be represented in Washington by delegates, who may be denied the floor of the Pan-American Union and the use of the elaborate press accommodations for newspapermen of all nationalities in the Navy Building across the street but as long as funds last, they will not be refused the use of the United States mails, Washington hotels, and in all probability the forum of the United States Senate, where no question is too large, too remote, or too complex to be aired by some Senator. In this respect, Washington is rapidly becoming a second Paris, but unlike Paris, Washington, blinking in the spotlight, as centre of the world for the first time in history holds open house for every guest who can pay his bills, be he invited or uninvited, distinguished or disgruntled. Business is business in Washington.

FRANK J. TAYLOR.

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MR. HECTOR C. BYWATER'S contribution to the study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem* is in no sense a war book. To a remarkable extent the effort to treat both sides impartially seems to succeed, with the weight of the writer's influence tending toward peace rather than war. The book deals mainly with the naval resources of the two powers and the strategical problems likely to arise in the event of a war for the mastery of the Pacific. The chapters on naval matters, however, are of necessity prefaced by a brief review of the principal questions at issue between the two governments. The first chapter amplifies this review by an account of the gravitation of naval power from West to East, the decline of the British navy compared to American prospects, the arrival of the United States Pacific Fleet in 1919, the growing prestige of the Japanese navy, the plans of the British colonies in the Far East, and the shifting of British interests since the war to the Pacific, where she cannot be indifferent to the efforts of any foreign power to establish an absolute mastery.

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* Sea Power in the Pacific; by Hector C. Bywater. Houghton Mifflin. $5.00.

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Statistics are given to show that the opinions prevailing abroad in regard to the supposed exorbitant price which America has to pay for her measure of sea-power are false, that in actual fact the main items of expense in the United States navy are no heavier than in England and in some important respects much lighter. For some years her battleships have been built at a lower cost than England's. The gravity of the limitation of docks on the Pacific side is pointed out. Until the improvements at Bemerton are completed—and Congress has not yet made appropriations for that, the author reminds us—the new Pacific fleet cannot be kept in good condition and repair even in peace, much less in war. From a strictly practical point of view the United States would be increasing the efficiency of the navy to a far greater degree by spending several millions on dockyards improvements than if the same amount were spent on new ships.

The personnel of the United States navy underwent a great expansion during the late war. On April 1, 1917, the establishment numbered 4,376 officers and 62,667 men; by November 1, 1918, it had increased to 10,400 officers and 220,000 men. Within the same period the naval reserve forces, practically non-existent in April, 1917, reached 20,000 officers and 285,000 men. But immediately after the Armistice rapid demobilization set in. Twelve months later the reserve had disappeared and the regular establishment had been reduced to 160,000 officers and men, insufficient to provide complements for the ships in commission. And though as a result of the efforts to remedy this crisis there was a marked improvement in naval recruiting, at the beginning of 1921 the personnel was still 20,000 or 30,000 below the authorized total and both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets were short-handed.

The strength of the United States navy in January 1921 including all completed ships on the official register is shown in the following table:

Dreadnought battleships	19	
Pre-Dreadnought battleships	18	
Armored cruisers	8	
Monitors	6	
Cruisers, first class	4	
Cruisers, second class	4	
Destroyers	300	
Submarines	115	
Gunboats	32	
Patrol vessels	60	
Submarine chasers	50	(about)
Tugs and minesweepers	100	
Fuel ships	35	
Special auxiliaries	51	

Vessels under construction to be completed before the end of 1923,

Dreadnought battleships	10
Battle cruisers	6
Scout cruisers	10
Destroyers	17
Submarines	39

The list shows the United States strong in heavy armored ships and weak in fast cruising ships. It has a large but not excessive complement of destroyers, a limited number of ocean-going submarines, and a reserve of auxiliary vessels adequate for home waters but wholly inadequate to supply a fleet operating at a great distance from its base. It would appear, then, that American naval policy hitherto has been aimed mainly at Atlantic and Caribbean strategy, and that little attempt has been made to forestall a war in the Pacific, where the conditions would be radically different.

Four chapters are given to the Japanese navy, its inception, growth and purpose, administration, dockyards, shipbuilding resources, men and ships, torpedo craft and air service. The Japanese naval administration was formerly modelled on the British system; but in recent years has been completely reorganized to resemble the German system before the war. Since the war the Japanese navy seems to have become the senior service, above the army. Naval officers have in late years gained a decided hand in national councils and policies, a fact not to be forgotten in considering the possibilities of Japanese naval expansion. The policy of Japan may be regarded ultimately not as defensive so much as offensive, since even the Japanese Year Book admits that "the object of expanding national armaments is primarily to guard our interests in Manchuria and China." Japan's ability to support herself with respect to steel seems not so certain as official reports would seem to indicate, but prospects seem good for sufficient production.

Japanese ship-building resources have grown prodigiously in the past few years, though the zenith of development has not been reached. They may be summarized as follows: Dockyards capable of building hulls, machinery and equipment for every type of warship, including dreadnoughts and battle cruisers, 4; dockyards of the same capacity up to and including cruisers, 4 (or 5); dockyards capable of building destroyers, submarines, minelayers and smaller craft, 10. This was up to 1920, but it is believed that in two or three years the position may be more than doubled. Since most of the technical difficulties have been overcome, Japanese naval expansion will in future be limited only by the amount of money available. In design, technical knowledge and construction, despite European suppositions to the contrary, Japanese shipbuilding can scarcely be said to be behind that of Europe; as may be said to be the case with regard to heavy guns, naval explosives, mines and submarines, which latter have been developed to meet special conditions in western Pacific waters.

At the close of the Great War the Japanese Naval Reserve numbered 38,000 officers and men, and by 1920 the total had risen above 41,000. The intention is to increase the reserve to 43,000 by 1922 and 45,000 by 1924. That will make a total of 127,000 officers and men, active and reservists. The strength and composition of the Japanese navy at the beginning of 1921 are set forth in the following table:

	Completed	Building and authorized
Dreadnought battleships	6	7
Battle cruisers	4	8
Pre-Dreadnought battleships	8	..
Armored cruisers	12	..
2nd class cruisers	17	16
Coast defense ships 1st class	3	..
Coast defense ships 2nd class	12	..
Gunboats	8	5
Destroyers 1st class	14	25
Destroyers 2nd class	36	20
Destroyers 3rd class	42	..
Torpedo boats 1st class	12	..
Torpedo boats 2nd class	8	..
Submarines	42	65 (or 76)

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The author follows this list with a detailed account of the important ships of the Japanese navy.

Japan has put special stress on torpedo building, and with the completion of all the vessels building or authorized to be built the Japanese torpedo flotilla will consist of thirty-seven first-class destroyers, and sixty-nine second-class destroyers. In organization and training methods the Japanese destroyer service is closely modelled on the German, the efficiency of which is admitted. Japanese seamen seem much less affected by the hardships of submarine service, and it is calculated that, with all conditions identically equal, a submarine manned by Japanese could remain at sea thirty percent longer than one manned by Westerners. The future submarine policy of Japan includes two distinct types, first, very large ocean-going cruisers of good speed, armed with two or more heavy quick firing guns and at least six torpedo tubes; second, smaller ocean-going vessels—averaging 1,000 tons displacement—of moderate speed, armed with two medium quick-firing guns and four or more torpedo tubes.

The peculiar atmospheric conditions of Japan and the fatalities connected with the ill-suited foreign-made machines, helped to retard the development of aviation in Japan. No large airship has up to the present been built in Japan or imported. The navy has from ten to fifteen small non-rigid airships, used as anti-submarine scouts and for gunnery control work The Naval Flying Corps in December, 1920, included 270 officer pilots and 160 officers under training. Moreover civilian flying is advancing rapidly; there are already ten aerodomes operated by private companies; and the three Aviation Societies—distinct from army and navy associations—have a membership of 14,000. It would seem probable therefore that at no distant date Japan will be one of the leading air powers of the world. What is more, the Japanese possess the advantage of experience with their peculiar atmosphere, where high winds, sudden variations and typhoons make flying possible only for the most practised airmen.

Mr. Hector C. Bywater's chapter on strategy in the Pacific considers first the division that has been made of the United States navy into two fleets that can be joined together without reorganization. Second, the relation of the Panama Canal to American naval strategy, which pivots on it; the defence of the canal, by sea batteries at each terminus, field works in the vicinity of the locks with a minimum of 7,000 men, and submarine flotillas at each terminus. War with Japan in the immediate future, he believes, would confront the American naval command with a task of extraordinary complexity. On the one hand a defensive war, with a loss of the possessions in the Pacific, a confession of defeat; on the other hand fighting under conditions so difficult that victory would be impossible. The capture of the Philippines as conditions stand at present would be easy for Japan. He discusses the fortifications now at Hawaii; the defence of Guam, now neglected, which he regards, with pages of statistical and authoritative support, as the most important item in the whole problem of the western Pacific. In contrast to these immense handicaps for the United States, the strategic position of Japan has a unique advantage. She is virtually impregnable to attack from the United States. She may reckon on an easy capture of the Philippines. She has the former German insular possessions near to Guam. She has a multitude of harbors, so that blockade would be improbable. The United States has no foothold in China to serve as a base. The whole of Honshu, the largest island of Japan, is practically served by the railway, which has even mounted guns on heavy trucks. Japan's reduction by the United States is regarded by the author as not among the probabilities to be discussed.

Among the probable features of a war in the Pacific Mr. Bywater discusses the probable loss within a fortnight of all American possessions in the western Pacific; the peace strength of the Japanese army, which by 1922 will be not less than 300,000 of all ranks, with a first line reserve of 250,000 and a second line of 1,150,000 men; the tremendous increase in the Japanese mercantile marine during the war, moving her up from the sixth to the third place among maritime countries, with a total of over 3,000,000 tons; and a disastrous blockade exercised at a distance by the American navy.

Political and economic factors conclude the book. In the first place it is pointed out that the Anglo-Japanese alliance would not hold, a fact coolly admitted by many of the Japanese and by their press, who are in favor of abandoning the alliance altogether as something farcical and without fruits. It would be necessary, as Japanese publicists have admitted, that Japan face alone the Pacific problem; she it not likely to have any hope of Chinese support, for China would be more apt to turn against Japan. The disparity between the economic resources of Japan and the United States is pointed out as enormous, and the corresponding disparity in the length of time that each country might hold out in a war is considered. There is also to be considered the relative poverty of Japan and her overtaxed people; the danger that has ensued from the moving of the people from the farms into the industrial towns and the corresponding decline in Japan's ability to feed herself, which she at present is unable to do without imports. But in spite of these and other dangers it is evident that a large section of the Japanese people, the military caste, the intellectuals and the men of business are enthusiastic supporters of armament and expansion, to which state of mind the press, with what seems to be government indulgence at least, loudly contributes.

To foreign observers it would seem that Japan has everything to lose and nothing to gain. She has already Formosa and Korea to solve her problem of over-population. She has in China plenty of room for her legitimate interests. It remains, then, to be seen, in the opinion of Mr. Bywater, whether her rulers and statesmen have sufficient acumen to seize the unique opportunity thus presented to them instead of hazarding the fortunes of Japan in a militarist gamble more reckless even than that which caused the ruin of the German Empire.

STARK YOUNG.

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